

PEACEFUL CHANGE
AND
THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

BY
BRYCE MARIAN WOOD, M.A.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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"For another thing, the date of a change, like that of a harvest, might have its influence upon the kind of fruit you got."

JULES ROMAINS, *Men of Good Will*,
Passion's Pilgrims.

PREFACE

This essay was sent to the printer before the outbreak of war in September, 1939. In revising the proofs, I have not thought it necessary to make any significant textual modifications, but I have, in a number of places, changed the tenses.

Thus far there has been no precise statement of war aims. Hence the problem of the retrocession of any of Germany's former colonies presumably remains where Mr. Malcolm MacDonald left it in December, 1938, when he said that "it is not now an issue in practical politics." At the end of the war, whichever side wins, the colonial issue is certain to reappear. Should the Allies win, it is not inconceivable that, in a peace conference with representatives of a non-Hitlerian Germany (assuming that they will be allowed to attend), Germany might be readmitted to the burdens and privileges of trusteeship over African territory.

The British and French would then have less fear of German power and they might have some hope that, if the way were prepared by a less drastic treaty, the missed opportunities of Locarno would knock once more. If the length of the war does make the Allies forget their early statements that they were not fighting the German people, some heed may be paid to those in England who will say that the colonial clauses of Versailles should not be perpetuated. Should this occur as part of a generally liberal settlement, favorable conditions will have been created for beginning the exploration of some of the difficulties attending the organization of peaceful change.

As one of its Pre-Doctoral Field Fellows, I am greatly indebted to the Social Science Research Council for making it possible for me to spend a year in Europe in furtherance of this study. I wish to thank Professors Lindsay Rogers, Philip C. Jessup, Nathaniel Peffer and James T. Shotwell of Columbia University, and Professors George Bernard Noble and Charles McKinley of Reed College, for their suggestions and criticism. They of course have no responsibility for what is expressed in the following pages.

B. W.

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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF PEACEFUL CHANGE

AFTER twenty years of berated existence the world settlement of 1919 has been broken up. The Polish denunciation of the minorities treaty, the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, and the partition of Czechoslovakia were successfully engineered attacks upon the régime of Versailles which were only feebly parried by the principal beneficiaries of the Treaty. The post-war epoch has come to an end, and the foundations of a new period are now being laid.

The system of Versailles, while world-wide in its territorial adjustments, was limited in its economic clauses to restrictions upon the freedom of the defeated states.¹ The methods of cooperative provisioning developed by the Allied Maritime Transport Council were not considered appropriate for peacetime adoption,² and, while individual agreements such as the San Remo oil-sharing pact were occasionally negotiated, the rules according to which the earth's wealth has been exploited

1 There are, however, minor exceptions as, for example, the provisions for the maintenance of the open door in "B" mandates.

2 See on this, A. E. Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (London, Macmillan, 1936), where the responsibility for the discontinuing of this work is placed upon Mr. Herbert Hoover, p. 157 ff. See also Sir Arthur Salter, *Allied Shipping Control* (London, Oxford U. Press, 1921); and Etienne Clémentel, *La France et la Politique Économique Interalliée* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires, 1931). M. Clémentel reports in detail (p. 313 ff.) the meeting of the Raw Materials Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on April 4, 1919 in which Mr. Baruch and Lord Robert Cecil for the United States and Great Britain, opposed the continuation of the economic cooperation developed during the War. M. Clémentel, for France, strongly favored the maintenance of coöperation, saying that it was necessary "in order to give to all, even to the enemy peoples, a just portion of necessary products," p. 315. In his observations on the results of this meeting, M. Clémentel pointedly says: "We consider that by reason of this error, the peace is incomplete," p. 318.

and distributed remained substantially unchanged by the Treaty. The third of the Fourteen Points called for equality of trade conditions and tariff reductions, but it was not applied, and in any case it had little chance against the prevalent enthusiasm for ideas of self-determination. In face of the need for a rapid settlement of boundary questions, and what was felt to be the all-important problem of dealing with Germany, the less urgent matter of international economic order was shelved.

The failure of the League of Nations' International Economic Conference of 1927 to do more than register the protest of the assembled experts against the trend toward economic nationalism, marked the failure of the principal post-war attempt to remove restrictions and regain relative freedom of trade. There was no economic society, no organized sense of common solidarity with respect to the availability either of raw materials or of markets.³

In spite of the prevalence of this practice of national self-help in commercial affairs, Europe, for some ten years after Versailles, appeared to be politically stable. There were pacts to supplement the basic law of the Covenant of the League, and the prevailing German policy was expressed in Stresemann's doctrine of fulfillment. The forceful disturbance of the territorial stipulations of the Treaties was out of the question so long as the disarmament provisions were observed by Germany. A period of peace seemed assured. It was not a peace to which all parties consented with equal satisfaction, but it was peace and it seemed to promise order; it was a comprehensive settlement, and after four years of fear and suffering, many men looked to it for security.

After 1933 fear returned, and the sense of security which followed Locarno disappeared. The league to carry out the treaties lost its functions; the league to outlaw war was in disrepute; and the league for international cooperation re-

³ The persistent Italian protests on these grounds should be noted. See G. de Michelis, *World Reorganization on Corporative Lines* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1935).

quired an atmosphere of mutual confidence in which to do its best work.⁴

War, as war, was dreaded in many quarters, apart from considerations of victory or defeat. Many people who had never heard of *The Great Illusion*, had read frequently enough that a new war would mean the end of Western civilization, so that, whatever their concern for civilization, they were at least afraid of the personal consequences of another conflict. And, to the extent to which war, as such, was feared, far-reaching modifications in national policy might have been expected. The desire to avoid war has always had some effect upon diplomacy, but until recently, when important issues were contested, the primary consideration has ordinarily been the probability of final victory. In so far as war itself is regarded as a disaster, to that extent the urge to avoid war will be stronger than in the past, and policy will be correspondingly redirected.

In 1919 men were determined that there should be no more war. Since they had just completed a re-ordering of power relationships, they were hopeful, in spite of various dissatisfactions, that the new settlement could be peacefully upheld, if sufficient force were obviously concentrated in favor of its maintenance. Although Article 19 of the Covenant conceded the possibility that a reconsideration of treaty relationships might later be thought advisable, and although there was some expectation that the League, and time, would soothe the most stinging irritations, the predominant concern was with the maintenance of the *status quo*. The better world for which millions of men had died had been given shape, and it had to be defended. There was also a more tangible reason for fortifying the new or regained outposts. Germany had not been crushed, nor had she been accepted as a cooperating member of the family of nations. While the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies, for example, showed a marked diver-

⁴ For these three leagues in one, see A. E. Rappard, *International Relations as Viewed from Geneva* (New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1925), p. 9.

gence of opinion as to which of these two courses should have been taken, the warnings from right and left all pointed to the necessity for continued military preparedness to guard a peace which was neither sufficiently harsh to guarantee submission, nor so lenient as to assure friendly cooperation.⁵ Unofficial, pre-1919 projects for international organization had envisaged collective action to maintain the peace settlement by making it too dangerous to question its validity by appeal to arms. The plan for a League to Enforce Peace, for example, provided for joint military effort against any state that should go to war before submitting a dispute either to a judicial tribunal or to a council of conciliation.⁶

The subsequent efforts to supplement the provisions of Article 16, to close the gap in the Covenant, to define the aggressor, or to organize a system of regional pacts within the League's orbit, were all variations upon the *motif* of mutual aid against aggression.⁷ This very preoccupation with security, however, implied that security had not been obtained.

So far as peace is the avoidance of war, peace was present; but peace as defined by mutual confidence, and a high threshold against fear, did not exist. Outwardly the world was at peace but that inner maximum of serenity concerning the future which is the essence of peace, was rarely to be found. This international peace which was yet not peaceful endured in Europe down to 1939. Japan and China are fighting, and Italy has subjugated Ethiopia, and there was an actual declaration of war between Paraguay and Bolivia; but in Europe, where the greatest energy was held in leash, there was no such outbreak, and the formal peace was observed.

⁵ See remarks by deputies quoted in George Bernard Noble, *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919* (New York, Macmillan, 1935), p. 398 ff.

⁶ See *Enforced Peace* (New York, League to Enforce Peace, 1916), pp. 189-90.

⁷ The General Act for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the Optional Clause, and the Paris Pact are in a different category, as they merely offer various procedures of peaceful settlement, or provide more or less complete promises of pacific action.

Informally, however, anxiety and mistrust increased.⁸ The attempt to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy through agreement to take common military measures against an aggressor failed. Preeminence in armaments was lost by the states which considered themselves to have the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, and the Third Reich continuously made disquieting demands for suitable recognition of its brusquely acquired strength. In the face of a general disinclination to risk war, some of Germany's claims were satisfied, and after 1935 there was a greatly increased interest in the principle, boldly expressed in Colonel House's draft of the Covenant, but only hinted at in Article 19; a principle which is known under the name of "peaceful change."⁹

There is almost universal interest in peaceful change; nearly everyone can agree that it would be a "good thing," but there are apparently important divergences of emphasis which come to light when precision in meaning is sought. The tendency of most Germans, for example, was to fix upon the word "change" and to enlarge upon those variations of this theme which might be peacefully exploited. A similar attitude might have been encountered in Poland, although there would probably have been disagreement on the nature of the desired

8 No attempt is made here to explain this development. It is desired only to show that the possibility of the enforcement of peace was being questioned.

9 It should be noted that Colonel House here contemplated territorial change only. See text of his Article 20 in Charles Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1928), vol. iv, p. 35. President Wilson's conception of the need for making adjustments in the peace settlement was also much broader than the terms of Article 19. It is interesting to speculate whether, if his views had been written into the Covenant, the process of treaty modification would have been accelerated. On the one hand, the existence of a more easily employable Article 19 might have facilitated the formal presentation of claims for revision. On the other hand, the effective application of Article 19 required only the desire to make adjustments on the part of the ex-Allies. Had the desire been there, the technical obstacles would have been overcome. It seems probable that there were other and more important obstacles (to be discussed later) to the changing of the Treaty.

changes. Still another reaction in the discussion of this phrase was met with in England, or France, where paramount significance was attached to the term "peaceful," and, while changes were admitted to be necessary, efforts were made to restrict their scope so far as possible.

In particular, the concept of peaceful change has become the subject of study by various elements of the peace movement in Great Britain, France, and the United States. In part, attention was turned into this channel by the sense of war's imminence, and the admission that it was becoming almost impossible to continue to follow a policy of repression. There was also the occasionally expressed feeling that, with regard to the colonial settlement, for example, something less than justice was done to German aspirations at Versailles, and that in general there should be a more equitable distribution of economic advantages between the nations.¹⁰ The combination of the fear of war and an uneasy conscience concerning the Treaty, or at least a suspicion of the unwisdom of certain of its stipulations, tended to arouse a growing concern over the problems of peaceful change.

In this connection, a goodly amount of discussion was devoted to the question of the legitimacy of the terms "have" and "have-not" as applied to the groups of states which accepted the international *status quo*, and to those which denounced it. Much effort was spent on attempting to show that the "have-nots" were not really in an inferior economic position, but that their armament and tariff policies were primarily responsible for the scarcity of consumers' commodities.¹¹ Even though this argument may have been correct, neither its reasonableness nor its accuracy could be counted upon to stifle the cries or to still the appeals of those who considered themselves underprivileged. Argument is useless against the propaganda-

¹⁰ See letters in the *Times* by E. N. Bennett, Dec. 18, 1936; A. L. Kennedy, April 22, 1937; Sir George Shee, Oct. 23, 1937.

¹¹ See Sir Norman Angell, *This Have and Have-Not Business* (London, Hamilton, 1936).

inspired fervor of aggrieved nationalists. If the use of words of this character is desired, it might seem more appropriate to speak of the "wants" and the "want-nots". There is at least no confusion in the use of these expressions.

In broad outline, this is the background of the interest in the vague and variously interpreted notion of peaceful change. What is significant in the phrase? What kinds of changes are in question? Some peaceful changes occur as the result of rainfall variations, differing attitudes toward birth control, the ingenuity of inventors, the discovery of new metals, the influence of a compelling personality. In this sense, change, and peaceful change, are inescapable concomitants of human life. Change is a matter of definition if life implies movement; and peaceful change is inevitable if some bayonets are beaten into tractor wheels.

It is not, however, with these types of changes that the movement is concerned, but rather with their effects. Some of these changes are as yet uncontrollable, and it is not desired to regulate others. Nevertheless, their occurrence tends to upset the equilibrium of economic and social relationships carried on within the framework of various political institutions and legal rights. If, for example, a rapid growth in population, despite industrialization, tends to lower living standards or to prevent their rise in one country, the government may make efforts to induce other states to lower their immigration restrictions, or their tariffs. If these appeals, which do not disturb the existing distribution of rights and duties, are unavailing, then claims may arise for a new ordering of legal obligations if justice is to be done; that is, if living standards are to be equalized. Should the internal situation become desperate, then war may be risked in the endeavor to obtain relief. Such changes in policies and changes in the rights of states, are those at present under discussion.

The word "peaceful" is an expression of intention and of hope. The changes are to be brought about without fighting. Does that mean that no threat of force is to be exercised as a

persuasive influence? Among the advocates of peaceful change, the place of force in the coming order is not as yet settled. Lord Davies of the New Commonwealth Society takes the view that coercion must play a leading rôle.¹² On the other side, H. Rowan-Robinson argues that the main objection to the Covenant is that nations are committed in advance to the employment of force irrespective of changes that may have occurred in political conditions.¹³

Without attempting to answer the question here, the term "peaceful" may be used, in a formal sense to refer to any changes which are brought about without bloodshed and without regard to the degree or type of inducement offered. In times when international tension is not great, the use of the term "change" implies the epithet "peaceful"; but when this usually unnecessary modifier is expressed, then the implication arises that there is a problem of choice between peaceful and forceful change, that is, that if adjustments are not made peacefully, they will be brought about as a result of war.¹⁴ Again, when relations between states are not strained, there is not very much talk about change. The occasion for changes may arise, and the changes may be made with little fuss, in a normal manner. A condition of maladjustment must continue for some time before the need for change is discussed widely. However, when the issue is made precise in terms of peaceful or warlike change, then those who employ such expressions have accepted the idea that change must occur. The only problem which remains is whether the new relationships will be ushered in peaceably or violently.

The acceptance of the inevitability of modifications in national policies and in "sovereign" rights, is the most significant feature of the concept of peaceful change. For, if change is unavoidable it might be presumed that general agree-

12 *Nearing the Abyss* (London, Constable, 1936), pp. 169-70.

13 *Sanctions Begone* (London, Clowes, 1936).

14 There is another choice: that between peaceful change and war.

ment upon the desirability of peaceful change would be fairly easily obtained. However, the recognition of the general principle that change is inevitable does not always reconcile men to the corrosive application of the principle to institutions, territories, or privileges which they cherish. Indeed, even those who admit that there is change in all things, may resist change at a particular time, believing that a revered custom has not yet become socially injurious. There are others who, while acknowledging the desirability of peaceful change, attempt to restrain modifications within certain limits, which may vary with individual loyalties.

These divergent views upon peaceful change involve the general problem of their purposes, for which such changes are studied. The ostensible purpose of seeking peaceful change is to avoid warlike change—in other words, to keep the peace. If peace is really the primary purpose behind the movement for peaceful change, then the nature of the changes which may be necessary is a secondary consideration. Logically the scope of modifications in the *status quo* must know no bounds if peace be the sole aim of policy. An American immigration policy, a network of Imperial Preference, a *Vier Jahres Plan* must all be given up if peace be paramount. If peace is the purpose in mind there are no cherished creations of man which may be exempted from spoliation in the primary cause of maintaining the pacific manner of disputation. If peace be sacred, then no other human ideal can be equally revered. The thoroughgoing advocates of peaceful change must be ruthless in their monism, ruthless mongers of peace. They must spare no interfering sentiments, respect no obstructive loyalties, permit the propagation of no principles to which more than lukewarm attachments may be made. For, if any other ideal than that of peace were enthusiastically espoused, it might be considered worthy of defence and so become peacefully unchangeable. When faced with these alternatives, there are relatively few people who will follow Canon Sheppard or

Gandhi into complete non-resistance, in spite of the occasionally useful applications of that technique in obtaining change.¹⁵

To most men the keeping of the peace is not an end in itself. The theoretical absolutism of the logical pacifist is not a popular doctrine, because men develop attachments to many different conceptions, for particular expressions of which, rather than see compromised, they will give up their lives. The absence of war is only one of the attractions of Utopia. It may even be doubted whether peace, as such, may be gained by a direct route. It may be argued that peace is not a condition to be sought for in itself, but is rather the by-product, the evidence of common satisfactions. If songs are sung about a period of peace, it is because men are then conscious that they are enjoying themselves. But if it is not the case that "the pleasures they are many and the troubles they are few," then the pipes of peace may lose their charm, and the trumpets of war clamor compellingly. It is the content of peace and not its mere existence that is of primary significance, and the keeping of the peace is only secondary to the attainment of other aims.

For example, consider the notion of liberty, for the realization of which Jefferson was not unwilling to contemplate the shedding of blood. It might be claimed that in a society where peace and change go hand in hand, liberty will reach its culmination. Peace would reign and the absence of war would assure freedom from unjust oppression. On the other hand it could be asserted that compulsion would by no means be non-existent. Man is not free if he has to keep the peace. He is not free if he has to limit his doctrines of human dignity to such inglorious expression as will avoid militant protest. If man tends to set high value upon what he calls liberty, he also has an apparently incorrigible tendency to set up standards of correct behavior, the accurate observance of which is called honorable conduct and is greatly esteemed. There is a

¹⁵ See R. B. Gregg, *The Power of Non-Violence* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1934).

comparable code for nations too, and the upholding of the national honor may at times be felt to justify a departure from peaceful pursuits. General Goering, as translated in the *Times*, stated in referring to the Ibiza-Almeria incident:

The days when Germany could be placed under pressure in any way are past and anyone who has still not grasped that Germany can no longer be insulted with impunity need only think of the latest event, in which we acted with lightning rapidity, to realize that he is mistaken. When German blood has flowed it cannot be made good with ink.¹⁶

Sir Edward Grigg, M.P., is thus paraphrased in the *Times*:

Now, as a generation ago, the peace of the world depends mainly on the relations between the British Empire and Germany. If we and our Teutonic cousins could find some honourable compromise between our different aims and ideals there would be peace in Europe. If we failed to find it he did not see how we could avert a situation compelling us, soon or late, to choose once again between war and dishonour.¹⁷

The choice here is not between one change and another change, as in a peacefully moving world, but between "war and dishonour", in which it seems pretty clear that the latter alternative stands small chance of selection. It is impossible for a great national state to follow a foreign policy which has no other aims than the maintenance of peace. In the course of a speech in the House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary was interrupted:

Mr. Eden — . . . "We do not base our foreign policy on rival ideologies."

Mr. Pritt (Hammersmith N., Lab.)—"On what do you base it?"

Mr. Eden—"Peace."¹⁸

¹⁶ June 6, 1937.

¹⁷ June 12, 1937.

¹⁸ *Parl. Deb. Commons*, April 28, 1937, vol. 323, col. 312.

This statement, however, was amplified by the Foreign Secretary himself in the debate on foreign affairs on June 25, 1937:

It is a true saying that to keep this country at peace is a great contribution to the peace of Europe, and, whatever may be said about "Peace at any price," if the right hon. Gentleman puts it "Peace at almost any price" I shall scarcely quarrel with him.¹⁹

However attached to the cause of peace any government of a great power may be, the inclusion of other, and perhaps antagonistic, aims in its foreign policy is unavoidable. If it is not "peace with equality" it is "peace in the West," or peace with the defence of "certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety."²⁰ A great power's foreign policy is necessarily one of peace-plus. Individuals may fold their hands when attacked, but great states usually clench their fists. In the study of peaceful change the policy of no state can be regarded as purely pacific, for the reason that no state will passively accept any and all conceivable changes of its rights, privileges, or standards of living.

In the course of the nationalistic educational process of modern states, the citizens of each nation acquire a concentrated intensity of attachment to certain conditions of life, ceremonial observances, territorial outlines and evidences of power. This induces them to become bellicose if the continued enjoyment of these cherished advantages is threatened. Indeed, there is probably an absolute standard of existence which any body of men who consider themselves as possessing mutual interests will fight to defend against whatever odds. Where a sentiment of group loyalty does not exist, this standard will be both lower and less rigid, for unorganized individuals are primarily concerned with the preservation of their lives, and are more timid in the assertion of their interests than those

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 325, col. 1614.

²⁰ Reservation of the British Government to the Paris Pact.

who are intellectually sustained by the justice of their principles, physically encouraged by the support of their comrades, and personally satisfied by the assurance that, whatever the outcome, their memory will be respected for their having tried to further the cause. From this point of view, the states of today form groups which are the least likely of all human societies to accept without armed resistance the desecration of their traditions or the impairment of what they deem their liberties.

In effect, the foregoing is but another way of saying that at the present time, or perhaps at any time, there are limits to the process of peaceful change. This is not to say that peaceful changes cannot be brought about between states unless man renounces his conceptions of honor and liberty. The suggestion is made merely that the present content of these conceptions places a limit to the relationships which may be peacefully modified in the interest of keeping the peace. It is not a question of the nature of liberty, but of the kinds of action which states insist upon being free to enjoy. "Give me liberty or give me death!" may still be a popular warwhoop, but expressions of liberty different from those over which Patrick Henry became excited, are now in demand.

However, one nation's liberty may be another nation's oppression, and the noble emotions of honor may be attached to the perpetuation of the one and the termination of the other. This double functioning of honor suggests that there are two limits to peaceful change. As suggested above, the maintenance of peace depends upon the degree to which national interests are satisfied at a given time. Though, for the moment, there is general satisfaction with things as they are, there will commonly develop maladjustments which will require negotiated adaptation. Within a state, for example, the effects of population growth, the development of industrial techniques, trade policy, or racial theories may create a sense of dissatisfaction with the state's territorial limits or the commercial practices of other countries. If the inhabitants of the former country can per-

suade themselves that their difficulties are due primarily to the greed, enmity, or self-satisfaction of their neighbors, and, if no amelioration of conditions occurs, their internal pressures may be transformed into external pressures upon the policies of other states. Disequilibrium, in one state, whether religious, intellectual, or economic, in this fashion tends to upset the balance of relationships outside its own borders, a phenomenon observable in inter-group contacts from the migrations of the Hyksos down to those of the Jews.

There are, of course, many domestic maladjustments which will occasion no warlike reaction, and it may be that the fear of the unpredictable results of modern warfare has a tendency to extend the sphere of such cases.²¹ There is, however, a limit of forbearance for any state, especially for any great power. A last straw of economic discomfort or one diplomatic humiliation too many, may seem to justify military measures, in the hope of alleviating an intolerable situation.

Here, then, is one of the two limits of peaceful change: the modifications in policy or in right which are offered by one state or group of states must be of sufficient extent and must be so timed as to avoid an outburst of violence from the states which consider themselves to be underprivileged. There is a minimum of changes which must be effected peacefully if a martial triumph of desperation is to be avoided. But there is also a maximum of changes that will be accepted by the states called upon to make concessions, and this maximum forms the other limit of peaceful change. If one state will fight to obtain what it regards as a vital interest, another state may prefer to risk war rather than peacefully forego the exercise of the disputed privilege.

It is probable that no completely satisfactory definition of the limits of peaceful change may be laid down, but it is possible, at any one moment, to describe particular relationships which are either outside or inside the range of pacific modifi-

²¹ See C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World* (London, Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 210-11.

cation. On any day in the spring of 1914, for example, it might have been possible to tabulate a whole series of changes in territorial control or commercial policy which would probably have been outside the reach of peaceful procedures. The retrocession of Alsace and Lorraine was, short of war, out of the question. This was one of the extreme cases, however, and a clear decision would have been more difficult on an issue such as the satisfaction of certain ambitions of Pan-Slavism. On the other hand, there seemed to be no reason to doubt the chances for an amicable conclusion of the negotiations over the Berlin-Bagdad Railway. Thus the limits of peaceful change may be defined in specific terms with relation to particular disputes; so that at a given time three classes of conflicts of interest between national policies are marked off by the two limits of peaceful change.

The first class of objectives of national policy lies above what may be called the upper limit of peaceful change and includes the various privileges and ownerships which the states most satisfied with things as they are, will fight to defend. The second class is found beneath the lower limit of peaceful change, and is formed of the rights to which the so-called unsatisfied nations consider themselves entitled, and toward the attainment of which they will forcibly press. In between is the third class of objectives, composed of those presumed advantages the pursuit of which a state may be willing to renounce in order that war may be avoided.

The limits of peaceful change may be considered as the boundaries of this middle area, in which the rivalry of national ambitions is most decorously carried on. Their more precise delimitation will be taken up later.

The recognition of these theoretical limits of peaceful change makes it possible to attempt here a partial and tentative definition of the phrase. It has been suggested above that a period of formal peace is not necessarily more attractive to men than a state of war. The essential element of a time of peace is not its existence, but its content. A reign of peace may be con-

temporaneous with hatred, fear, and misery and so become unbearable. Therefore, it has been argued that the maintenance of peace is only secondary to the attainment of other human satisfactions, and is conditional upon their attainment. Peaceful change and warlike change are merely two ways of obtaining something. That is to say, they are methods of deciding differences of opinion or of registering inequalities in power, and, while the ways of peace must be preferred to the forms of war, as methods, there is little question of their competing, as aims, with what men demand in terms of sufficient food or adequate respect for their dignity.

There is change in all things. In human relationships change is either peaceable or forced. A "state of peace" is a period of time in which changes occur without armed conflict, or in other words, in which peaceful changes take place. Thus it is misleading to speak of obtaining peace through peaceful change. Peace is peaceful change. Otherwise it is not peace, since changes can be made in only two ways. In summary then, peaceful change may be defined as a regularized process for effectuating modifications in law and policy of the economic and political relationships between nations, which will be so satisfactory to the dissentient elements that the threat of war's breaking out through their aggression may be removed, but which will not be so distasteful to the defenders of things as they are that these will make their agreement contingent upon the outcome of a trial by battle.²²

²² In ordinary usage, the term "peaceful change" may also describe a policy of appeasement or a particular concession; and it is occasionally so employed in the following pages.

CHAPTER II

THE LIMITS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE

I. THE NATURE OF THE LIMITS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE

THE problems of peaceful change arise out of the demands made by one state upon another, which, if not satisfied, might eventually lead to war. These demands may arise from disturbances of the equilibrium within the first state, or from a change of policy by the second. One limit of peaceful change, as described previously, is determined by the extent to which one state will permit its interests to be injured by such changes without fighting. The other limit is set by the extent to which the state from which concessions are demanded will be willing to grant them.

What is the precise nature of these limits? May they be defined as certain, immutable principles of a code of national honor; specific rights or privileges which are peacefully unassailable; or are they rather to be defined in terms of the shifting relationships of power and confidence between states? Some idea of their character may be obtained from a consideration of examples of peaceful changes within the last hundred years or so.

The history of international relations since 1815 offers many types of territorial adjustments. There have been cases where sovereignty over territory forming a part of the national state has been given up, as in the separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, or where colonial territory has been transferred voluntarily as when Great Britain ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece. The formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria-Hungary was a pacific departure from the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, although war with Russia was barely avoided. The Russian abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris was also an example of one-sided treaty breaking which occasioned no armed resistance. Territory has been ceded to carry out the terms of

an alliance, as when Great Britain transferred Jubaland to Italy in 1924, and France in 1919 agreed to a rectification of the Libyan frontier in fulfillment of the Treaty of London of 1915. Territory has been shifted also in expectation of future favors as well as in recognition of those past. Such at any rate appears to have been one motive behind the Laval-Mussolini agreement of January 8, 1935, in which France agreed to transfer small areas in the Sahara and Somaliland to Italy. The transfer of territory from one state to another according to the wish of the people in that territory as determined by a plebiscite is another type of territorial reshuffling which was used in certain cases following the war, notably in the Saar and in Upper Silesia.¹ There is one example of the shifting of a mandated territory from one mandatory to another. Belgium obtained Ruanda-Urundi from Great Britain in 1922 after approval by the Supreme Council, and the Council of the League; principally, apparently, because this territory had been occupied during the war by Belgian troops. A small piece of land formerly part of German East Africa and, before that, of Mozambique, was even handed over to Portugal in 1923 by Great Britain without the attachment of mandatory obligations. There have been purchases of territory for cash, a mode of acquisition favored by the United States in connection with Louisiana, Alaska and the Virgin Islands. Occasionally, possessions have been traded between powers, as in the swapping of Heligoland for a protectorate over Zanzibar in 1890.

It appears that many types of territorial modifications are compatible with national honor, even when accomplished without bloodshed. Treaties may be violated in the name of national honor, and the violations may be condoned without its being noticeably impaired.

¹ It should be noted that the vote in the Upper Silesian plebiscite could have been interpreted in several ways, and that the final boundaries have been claimed by both sides to represent a misapplication of the plebiscite.

Similarly, economic concessions of many kinds were frequent features of interstate relations of the last century. The Cobden Treaty of 1860, although shortlived, was a notable example of mutual tariff concessions. The Franco-Italian commercial treaty of 1898 ended more than a decade of tension between the two nations. The economic provisions of the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 concerning the Conventional Basin of the Congo, and the attempt to insure the open door in China by establishing the principle of equality of opportunity, were directed, in part at least, at the avoidance of the disputes which would arise from exclusive exploitation. The Anglo-German agreement for sharing the construction of the Berlin-Bagdad railway, signed in June, 1914, was a further type of peaceful cooperation in economic development. In all these cases, both parties retreated from their first positions; bargains were made as offers were raised and demands reduced, and despite diplomatic retreats, national honor was saved.

Another type of peaceful change, which was not less important because it did not require positive concessions, was accomplished through the granting of permission to emigrate and immigrate. Throughout the nineteenth century a vast movement of peoples was permitted to take place. The United States, Canada, and Australia were populated, and South America received hundreds of thousands of Europeans. The effects in terms of war and peace of this migration from Europe are difficult to assess, since there was no dispute in connection with it until restrictions began to be imposed. It is significant, however, that "outlets for population" are now being sought by Italy, for example, a state which formerly furnished a goodly share of the annual total of emigrants.

Thus, in several ways, national honor is capable of curious contortions in the national interest, however rigid it may seem when called upon to unbend in the service of other ideals. On the whole, it appears that no types of international changes are in themselves inconceivable, for examples may be offered

of their previous occurrence. The experience of Texas, of the British protectorates in South Africa, of Montenegro, indicates that independent units may on occasion be willing even to lose their own individuality, when they consider it to be to their advantage.² Thus it does not seem that the limits of peaceful change can be defined solely in terms of certain kinds of action which all states will at all times refuse to take. States have their price in this regard, for when self-interest, that is, the self-conceived interest of the dominant groups of their citizens, is paramount, no perversion of the theoretical prerogatives of the state is impossible. This does not, of course, mean that the subjects of proposed changes in the prerogatives or policies of states are without importance. It merely suggests that they form a contributory, but not an essential, factor in the determination of the limits of peaceful change.

What, then, are these essential factors? One of them which has found frequent employment in the past is coercion. Coercion in the form of the threat of force has often been used to bring about change without war. It might even be claimed that an element of force has usually been present in the effectuation of unwarlike changes. In some cases it was the immediate determinant, but more often it has been kept in the middle distance of negotiations, and its express verbalization has been avoided, although its shadow persistently hovered over diplomatic maneuvers. The *ultima ratio* of force weighted the votes in the Concert of Europe, and mitigated in practice, as it did in the League of Nations, the theoretical difficulties of the unanimity rule.

Among the examples of the carrying out of changes as the direct result of an unmistakable threat to employ an obviously superior force may be listed the diplomatic defeat of Russia after the Russo-Turkish War. The Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878, created various relationships in Southeastern Europe, notably the "Big Bulgaria," which were disturbing

² Austrians, just after the War, were willing to merge with Germany, but the *Anschluss* would hardly be appropriate to list here.

to Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. Working together, these powers induced the Russian Government to agree to the modification of the Treaty of San Stefano at the Congress of Berlin. The nature of the inducement offered was immunity from an Austro-British attack. The victory over the Turks had not been easy, as the casualties at Plevna testified, and Gortchakoff realized that his restraining influence on Berlin at the time of the war scare of 1875 had made it impossible for him to expect support from Bismarck. Facing certain military defeat, he was forced into a diplomatic withdrawal, complaining bitterly the while of "honest brokerage." This was territorial peaceful change obtained with no compensation except the negative one of the avoidance of defeat in war.

Another case was that in which Japan was brought to reduce the severity of the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895, after the surprisingly short war with China. Russia, Germany and France suggested to Japan that the ratification of a less onerous treaty would be advisable. The Japanese Government considered acquiescence imperative, and the treaty was revised to include a lower indemnity and other concessions. The alternative was war, and Japan was not otherwise compensated than by the poor advantage of being able to reject the greater evil.

The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was also an example of peaceful change, although its recency and its critical character make its mere classification in this fashion appear singularly inappropriate. From the point of view of the Czech Government, the German demand could not be resisted, for Great Britain and France, whose aid had been counted upon, were counselling surrender, and Russian help, without France's, was not certain. Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier, and most of their colleagues, decided that their interests in Czechoslovakian integrity were not sufficient to justify their risking a conflict; so they accepted the Munich "settlement," asserting it to be the only alternative to war.

If the *status quo* may thus be modified in a non-violent manner, it may also be defended in a similar fashion; and demands for change may be resisted or scaled down or put off by a show of force. An interesting case in this connection is provided by the Franco-German settlement which followed the Agadir incident. The French expedition to Fez, the dispatch of which was announced on April 19, 1911, was properly regarded in Berlin as an infringement of the Act of Algeciras. Kiderlen-Wächter, the German Foreign Secretary, had apparently decided that there was no chance of getting France out of Morocco, but, as the price of allowing the French a free hand there, he demanded the cession of French territory in West Africa. His first specifications called for the transfer of French Congo from the River Sangha to the sea, which meant practically the whole colony. The French Government refused to grant so much, although they were not unwilling to offer some compensation. Throughout a tense week following the statement of Kiderlen's terms, there seemed no prospect of an agreement. Progress toward a compromise was first visible after the bold words of Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech. Faced by Franco-British solidarity, with Britain apparently in a pugnacious mood, Kiderlen backed down and reduced the demand which a short time before he had presented in no bargaining spirit. The words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer had changed the odds, and the German Government found it necessary to hedge. The chances for successful coercion by Germany had dwindled and the terms consequently had to be readjusted to the new power situation. These cases indicate that the determination to use force has proved effective in inducing states to relinquish various material or positional advantages which they enjoyed.

The other essential factor in the determination of the limits of peaceful change may be called confidence. Confidence is here used to mean the assurance that the change in question will not, in any vital way, injure the interests of the state called upon to make concessions. Who is to define what is a "vital

way"? At the moment, each independent state possesses the power; and the actual definition will be made in response to the demands of various interest groups within the states. These groups have usually desired to gain exclusive economic advantages for themselves, and their political influence has usually outweighed considerations related to peaceful change. Consequently, confidence between nations has been slow in development, and limited in scope, despite some outstanding readjustments which have occurred because of its existence. The question of a substitute for individual determination of the criterion of a "vital way" will be considered in the last chapter.

The cession of the Ionian Islands by Great Britain to Greece in 1864 was made possible by British confidence that Greek control would not be a menace to British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Islanders were troublesome, of course, and their territory was not rich in natural resources; it was altogether an ideal opportunity to honor the humanitarian principles expressed in Gladstone's Report.

With adequate reservations for Eire, the evolution of the Dominions within the British Empire offers a striking example of a continuous process of peaceful change based upon confidence and good will. A unique network of racial and cultural ties, which has made possible manifold adjustments by the British Commonwealth of Nations, today renders almost inconceivable any use of force between its members.

The granting of independence to the people of the Philippine Islands by the United States was made possible by American conviction that no national interest would be menaced through Philippine statehood, although that assurance seems now to be diminishing. The transaction can hardly be labelled altruistic, or disinterested, in view of popular indifference, and the economic advantage which will accrue to the beet sugar producers in Utah and the cane growers in Louisiana; but such considerations are beside the issue of confidence.

In still other cases, some combination of these elements of confidence and coercion has brought about peaceful change, and fear and hope together have achieved what neither could accomplish alone. These examples would seem to indicate that there are no fixed and immutable limits to peaceful change between nations. The limits of peaceful change vary from time to time with fluctuations in confidence and in the capacity of the states to coerce each other. There can be, therefore, no definition of the limits of peaceful change which will provide permanent guide-posts warning statesmen that their resistance to change must give way, or their demands for change must be whittled down, if war is to be escaped. Their decision in a world of competing national states, is a personal evaluation of the circumstances, and, from the point of view of the maintenance of peace, it has frequently been an unfortunate one, either because of errors of judgment, or because the avoidance of war has not been deemed to be of supreme import. In general, their decisions tend toward an acceptance of peaceful solutions in proportion to their coercive incapacity, and to the strength of their confidence in the intentions of other statesmen. What are the relationships between these two determinants of political judgment?

2. THE EXTENSION OF THE LIMITS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE

The limits of peaceful change are thus not capable of general definition in terms of certain kinds of changes which are either inside or outside the range of peaceful modifications. They are, rather, fluctuating boundaries which vary from time to time with concentrations of power, and with feelings of confidence. These are the agents which dissolve the apparently elemental stuff of nationalism and give new content to presumably immutable notions of territorial integrity or national honor. They are the catalyzers of the international *status quo*.

At any given moment, however, a fair degree of precision may be brought to the delimitation of the boundaries of peace-

ful change. When the factors of coercion and confidence can be carefully gauged, then it is possible to determine with considerable accuracy just which changes may be pacifically contemplated. The claims of each state may then be weighed in relation to its power and its intentions, and to those of other states; and the line may be clearly drawn between the peacefully and the warfully possible. Such a line will remain accurate, however, for only a short time, and it may have to be redrawn within a few days. It can be described in precise terms in each individual instance only as a kind of "so far and no farther" admonition, which is quite unhelpful until its meaning is resolved by the investigation of specific circumstances.

It is therefore not strictly accurate to speak of "the" limits of peaceful change, since at a given time there is, when all factors are considered, in each separate case an individual set of limits which may have little connection with the limits in another contentious relationship. Over a period of time, however, and speaking broadly, it may be said that the limits of peaceful change have been expanded or have been contracted, if in a number of disputes the prospects for peaceful solutions have increased or decreased, respectively. The question of the means by which such pulsations take place, and more particularly the opportunity for steady expansion, are here of immediate concern.

It appears to be fairly well settled that in the past various changes have been brought about, without war, as the result of threats to use force. The problem then arises as to whether upon this basis it may be contended that all peaceful changes may be accomplished by the pooling of sufficient force in their behalf. That is to say, can a system of peaceful changes be maintained by coercion? Such a conception requires the minimization of the force available to each state in resistance to change. The possibility of the employment of force is an ineradicable contingency of international relationships. Even within our most highly integrated states outbreaks of violence occasionally occur, and force is used in their suppression.

The proponents of peaceful change must give to coercion a place in their proposals. They cannot ignore it, they cannot conjure it away; they must attempt in some way to make it serve their end. Thus, disarmament alone would not result in a reduction of a state's power to resist change, since inequalities of power due to population or industrial development would remain. The minimization of each state's power must therefore be managed through an agreement by all states to support, by force, if one state should break the circle, a system of peaceful change.

When coercion has in the past successfully engineered changes which did not involve war, there was recognition on the part of the submitting state firstly, that the opposing force was overwhelmingly strong, and secondly, that its possessors would have no hesitation in using it if any procrastination were attempted.³

A striking example of such a combination of elements is provided by the Greco-Bulgarian frontier affray of October, 1925. The telegram sent to both Governments on October 23 by M. Briand, the President of the Council of the League, had behind it the possibility of the application of the apparently formidable Article 16. The Greek Government immediately countermanded its orders for an attack on Petrich scheduled for the 24th, and completed the withdrawal of its troops on the 27th, no doubt fearing the imposition of sanctions. This shining example of the enforcement of peace has been commonly hailed as the outstanding accomplishment of the League of Nations in the political field.

Can such irresistible force, combined with willingness to use it, be similarly employed in the enforcement of peaceful change? A negative answer to this question would appear to be given by Mr. Cruttwell, who, writing well before Munich, said:

3 Why then did Denmark dare to challenge Prussia and Austria together in 1864? The opposition was unmatchable in fact, but the Danes had been led to believe that they would receive British assistance, which would have made the odds nearly even.

"Doubtless where a change was simply enforced by a threat of overwhelming strength it would be inappropriate to describe it as peaceful, even though no drop of blood was shed in its accomplishment." He adds that such changes "may be described as the result of bloodless wars."⁴

However, it is precisely the large scale sanguinolence of modern war which has recently attracted many people to the notion of peaceful change, and some at least of these were able to applaud the Munich "settlement." There is, nevertheless, a suspicion of paradoxy about a proposal to enforce the execution of peaceful change, even though the mere threat of coercion is sufficient to obtain the desired end. The issue here perhaps turns on the question as to the identity of the beneficiary on whose behalf force is to be utilized. When one state browbeats another for its own advantage, the proceeding may only with difficulty be accepted as peaceful, even though there is no fighting, and in any case it does not settle the issues on the permanent basis of mutuality of interests. On the other hand, the employment of coercion by and in the name of society as a whole, in order to force a recalcitrant state to make adjustments, may be looked upon as peaceful, even though the techniques in the two cases are the same.⁵

There are, however, strong reasons for doubting the efficacy of the employment of force as the bulwark of a scheme for peaceful change. One of these is the technical difficulty of coercion. The task of forcing one of the great powers to make a change in its immigration policy, for example, might very well involve the waging of a first-class war, the outbreak of which would mean the end of a series of peaceful changes. The obviously overwhelming power necessary to enforce submission is simply not available in face of a great power's obduracy.⁶

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵ The term "browbeating" might also be used instead of "employment of coercion" in this sentence without change in its meaning.

⁶ Cf. Sir Arthur Salter's proposal that collective assistance might be re-

In this connection, another reason for scepticism about the use of coercion to enforce peaceful changes finds its origin. If desperate men are undismayed by the apparently formidable forces arrayed against them, the remaining hope of avoiding conflict lies in the prevention or amelioration of conditions that may breed desperation. A changeful peace cannot be enforced any more than can a changeless one, for men will not fight to defend any procedural framework unless they feel that it is only within that structure that their common aspirations are satisfied. The probability of the use of sanctions to maintain peace depends upon the answer to the question: "What kind of a peace are we asked to perpetuate?" If there is such general satisfaction with the shape of things as they are, a solitary, weak rebel may be unanimously suppressed. If the conditions of the peace do not receive universal acclamation, the force once enlistable in their maintenance will suffer a gradual disintegration, and the discord between revisionists and standpatters may finally break out into open warfare.

Similarly, the efficiency of the force which may be mobilized in the creation of new international relationships at any time, is dependent upon the answer to the question: "What changes are we called upon to enforce?" If the changes proposed are greeted with general approval, then, and then only, will the support of the states be assured. It has already been suggested that while no element of nationalism can be counted upon to resist the dissolving action of force or confidence, the force or confidence required must be greater as the prerogative which it is desired to modify is more highly cherished. But as the expression of nationalism is not dissimilar the world around, it will usually be found that those rights most prized by one state will be equally valued by others. These others, fearing that they in their turn may be forced to renounce privileges which they hold essential to their national interest, will be re-

fused a state which found itself attacked because of its refusal to make a change recommended by the League of Nations. "Reform of the League," *Pol. Quart.*, Oct.-Dec., 1936, p. 467.

luctant to provide a precedent which might later be used against their own obstinacy. The British Government may have had consideration for the future in India, when, in 1931 and after, their attitude toward Japanese activity in North China was something less than sharply antagonistic. The result may be, therefore, that while greater force may be required to make changes in the fundamentals of nationalist policy, the very fact that those fundamentals are being attacked will result in the impotence of the only available means of coercion.

The situation is different when only three or four states are involved in a struggle. Then, as in 1895, when Japan was forced to renounce some of the gains made in the Sino-Japanese War, the coercers feel themselves sufficiently strong so that their victim can not retaliate in any way, and while they may have a qualm about possible future developments, they are willing to take a chance upon their continued solidarity. Further, since they did not act upon any principle other than self-interest, they have no fear that they will later be bound by any principle of social welfare, or the general good. When, however, force is used collectively, it is assumed that it will be used impartially, and what is required of one state will be equally insisted upon from all. While this possibility of the universal application of coercion may be ideal, its very existence as a possibility will make governments hesitant to use what they will recognize as a double-edged weapon. This hesitancy can be overcome only if the governments are confident that the purposes for which force will be collectively employed are limited or, if these purposes are not expressly limited, that force will not in fact be used so as to harm the interests they wish to protect.

The possibility of the employment of collective force for the defence of any peace settlement has been shown by the experience of 1919-1939 to rest upon the degree of general enthusiasm for the terms of that settlement, as well as upon the relative strength of the opposed states. It may be argued that this is the case regardless of whether or not the reasons

for discontent are directly or indirectly the consequence of the relationships then established. Since no government, by 1937, held that the Treaties of 1919 must at all costs be maintained, the force available for their support disappeared, and even their territorial provisions were violated with impunity. In the face of this situation, a number of partisans of international cooperation put forward the concept of peaceful change as offering a means for avoiding the catastrophic effects of another war. This proposal was represented as being desirable because it would, through changes in the *status quo*, satisfy contemporary discontents, and endeavor to prevent the appearance of new ones by a continuous process of adjustment of institutions to facts, of forms to realities. Peaceful changes have occurred in the past; but with certain exceptions, notably in the case of the Congo régime, they were hardly comparable to these proposals for peaceful change because they were carried out in the interest of one state or of a small group, and they were not part of a broad attempt to prevent war. While some of these changes resulted from the threat to use force, it has been suggested above that the adoption of coercive measures on a worldwide scale will be possible only when confidence in the equitable exercise of such power becomes general. Two questions are immediately presented by this conclusion. The first concerns the means for creating such confidence, and the second the meaning of the term "equitable."⁷ These questions are interdependent, but in certain respects they may be considered separately.

In relation to confidence it is probably less difficult to find support for the defence of a particular peace settlement than for a scheme of peaceful change. In the former case the terms are precise, the advantages measurable, and the supporting force known. In the latter case, however, there is no surveyed terrain, no "felicific calculus" and no even temporarily comforting guarantee of future allies. All that is certain is that changes are to ensue: their scope is unknown. When a specific

⁷ This second question is discussed in Chapter IV.

treaty is being defended, there exists at least the hope that for some time security may be enjoyed, but how can confidence be given to a process which appears to institutionalize insecurity?

In politics, as in finance, there can be no certain confidence in the future. Estimates of what is to come must be based upon the relevant experience of the past. Where there is no experience there will be hesitation, as when a bather who has not felt the water, teeters on the end of the diving board. The only way to obtain general participation in the making of peaceful changes is through the actual offering of changes by one or more states, whether freely or on conditions. If the use of force tends to breed forcible opposition, the evidence of a willingness to make peaceful changes on one side may have disarming reactions on the other. There are, however, certain fairly definite conditions under which a beginning toward peaceful change may be made. That is to say, there are certain times at which peaceful changes are possible, and others where offers of concessions cannot be expected.⁸

If there is fear and distrust existing between two nations, and their respective military power is about equal, then the making of a concession by one will probably be looked upon by the other as a confession of weakness, and may provide the opportunity for the making of fresh demands. Further, any concession might have the effect merely of augmenting the strength of the other state without producing any basis for mutual reconciliation. This would be the necessary conclusion if there existed such hatred between the people of the two countries that, even though war were not in progress, each felt that war could not ultimately be avoided between them, and each considered the other as an implacable foe. In these circumstances of fear and hatred, peaceful change is out of the question; and yet it is possible that had adjustments been made at an earlier date, these poisonous emotions might never have been aroused.

⁸ On the general question of timing, see an article by Nathaniel Peffer, "Too Late for World Peace?", *Harper's*, June, 1936, p. 23 ff.

From some points of view, it may be contended that the moment at which peaceful changes may be made most freely is just after the proclamation of the treaties of peace which mark the termination of a war, especially a world war, since the scope of possible change is then wider than after a bilateral conflict. It might be contended that since the changes set forth in the peace treaties are usually executed without bloodshed, these are peaceful changes which are accepted because the force which might be unleashed if resistance were offered, is admitted to be irresistible. However, the treaties of peace are here considered to be part of the process of war, and therefore peaceful changes proper can commence only after the settlement is established.

The statement is frequently made that "war settles nothing," but it appears that war nearly always settles one question and may frequently determine others. The one question that is usually answered is: "Which state or group of states is going to determine the disposition of the issues over which the war was fought, and the others arising from it?" Technically it may be asserted that war solves no other problems, since there is no fighting over the terms of the treaty of peace. However, it would appear that war settled the Carthaginian problem for Rome, and that war determined that the American Colonies might decide for themselves their status with respect to Great Britain. It is not implied that war permanently solves anything in the sense that new issues will not arise, but for a particular moment, the decision by arbitrament of force is a final judgment on the one question with which that judgment deals. If war is claimed to have settled nothing, it is because too much has been asked of a procedure which is of limited application. A military victory settles the identity of those who will be the architects of the peace. That is to say that the winners in a war are in a position to formulate new territorial and economic relationships. If these relationships are so conceived as to perpetuate hostility and hatred so that a second war may arise from the treaty of the first, then it is the peace

which has been bungled, and it might thereupon be contended that "peace settles nothing," a statement as inaccurate as that which makes a similar claim for war.

The outcome of a war makes it possible for the victor to formulate modifications of the *status quo ante* which will receive peaceful application. The responsibility of the opportunity thus presented is one before which any statesman not filled with conceptions of immediate national interest might well hesitate. A purely national standard of values, however, tends to make decision easy, at the same time that it makes the prospects for future peace more gloomy. At the end of a war the limits of change, which are normally set by an equilibrium of forces, are removed. A conciliatory peace may now be made without any fear on the part of the victors that their generosity may be taken as evidence of weakness. The treaties of Prague and Vereeniging are not considered to have been Draconian, but their mildness arose, not from the weakness of Prussia or Great Britain, but from a desire on the part of the Governments of these states for future friendly relations with their late opponents.

Thus at the end of a war, conditions are usually favorable for the carrying out of peaceful changes so far as concerns power relationships. Indeed, the changes laid down in the treaties are peaceful in a formal sense, since fighting has ceased. The question remains as to the nature of these changes, and it is here that the problem of confidence acquires significance. If it be assumed that the annihilation of the defeated peoples is not contemplated, the terms of peace will be to some degree dependent upon the prospect of future relationships between victor and vanquished. In so far as this factor is taken into account, the character of the provisions of peace will depend upon the confidence placed by their authors in the friendly reactions of those to whom generous terms are offered. If it is felt that the enmity of the defeated state is implacable, the conditions of peace will attempt to render that state powerless in the future. If, on the other hand, it is hoped that fair treat-

ment will beget cooperation, then a drastic settlement may be forsworn. In such an atmosphere, even the creation of regular methods for carrying on peaceful changes might not be outside the bounds of possibility.

It is, however, not simply a question of the content of the treaties of peace, but also of their administration. The claim has been made that in 1919 the terms of peace could not have been made less drastic, because of the strength of popular passions which had been aroused in the course of the struggle.⁹ But even so, passions may cool in time, and policies may correspondingly change. If, as Bagehot said, "the men of Massachusetts could have worked any constitution," it may not be impossible for treaties similarly to be managed, unless, of course, there were giants only in the good old days.

If the hatred necessary to carry on a war has been so tenacious as to require the imposition of a peace likely to generate new conflicts, these can be avoided by treaty manipulation, if the modifications are achieved in time. Changes should be made before the harshness of the peace has rooted permanent hostility among the defeated peoples, or before their power has regained such a level that they look upon changes as a concession to force, rather than as an offer of friendship. This is the essence of the problem of timing in the effectuation of peaceful change, a problem upon the correct solution of which confidence, and therefore peaceful change itself, depends.

Even though the principles of the timing of peaceful change may be clearly described, their application is no easy matter. It has already been suggested that in some ways the most favorable time for the accomplishment of peaceful changes is immediately following a war. More precisely, perhaps, it may be said that since at that time the chance of a new conflict is small, the victors need have no fear of war whether they make concessions or do not make them. So long as they are supreme in battle, they need not be afraid of diplomatic retreats; assum-

⁹ Noble, *op. cit.*, p. 419 ff. Also Charles Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1926), vol. iv, p. 378.

ing, of course, that there remains some hope that these retreats may ultimately result in the attainment of relations of mutual respect and friendship.

If, however, the granting of concessions by the possessors of power appears most possible shortly after a successful war, it by no means follows that their realization will then and therefore take place. For, it is just when concessions are most feasible that they seem least necessary. They are most feasible when there is no fear of their adverse effect on power relations, but they then appear least necessary just because no pressure can be brought to bear for their enforcement. So soon as such pressure may be exerted, then the probability that concessions will be made tends to diminish, for then the grantor may fear that concessions to strength will merely invite renewed efforts at coercion; or that if the use of force is being contemplated by the eager grantee, the possibility for conciliation has passed, in which case a concession would augment the opponent's strength without diminishing his appetite. At such a time, it may be that the position has so far been altered that the concessions most necessary have become most difficult to carry out.

The cause of this procrastination lies perhaps in the difficulty of the choice which is presented to statesmen. That choice is one of whether to treat a defeated state as though its future friendship could be counted on, or as though it must continue to be a deadly enemy. If the latter conviction is held, then from a strictly nationalist point of view, the destruction of the vanquished state might reasonably be demanded. The application of Cato's ruthless logic has in the last century been avoided in international affairs, and no relentless pursuit of power has permitted a returning conqueror to give Scipio's reply to *delenda est Carthago*. But if statesmen have not taken full advantage of their strength, they have rarely followed a consistent policy of reconciliation. Even when they were hopeful that their friendly gestures might be reciprocated, they refused to abandon altogether their instruments of coercion or the

advantages which they considered strategic. Bismarck clearly recognized that the French would attempt to find the means of upsetting the Treaty of Frankfort, but by isolating France, he expected to prevent her from becoming dangerous by gaining allies. The issue of the lost provinces could be solved only by retrocession or war, since the interest in Tunis turned out to be merely a temporary diversion of attention. War could be averted so long as France was unaided. Retrocession was hardly a serious issue under Bismarck, even though he may not have been in sympathy with the original annexation; and his successors refused to consider retrocession when the French made it the condition of their cooperation in joint action against Great Britain during the Boer War. When a state refuses to make concessions, then it would be well advised to keep its powder dry. Bismarck was successful in this, but the superiority of power which he built up was dissipated with no compensating change in the form of greater goodwill between France and Germany.

It is this decay of the relative power of the victors that took place after 1870 and 1918 which invites careful attention to the question of the timing of concessions. It is not inevitable that such a shift in relative strength should occur, but so long as the vanquished is not utterly wiped out, his regaining power cannot be excluded from the range of the possible. If it is desired to avoid a war in which the *status quo* would be endangered, then efforts should be made to avoid resentment when the defeated state shall have regained power. The choice between a policy of power and one of conciliation has commonly resulted in a compromise, in which the politics of power have dominated. The evidences of power are tangible and present, and the prospects of its dissolution or of its being overreached, seem remote. Confidence remains to be created, and there is uncertainty regarding its quality and, therefore, its permanence. Further, patriotic enthusiasm may usually be aroused for a policy of "millions for defence; not one cent for tribute," but the development of confidence requires the

actual making of adjustments which involve retreats from nationalism.

An additional reason for the weighting of the scales in favor of power is that the possession of military strength is looked upon as a guarantee of stability, while the evidence of future good faith, namely, promises, is not always trustworthy. Thus even at the time when concessions would not endanger military superiority, serious efforts at conciliation are often frustrated by fear of betrayal by those in whom confidence might be placed. This fear has seemed more keen than the fear of a lessening of the existing disparity in power; and it would be idle to deny that many examples of deceit may be cited by those who put their faith in the sword. The notion that the timing of concessions is significant in the peaceful evolution of international relations, rests upon the assumption that men, as organized into states, will respond with good will to conciliatory treatment. This postulate was challenged by numerous voices among the victorious states in 1919. Since the assumption involves the forecasting of future action, the demonstration of its accuracy is impossible; and therefore the mere fact that it is not accepted makes immensely difficult its rational defence. In so far as this assumption is not given credence, confidence is non-existent, and peaceful changes cannot be expected to be granted.

In general, the most favorable moment for the effectuation of peaceful changes is at a time when those upon whom demands are made possess supreme power, but fear their supremacy to be transitory, and are hopeful that those who may later obtain power may be made permanently friendly by present evidence of goodwill in the form of the sharing of advantages. This is indeed a rare moment, for the tendency of the powerful has been to attempt to perpetuate their domination by force; but this timely combination must be aimed at by those who intend to assure to the world a régime of peaceful change.

In the course of this discussion of the problems of pushing outward the limits of peaceful change, it may seem that a kind

of closed circle of mutual dependence has been outlined. It has been suggested not only that the accumulation of force to broaden the field of peaceful change is dependent upon confidence, but also that confidence is dependent upon force. Is there any way out of this directionless track?

The mobilization of coercion in support of the maintenance of procedures of peaceful change has been found to rest upon the confidence of the nations that their common interests may best be protected by the making of changes peaceably. Because the extent of the prospective changes is unknown, however, it was suggested that at first, confidence would have to continue to be based upon force, and only those changes which were of minor strategic importance could be looked for. On the one side, the granting of concessions must be followed by evidence of friendly intentions. On the other side, there will then be confidence that if concessions involving power are made, the advantages thus obtained will not be used against the grantors. Thus confidence may build upon confidence, its surest foundation, and the way be made clear for permanent cooperation. This seems to be the only way in which sufficient centrifugal force may be developed so that the circle may be straightened out. The confidence which is originally based upon force must be superseded by confidence resting upon mutual trust; and this supersession must be carefully timed so as to take place before the hope of redress by pacific means has been exhausted.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH REACTIONS TO GERMAN COLONIAL CLAIMS, 1918-1939

I. THE WAR AND THE PEACE

THE timing of changes has been suggested above as of major significance in the establishment of a system in which the peaceful development of international relations may be counted upon. The discussion of this whole problem has so far been largely of a general nature and *a priori* in character; and it may be desirable to consider in detail the growth of a present-day interstate relationship which will more fully illustrate the preceding argument.

There are many examples of historic disputes which might be adduced, and a number in Europe and the Far East which have arisen since 1919 readily spring to mind. One of the most dramatic of these latter is furnished by the demand on the part of the German Government for the return of its colonies which were placed under mandate following the Treaty of Versailles. The growth of these demands, and the replies which have been offered by the mandatory powers, bring to sharp focus the problems involved in the timing of peaceful changes.

The German Empire in 1914 included four African colonies: German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, Cameroons, and Togoland; and in the Far East: the leased port of Kiao-Chao, parts of Samoa and New Guinea, and the Bismarck, Caroline, Marianne and Marshall Islands. The total area of these possessions was approximately 1,140,000 square miles, a little more than a third the size of the United States. They were populated by 13,690,000 people, of whom 24,010 were Germans.¹

¹ Figures from G. Kurt Johannsen and Heinrich Kraft, *Das Kolonialproblem Deutschlands* (Hamburg, Hartung, 1936), p. 18. The total area is there given as 2,952,600 sq. km.

Before the end of the war the Allied Powers were in undisputed possession of all of these territories with the exception of German East Africa, where General von Lettow-Vorbeck carried on a skilful campaign against superior numbers and surrendered only after the Armistice. After the loss of the colonies, the German Government of course regarded their recovery as one of its most important war aims.²

Understandably the attitude of the Allied Powers during the War was more ambiguous than that of Germany. The Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, gave Italy the right to claim "some equitable compensation" should any colonial gains be registered by her allies.³ This implication of intention on the part of Britain and France to secure German colonies was not explicitly rejected by any subsequent expression of Entente war aims.⁴ An interesting point of view was expressed by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech of January 5, 1918, when he said, in referring to the German colonies, that he had "repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a Conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies."⁵ Mr. Lloyd George proceeded to assert that "the general principle of national self-determination is therefore as

2 See article in *Times*, April 12, 1917, "German Colonial Claims," by its former Berlin Correspondent. Cf. speech by Herr von Sydow, Prussian Minister of Commerce, asserting the need for the return of the colonies. *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1918.

3 René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, Columbia U. Press, 1938), p. 337. British support of Japan's claims in Shantung and the German Islands north of the equator was promised in the agreement of February 16, 1917, "'it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to German islands south of the Equator.'" R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1922), vol. i, p. 61.

4 Nothing was said about colonies in the Allied Governments' Reply on January 10, 1917 to President Wilson's Note of December 18, 1916. Text in G. Lowes Dickinson, *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1919), p. 10 ff.

5 *Times*, January 7, 1918.

applicable in their cases as in those of occupied European territories," but his championship of that principle could hardly be labelled disinterested in view of his following statement that "the German treatment of their native populations in their colonies has been such as amply to justify their fear of submitting the future of those colonies to the wishes of the natives themselves."⁶

Shortly afterward, General Smuts made an address in which he said that "no fresh extension of Prussian militarism to other continents and seas should be tolerated; and the conquered German colonies can only be regarded as guarantees, as securities for the future peace of the world."⁷ Some months later, Mr. Balfour added a qualification to Mr. Lloyd George's faith in self-determination by stating in the House his, and therefore the Government's, opposition to the return of Germany's colonies. He argued that the German administration had been harmful to the natives, and that in the future Germany would use the colonies as bases for further expansion. "What I object to is giving back to Germany at the end of the War an instrument so powerful for universal evil as a great colonial empire."⁸

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Address before the Geographical Society, *Times*, Jan. 29, 1918. Mr. Lees-Smith (Lib) asked a question in the House on February 5, 1918 suggesting a certain lack of consistency between these speeches of two members of the War Cabinet, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Bonar Law, in replying, said that he did not see in them "any want of conformity." *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 101, col. 2089. A leader in the *Times*, Jan. 29, 1918, strongly supported Smuts' point of view, and denounced the alleged German plan for a great Central African Empire. For a German answer to General Smuts, see speech by Dr. Solf, German Colonial Secretary, reported in *Times*, March 1, 1918. Dr. Solf charged that General Smuts desired to destroy Germany as a colonial power, and intended to militarize the colored races.

⁸ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, August 8, 1918, vol. 109, col. 1633. See the reply to this speech by Dr. Solf, who asserted on August 20 that it was merely a justification for British imperialist aims, and also the reply to Dr. Solf by Lord Robert Cecil, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on August 23. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 211, 218.

These were the two recurrent themes of the opposition to the giving up of the conquered territory: the Germans had exploited the natives and had treated them brutally, and therefore they could not again be allowed to control subject populations; and a resurgent Prussian militarism must be prevented from developing the colonies as strategic bases for use in another war.

Articulate Britain was almost unanimously against allowing the colonies to revert to German sovereignty. Even the Labour Party was with the majority on this point, although its position differed in one important respect. Most of those who opposed relinquishing the colonies were silent as to their ultimate allocation, perhaps relying upon a later application of the principle of *uti posseditis*. The Labour Party, however, took a clear stand for international control of all African colonies under the League of Nations. Rejecting the idea adopted by the Prime Minister that self-determination could be applied to the colonies, the Party's view was that the German administration was not "so much worse than that of other European Governments that the Peace Conference would be justified in singling it out for special treatment."⁹

The Labour Party's position was assailed early in 1918 at a meeting under the auspices of an organization called the British Workers' League. Sir Harry Johnston and Lord Sydenham sent favorable letters to the promoters of the meeting, Lord Sydenham pointing out the "hopeless impossibility of administering great territories by international authorities," and stating that "it is unthinkable that these colonies should be handed back to the tender mercies of the most barbarous nation in the world."¹⁰ A resolution was passed unanimously repudiating

⁹ From a "Message to the Russian People," signed by C. W. Bowerman, M.P., for the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, and Arthur Henderson, M.P., for the National Executive of the Labour Party. *Times*, Jan. 16, 1918. See also the *Memorandum on War Aims*, adopted by the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, held in London, February 18-24, 1918, for a statement of similar views. *Times*, Feb. 25, 1918.

¹⁰ *Times*, Jan. 3, 1918.

ing the proposals of the Labour Party "to hand the colonies over to a cosmopolitan commission."¹¹

Religious bodies entered the lists also, and the Lower House of Canterbury Convocation adopted on May 2, 1918 a resolution opposing "the restitution of the tyranny of German rule in Africa or the South Seas," but condemning any scheme for "exploiting the so-called German colonies in the commercial interests of this country."¹² The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland heard with appreciation its Moderator say, concerning the colonies, that their "retrocession to Germany would be a calamity."¹³

Antagonism to Germany's renewing colonial activity was also voiced with equal fervor by lay organizations. These repeated the twin arguments of German unfitness, and future imperial safety, which ran throughout the public discussion of this issue toward the end of the War. The Council of the Royal Colonial Institute resolved that "alike in the interests of the empire and in the interests of the native races concerned, no one of the former German possessions beyond the seas should be restored to Germany."¹⁴ Similar sentiments were expressed by the Australasian Section of the London Chamber of Commerce,¹⁵ and by the Central Committee of the Overseas Club and Patriotic League.¹⁶

11 *Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1918.

12 *Ibid.*, May 3, 1918.

13 *Ibid.*, May 24, 1918. The Moderator went on: "Their East African colony was known as the 'land of the twenty-five lashes,' because of the terrible rhinoceros hide punishments inflicted on the natives for trifling offenses. The natives now sang a special chant around their village fires, the refrain of which was: 'The twenty-five lashes are gone, are gone.' And what is gone, said the Moderator, amid applause, must be gone forever."

14 *Ibid.*, June 11, 1918.

15 *Ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1918.

16 *Ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1918. Occasional speeches by well-known men reflected the same attitude. Lord Northcliffe, Walter Long, Lord Leverhulme. Major-General Sir Edward Northey, may be included in this group. Speaking before a party of American officers, Lord Northcliffe said: "We will not deliver their native inhabitants again to the tender mercies of the Hun, nor allow him to use their harbours as submarine bases from which he might paralyse the seaborne traffic which is the life blood of our great commonwealth of free peoples." *Times*, Sept. 23, 1918. "Then it seems that Germany

The position of the Government on the question of the German colonial administration was indicated by the publication on September 11, 1918 of an elaborate 200-page illustrated Blue-book (Cd. 9146). It relied upon the 1906 Reichstag investigation of the brutality of certain German officials in Southwest Africa, upon the records of the German administration in that colony, and upon testimony given by natives and others, to depict an admittedly infamous episode: the ruthless German suppression of the Herero uprising. This Blue-book undoubtedly exerted a great influence over public opinion at the time. It inspired the relatively reserved *Times* to comment: "The unhuman outrages committed in Europe are insignificant compared with the savage abominations which were the foundation of German rule in Africa. Here we see the 'blond beast' untrammelled; here he gluts to the full his appetite for blood, for plunder, and for bestial lusts."¹⁷

The prevailing attitudes in England on the colonial question were, of course, well known in Germany during the War; but so long as there was fair hope of victory, a defence of German administration appeared unnecessary. At the beginning of the war, Germany had made proposals for the neutralizing of the colonies, and had pointed out the non-military character of German colonial policy.¹⁸ When these proposals failed of ac-

is to insist upon the return of her colonies.' (Laughter)." Report in the *Times*, Sept. 7, 1918, of speech by Mr. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Royal Colonial Institute, Sept. 6, 1918.

¹⁷ Editorial, Sept. 12, 1918. Several books published in 1918 enlarged upon German infamy in Africa, and expressed fear of German imperialist designs. See Frank Maclean, *Germany's Colonial Failure* (New York, Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), and Sir Hugh Clifford, *German Colonies, a Plea for the Native Races* (London, John Murray, 1918). Cf. two translations by Edwyn Bevan, *The Pan-German Programme* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1918), and Emil Zimmerman's *The German Empire of Central Africa* (London, Longmans, Green, 1918). Bevan's own comments are distinguished, by their temperate character, from the hue and cry of the time.

¹⁸ See comment on German note of August 23, 1914 in M. E. Townsend, *Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), p. 364. Neutralization would clearly have been to the advantage of Germany, since she could not defend the colonies.

ceptance, the German Government, as noted above, made the return of its colonies one of its principal war aims.

This, however, was not the full extent of the German pretensions. The private dreams for a great German *Mittelfrika* were not given diplomatic expression from the *Wilhelmstrasse*, but occasional official statements were sufficiently directional so that the existence of wide ambitions could be reasonably inferred. Dr. Solf, the German Colonial Secretary, made a speech in Karlsruhe in February, 1917, in which he said that there must be a just redistribution of all African territory, after the return of Germany's colonies. The standard of such redistribution should be the ratio of the physical strength of the states concerned, and the ratios of their economic needs and productive capacities. "It is enough to point to the over-extensive possessions of France, Portugal, and Belgium clearly to recognize that the present distribution of colonial possessions does not correspond to this just standard."¹⁹

Authoritative statements similar to this, coupled with broad claims advanced by various organizations in Germany,²⁰ gave rise to the feeling in the Allied countries that if Germany won the war she would greatly augment her African territories at their expense. Diplomatically speaking, the Germans were at a disadvantage since, if they were to make any colonial gains

¹⁹ *Times*, Feb. 26, 1918. As late as September 30, Dr. Solf stated that "The Imperial Government adheres firmly to its demand for the return of our African and South Sea possessions, as well as a fresh partition of Africa such as to consolidate our scattered possessions." *Times*, Oct. 3, 1918.

²⁰ *Times*, June 1, 1918, quotes *Germania*, the Berlin paper of the Center Party as saying that "'The more hopes are based upon an extensive German Central Africa, the more clearly will it be seen that such expectations are not realizable if German sea power is restricted to the Atlantic Ocean. German sea power must embrace the Indian Ocean.'" Similarly, the *Kreuz Zeitung* is reported to have said that "'a self-contained German Central Africa, equipped with a strong white and coloured army, will never permit her neighbours to transfer a single man from Africa to the European theatre of war. . . . The peace of Europe will be anchored in the redistribution of Africa.'" *Times*, Aug. 7, 1918. See also Dr. Ebba Dahlin, *French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims, 1914-1918* (Palo Alto, California, Stanford U. Press, 1933), p. 69.

from the war, they had to demand not only their lost possessions, but also parts of other empires. This made their claims seem excessively large alongside those of the Allies, who had merely to stand pat on their conquests. Furthermore, the indefinite nature of the German measurement of the size of a desirable place in the sun, allowed hostile commentators full scope for invidious amplification of possible German intentions in the "dark Continent." The limits of Allied expansion in Africa, on the other hand, were reached during the War, and such vagueness as here existed had relation not to dreams of further acquisitions, but only to the question of transfer to the Allies of territory they had already won.

After the Armistice, the German Government hoped that its colonies would be salvaged by the Fifth of the Fourteen Points.²¹ The Foreign Minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, said that "in the sense of this program we await the handing back of our colonial possessions which we have had taken from us, partly in contravention of international treaties and partly under shabby pretexts."²²

21 "A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined."

22 Speech at Weimar, Feb. 14, 1919, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Feb. 15, 1919. In this speech Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who also held the portfolio of the Colonial Office, admitted that the Germans had in the past made mistakes with regard to the treatment of the natives; and he favored for the future an international control of all tropical colonies, with a proportionate share for Germany in the new system. See review of German press comment on the speech in *ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1919. Herr Erzberger expressed a similar attitude, according to the *Times*, of Feb. 10, 1919. See also *Times*, April 14, 1919 for an account of a petition claimed to have been signed by over three million people, which based Germany's right to retain her colonies on President Wilson's Fifth Point. For documents on the peace settlement and a collection of opinions just after the War, see Hans Poeschel, *Die Kolonialfrage im Frieden von Versailles* (Berlin, Mittler, 1920). See especially the opinion of the Colonial Commission of the German Delegation, p. 24 ff., and speeches by German statesmen, p. 39 ff.

In Great Britain the end of the War resulted in a hardening of opinion on the fate of the German colonies. Early in the War, the question had been raised as to whether the colonies should be given back to Germany. Later on, this question had been answered in the negative, but the Government and the press were non-committal on the identity of the transferees. A month after the Armistice, a White Paper²³ was published, giving statements by many natives of their antagonistic attitude toward their former masters. It included declarations by British administrators that a plebiscite could not be adapted to African or Samoan conditions, and that the natives, except in East Africa, were almost universally opposed to being returned to German rule, and that even in East Africa there was only a minority which preferred to remain under German control.²⁴

Coming out into the open with what might have been an inspired *ballon d'essai*, the *Times*, on January 31, 1919, took editorial notice on the one hand, of the desire of certain of the Dominions to annex some of the German colonies, and, on the other hand, of the view of the Government of the United States that all conquered possessions should be placed under a mandatory system. The *Times* plumped for the Empire. "By all the laws of race, geography, and convenience, it is far better to hand them over frankly to the Dominions of South Africa, Australia, or New Zealand, as the case may be, than to constitute them beneficiaries under reluctant trustees." The sacrifices of the Dominions in the War had been great, and they were entitled to "something more than consideration in a matter which concerns them deeply." Obviously the colonies could not go back to Germany: "The man-eating tribes in

23 Cd. 9210, 1918.

24 See comments in the *Times*, Dec. 12, 1918, on this White Paper. There was no statement of British policy in this document, although some of the testimony by natives indicated their desire to be ruled by Britain rather than by Germany. While one of the administrators' reports said a plebiscite could not be proposed seriously by anyone familiar with "the native mind," the natives' testimony, signed with a cross, was presented as of some importance in showing the nature of native opinion.

German East Africa from which she recruited her soldiers are the only natives of whose good will she can boast." ²⁵ Also, a probably unregenerate Germany would use her colonies in the future only as submarine bases to threaten Great Britain and "the peaceful maritime highways of the world." ²⁶

This attitude was not shared by the Labour Party,²⁷ but was probably representative of a majority of the British people at the time. The Government's own reports showed that the Germans had mistreated their native charges, and that the natives wanted to remain free from the German yoke. Therefore, the Germans could not regain their colonies. The only acceptable aspirants for the territories were those who had made sacrifices to obtain them. Otherwise Britain and the Dominions would have no tangible territorial evidence of victory. Furthermore, the newly-acquired, if as yet undefined status of the Dominions *vis à vis* the mother country, would find suitable recognition if they should all have little empires of their own. In view of a prevailing opinion along these lines, British and Dominion acquiescence in the scheme for supervision by the Mandates Commission was looked upon as a generous and self-denying action.²⁸

²⁵ The Council of the Royal Colonial Institute addressed a request to the Government not to consent to any arrangement which would leave any doubt as to the future of the (already) "late German Colonies." The Dominions should be confirmed in their conquests, and if international supervision were found necessary it should be limited to general rules similar to those laid down in interstate conventions concerning Tropical Africa. *Times*, Feb. 11, 1919.

²⁶ Speech by Lord Curzon, Lord President of the Council, *Parl. Deb.*, Lords, July 3, 1919, vol. 35, col. 165.

²⁷ Mr. Ramsay MacDonald at the International Socialist Conference at Berne, said that the Labour Party favored a system of international control for the ex-German colonies. *Times*, Feb. 10, 1919.

²⁸ Cf. speech by Lord Curzon, cited, n. 26: "At the same time—and this is, I think, more important from our point of view—the Allies have declined to allow these colonial acquisitions to be treated as the spoil of their conquerors, or to be bartered about as if they were the possession of this and that State, to be exploited in the interests of the owners. . . . The mandatory is definitely placed in the position not of owner but of trustee." See also Mr.

Viewing the situation as a whole, and considering the atmosphere of opinion in the first six months of 1919, it is difficult to see how less drastic colonial terms could have been written into the treaty. The demands of the Dominions were imperative, and the French were only slightly less anxious for outright annexation. The British overcame some early scruples against accepting additional imperial burdens, and the Americans, having won acceptance for the principle of international supervision, did not press for rigid or complete control through the League.²⁹ This problem was unimportant to the Great Powers when compared with the questions of reparations or of the Rhine frontier; and this consideration was perhaps of some significance in reaching a relatively moderate solution against the objections of the Dominions.

Lloyd George's defence, on the same date, of the colonial sections of the Treaty. *Ibid.*, *Commons*, vol. 117, col. 1216. "The extension of our territory and of our control, in Africa and the Middle East, is, in fact, so far as we are concerned, the one positive and solid result of the War." L. S. Amery, *The Forward View* (London, Bles, 1935), p. 249.

²⁹ See on this David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London, Gollancz, 1938), and David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (Privately Printed, 1928). Mr. Lloyd George notes that at the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on Nov. 20, 1918, there was an "absence of any real desire on the part of the representatives of Great Britain to add any more territory to the vast areas of undeveloped land now under the flag." Vol. i, p. 115. However at a later meeting where the colonial question was discussed, "All the observations made were on the accepted basis that not a single captured colony should be restored to Germany by the Peace Treaty," *ibid.*, p. 115.

Mr. Lloyd George inferred from the discussion "that with one exception the Cabinet would not be averse to handing over the Mandate for East Africa to the United States of America," *ibid.*, p. 122. At the Conference, however, the British Government made no protest against becoming a Mandatary. Mr. Lloyd George, seconding Mr. Balfour, said on Jan. 28, 1919 that "as far as the British Empire was concerned, most of the conquests had been accomplished by the British troops, and as far as these territories were concerned, Great Britain would be prepared to administer them under such conditions as might be laid down by the League of Nations. He could see no difficulties except perhaps difficulties of definition." Miller, *Diary*, vol. xiv, p. 44. For speech by M. Simon (France) favoring annexation and opposing the mandate idea see *ibid.*, p. 36 ff.

Starting with the commentary on the conditions of peace, a campaign against the colonial settlement has been carried on by the German Government, and, more vehemently, by various unofficial organizations in Germany. The course of this campaign, and particularly its reception abroad, may be divided into three chronological phases from the point of view of one who is interested in peaceful change. The first of these, the period of quiescence, extends from 1919 to the Locarno Conference in the fall of 1925. The second period ended with the accession of Chancellor Hitler, and the third runs from the beginning of 1933 down to the present time.

2. THE PERIOD OF QUIESCENCE, 1919-1925

During these first years, the German Government took no diplomatic action in relation to the former colonies. It was absorbed in the more immediate questions of internal strife, inflation, and reparation disputes; and there was before 1925 no good chance for the opening of any colonial discussions. Privately, however, a program of propaganda designed to maintain the interest of the German people in the lost colonies was carried on by groups of ex-colonial administrators, former colonists returning from Africa, veterans who had fought with von Lettow-Vorbeck, and commercial interests with a past or potential stake in the tropics. A specialized body of writings about the *Kolonialschuldfrage* began to develop. This subject did not gain the attention given to the *Kriegsschuldfrage* in Germany, nor was it so widely studied abroad, but a devoted minority endeavored with considerable success to keep it before the public eye.

The *Tropeninstitut* continued its outstanding work on tropical diseases, and several magazines devoted to colonial affairs remained in publication.³⁰ In 1924 was held the first in a series of post-war colonial congresses. It was attended by delegates

³⁰ For detailed discussion of the various activities of the colonialists, see M. E. Townsend, "Contemporary Colonial Movement in Germany," *Pol. Sci. Quart.* (1928), pp. 64-75; Evans Lewin, "German Colonial Ambitions," *Outlook* (London, 1925), pp. 38-9.

from the various societies, and it passed a resolution asking the Government to make its entry into the League of Nations conditional upon Germany's being granted territory under mandate.³¹

In Great Britain during this period there appears to have been little discussion of the German colonial claims. It was known of course that a campaign was being carried on in Germany, but almost no attention was given to it. Diplomatically it was beneath notice and, since it seemed harmless, it was generally ignored. True, the Duke of Portland asked³² that the facilities of the post be refused to German societies sending out literature "of a very misleading propagandist character," relating to the colonies; and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Under-secretary of State for the Colonies, admitted that "the mere fact that propaganda is still going on in Germany makes it absolutely incumbent upon us" to give Tanganyika "at least as good and complete an administration as was given by the Germans in that country before the war."³³ These, however, were only surface cracks in a nearly pyramidal impassivity.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore's remark is, in another way, of more than passing interest. If the British set their minimum goal as trustees no higher than the level of the pre-war German administration, then the British conception of native policy is sadly lacking in humaneness, unless the charges of brutality made against the Germans in the Blue-book of 1918 are only

³¹ *Times*, Sept. 18, 20, 1924. Wolf von Dewall, in his *Der Kampf um den Frieden* (Frankfurt, Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei, 1929), says the German Cabinet on September 23, 1924 decided to enter the League on four conditions, a minor one of which was the receipt of a mandate by Germany. p. 153. A memorandum was presented to members of the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1924 by Herr Ludwig Scholz, described as a "pioneer German colonist," in which it was urged that the Commission should arrange a colonial conference with a view to a restoration of the former German colonies. *New York Times*, *New York World*, Nov. 7, 1924. There is apparently no mention of this memorandum in the transactions of the Commission.

³² In a letter to the *Times*, March 8, 1921.

³³ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, July 25, 1923, vol. 167, col. 503.

dubiously supportable, or at best inadequate as a basis for a blanket indictment. Mr. Ormsby-Gore would no doubt have chosen the second of these interpretations, and he would have been supported by others who had preceded him in saying a good word for the German administration.³⁴

It is interesting to recall a slight deviation from the general assumption that all was well with the colonial *status quo*. Lord Lugard, author of "The Dual Mandate," and an eminent colonial administrator, suggested in 1924 that it would have been wise to throw open the door to German business in her former colonies. "To deny access to direct sources of raw materials and markets, vitally necessary to an industrial nation of 60,000,000 souls, must necessarily engender bitterness and resentment and add to the incentives of a new war."³⁵

3. THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING, 1925-1933

In the period just reviewed no diplomatic cognizance was taken of the German desire to regain her colonial empire. No demands, not even any requests, were officially made. Therefore, no governmental response was necessary. The status of the colonies was not an international issue, whatever the noise made by unauthorized and irresponsible propagandists; and

³⁴ See, e. g. *Times*, *Empire Supplement*, May 25, 1920. An article about Tanganyika from a correspondent states that "The Germans were very enterprising in developing the agricultural possibilities of their colony and had established five experimental stations. . . . These have been kept going by the British authorities, and ought to prove of the highest value in the future development of the country." The *Empire Supplement* of May 24, 1921 prints a "widely quoted saying" of the natives of Tanganyika, "to the effect that 'The words of the Germans were fierce, but their hearts were right. The Englishman speaks us smoothly but his tongue is crooked.'" An article in the *Times* of May 24, 1922 on Tanganyika notes that "The Germans had so largely understood the value of local schools that to-day it is possible to communicate in writing with every village headman and to receive his report in Swahili."

³⁵ Speech before the Royal Society of Arts, June 2, 1924, *Times*, June 3, 1924. Cf. in this connection *Times*, Sept. 16, 1920, where an article on Tanganyika said: "There is no foundation for the rumour, which is said to be circulating in Tanganyika Territory that the country is to be given back to Germany."

no problem of peaceful change arose. At Locarno, however, the question was broached, and the British and French statesmen had to decide whether or not any modifications should be carried through. In effect, their decision was in the negative, although formally Germany's eligibility as a mandatory was in principle admitted. The Locarno Treaties did not refer to the colonies; but Herr Stresemann was given verbal assurance by M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain that Germany, "as a member of the League of Nations, would be a possible candidate for Colonial mandates, like all other members."³⁶

This of course did not mean that Germany would shortly receive a mandate. Sir Austen Chamberlain told the British Press Representatives that Germany might receive a mandate should one be created or fall vacant, "but there was no idea of depriving any State of a Mandate that it already held."³⁷ Mr. Noel Buxton asked the Prime Minister some time later if he could "assure the House that the attitude of the Government in regard to future mandates and possible German occupation has not been modified since Locarno?" Mr. Baldwin replied: "Oh, certainly not."³⁸

Nevertheless, the apparently harmless granting to Germany of equality in status, if not in possessions, caused some uneasiness in Britain. Letters were written to the *Times*,³⁹ and that

³⁶ Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, March 18, 1926. *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 193, col. 601. This identical phrasing was used by Mr. Baldwin on July 6, 1926, in answering a question. *Ibid.*, vol. 197, col. 1874. Mr. Locker-Lampson reiterated his earlier statement on July 1, 1926. *Ibid.*, vol. 197, col. 1342.

³⁷ *Times*, October 24, 1925.

³⁸ *Parl. Deb.*, July 6, 1926, vol. 197, col. 1874. Mr. Baldwin's negative applied, of course, to the modification of the Government's policy. See also the reply by Sir Austen Chamberlain to a question by Lieutenant-Commander J. M. Kenworthy (Lab) on April 22, 1929. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the attitude of the Government had not been modified since Locarno, nor had the colonial question "really been under discussion" since that time. *Ibid.*, vol. 227, col. 615.

³⁹ See *e. g.*, those by G. H. Lepper, Oct. 5, 1926, and Captain A. Gault MacGowan, Oct. 9, 1926. Mr. Lepper considered the adoption of the man-

paper found it desirable to publish two editorials less than a month apart, reassuring its readers in one of them "that the uneasy feeling that these remote settlers [in Tanganyika] might be given away as a gesture in the interests of European good feeling or bartered away in negotiation, is not founded upon any solid calculations."⁴⁰

Another source of disturbance in British imperial circles was the increasing propaganda activity of the colonial societies in Germany. The second Colonial Congress was held in March, 1925 and, with the prospects of Germany's entry into the League, the campaign for a mandate or mandates grew in intensity. Just before the initialing of the Locarno agreements, Dr. Schacht declared that Germany could carry through the Dawes Plan if she were able to obtain raw materials from her own colonies,⁴¹ and the gaining of a mandate was one of the points in the last-minute telegram sent to Herr Stresemann by the Nationalist Party asking him to require a written promise of various concessions by France and Great Britain.⁴² Early in 1926 the *Kolonial Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft*, known as the *Korag*, requested the Government to demand the return of all

dates system a blunder, "since it left the way open for a persistent campaign by Germany in favour of restoring her former colonies as soon as she had secured the vantage point of a seat on the Council of the League."

⁴⁰ Oct. 5, 1926. In the earlier editorial, Sept. 11, 1926, it was said that Germany's "supposed ambition to become a Mandatory State under the League may, for the present, be regarded merely as a vain aspiration, because no mandate is available."

⁴¹ *Times*, Oct. 6, 1925. See also his later speech outlining the German need for colonies from the economic point of view, *ibid.*, March 26, 1926. Dr. Schacht again took up the colonial argument in his Memorandum on Reparations, presented to the Young Plan Commission, April 16, 1929. "If Germany is to assume the engagements specified in this plan without running more and more heavily into the debt of other countries, she must be placed in a position to build up for herself once more her sources of raw materials beyond the seas." Text (tr) in *Times*, April 22, 1929. In an editorial the *Times* considered the colonial issue quite irrelevant to that of reparations (April 22, 1929) and later expressed its satisfaction that this political pitfall had been avoided. (June 7, 1929).

⁴² *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1925.

the former German Colonies before entering the League of Nations.⁴³ The *Korag's* program was gently criticized by the *Times* for "a certain impetuosity which it may be hoped will be restrained when German representatives find themselves actually cooperating in the work of the League."⁴⁴

At about this time a good deal of comment was caused in Great Britain by the publication of a book by Dr. Heinrich Schnee, ex-Governor of German East Africa.⁴⁵ Dr. Schnee's principal purpose was to disprove and explain away the charges made by the Allies against the German administration before the War. He quotes Sir Harry Johnston and other English observers who had praised the Germans as colonizers, outlines the educational, health, and other work done in the colonies by German officials, and, while admitting certain cases of mal-administration, charges that their total importance had been exaggerated.

He denounced the Versailles settlement as hypocritical, and said that Germany must be "reinstated in the ranks of colonizing Powers."⁴⁶ The book was reviewed favorably in several English papers,⁴⁷ and probably was of considerable influence in modifying opinion hitherto entirely dependent upon the

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1926. Cf. report of an article in *Tägliche Rundschau* of April 6, 1926, in which it is declared that Germany, once in the League will take the earliest opportunity of announcing her demands for a colonial mandate. *Ibid.*, April 7, 1926. The correspondent says that "Perhaps on no question is public opinion so sensitive or so determined that Germany shall in some form or another, resume Colonial activity at the earliest possible moment."

⁴⁴ Editorial, July 29, 1926. A semi-official color to the colonial campaign was given in a speech by Herr Külz, Minister of the Interior of the Reich, in which the return of the colonies on grounds of "Right, honour, and of economic political and cultural equality of states and self-determination" was proclaimed. *Ibid.*, April 14, 1926.

⁴⁵ *German Colonization Past and Future*, Introduction by William Harbutt Dawson (London, Allen & Unwin, 1926).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁴⁷ The *Times'* review defended the mandatory administrations against Dr. Schnee's charges, but admitted that there was something to be said for his case concerning the German record. (June 15, 1926.)

Blue-book. It apparently gave rise to the above-mentioned questions in the House, and also to some reassuring remarks by Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and for the Colonies. At an East African Dinner, Mr. Amery noted that there existed fear that there was something "temporary and uncertain" in British tenure of Tanganyika. This "mistaken notion" was due merely to a misunderstanding of the meaning of the term "mandate." He said that "we held Tanganyika under our obligations to the League of Nations, but we held it in our own right under the Treaty of Versailles. The foundations of the East Africa of the future were as sure and as permanent in Tanganyika as they were in any other East African territory. (cheers)"⁴⁸

Shortly afterwards, as a result of comment abroad, Mr. Amery in a speech at the Corona Club emphasized Britain's intention of fulfilling her mandatory obligations, but, so far as concerned the permanence of British control over Tanganyika, he stated that he could not do better than repeat a remark of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's: "What I have said, I have said." (cheers)"⁴⁹

There were immediate reactions in Germany against Mr. Amery's views in the form of a protest by the Inter-Party Colonial Association of the Reichstag, and an article by Dr. Schnee, charging that Mr. Amery was placing British tenure before the duties of Britain to the League. Both of these statements referred to the recognition at Locarno of Germany's mandatory eligibility, indicating the importance to Germans of the new status.⁵⁰

The question was sufficiently alive for the publication of a special article in the *Times* of July 28, 1926. The theme of the article, written by the Berlin correspondent, was that the colonial agitation was not of great importance. Dr. Schnee was

⁴⁸ *Times*, June 12, 1926. It will be noted that this is not a direct quotation. However, it probably needs changes only in tense to make it accurate.

⁴⁹ *Times*, June 24, 1936.

⁵⁰ *Times*, June 28, 1936.

represented as being at the bottom of most of it, and few Germans would press it at the risk of alienating British goodwill. "The only risk that the colonial question might become a danger lies in the suspicion that in other quarters Great Britain is pursuing a policy inimical to German interests."⁵¹

The active campaign for colonies was carried on by a small minority, but there was a considerable number of Germans who, if they did not strongly desire that the Reich should possess colonial power again, were anxious that the stain on her reputation represented by the *Kolonialschuldliüge* should be removed. Many of these were satisfied by the Locarno admission,⁵² but others, particularly in "colonial circles", desired material evidence of Germany's vindication in the form of a mandate or mandates.⁵³ Herr Stresemann was apparently

⁵¹ The organ of the Center Party, *Germania*, expressed views which offered support to the minimization of the importance of the colonial question in saying that "the shoe pinches elsewhere than in Africa," and "our political life has tasks much more important and urgent than the wresting of a few colonial mandates. The impression must not be conveyed that we can be induced by a few colonial crumbs to forgo [*sic*] other more vital interests elsewhere." *Times*, July 31, 1926. Cf. *Times*, Aug. 2, 3, 5, 1926 for reports that the Colonial Congress at Hamburg, while marked by local enthusiasm, did not obtain much space in the press in other cities. See above p. 65, n. 43, for a different view.

⁵² See report of the views of Herr Müller, Chancellor of the Reich and member of the Socialist Party, in *Times*, Aug. 4, 1928. Herr Müller considered that Germany had no capital for colonial development, and that she enjoyed a high prestige among colonial peoples because she no longer engaged in their exploitation.

⁵³ See speech by Herr Jarres, Mayor of Duisburg, before the *Kolonialgesellschaft*, *Times*, Nov. 24, 1926. There is a considerable body of writing by Germans on the colonial issue between 1925 and 1934. The majority of the authors favored the regaining of the colonies, but a few advised the renunciation of imperial ambitions. Among these latter were: A. Mendelssohn Bartholdy, "Vier Europäische Aufgaben: I. Mandatsgemeinschaft in Mittelfrika," *Europäische Gespräche*, Nov.-Dec., 1932; M. J. Bonn, "German Interests in the Pacific," *Inst. Intatl. Relations. Proceedings*, April, 1930; A. Etscheid, "Braucht Deutschland Kolonialbesitz?" *Koloniale Rundschau*, August, 1926; Karl Wehrstedt, *Die handelspolitische Bedeutung der deutschen Kolonien* (Hildesheim, 1926); Paul Rohrbach, "Siedlung in Afrika als deutsches Kolonialproblem," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Jan., 1934.

Of those desirous of regaining the colonies may be mentioned: Dr. Theodor

willing for the time being to trust the further development of the Locarno spirit, for he made no demands for German mandatisation. At a meeting of the German colony in Geneva during the Seventh Assembly, he mentioned the loyalty of the native ex-subjects toward Germany and said that it could now be confidently asserted "that Germany had the same right to possess colonies as any other people."⁵⁴

For some time after Locarno, the colonial question received little attention in Germany or Great Britain. Lord Noel Buxton and Dr. Schnee had a little correspondential tiff,⁵⁵ but the controversy lagged until it was given fresh material in 1927 by British moves toward East African federation. However, an important statement by Sir Donald Cameron deserves some notice. In his opening address to the first session of the new Legislative Council in 1927, the Governor of Tanganyika said that the mandate "constitutes merely an obligation and not a form of temporary tenure under the League of Nations. This obligation does not make British control temporary, any more than other treaty obligations . . . render temporary British control over Kenya or Uganda, which are no more and no less

Seitz, *Vom Aufsteig und Niederbruch deutscher Kolonialmacht* (Karlsruhe, 1927); R. Böhmer, "Kolonialpolitik oder Proletarisierung?", *Deutsche Rundschau*, Jan., 1929; A. Full, "Die Zukunft der Kolonien," *Koloniale Rundschau*, Oct., 1931; Professor Dr. R. Hennig, "Das koloniale Mandats-system und die Frage neuer deutscher Kolonien," *Der Weg zur Freiheit*, Oct. 15, 1933.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1926.

Seitz, *Vom Aufsteig und Niederbruch deutscher Kolonialmacht* (Karlsruhe, 1927). Mr. Amery's attitude on British permanence in Tanganyika. *Times*, May 12, 1927. Dr. Schnee made certain criticisms of this speech in a letter in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 15 (*Times*, May 16), and Lord Noel Buxton wrote to the *DAZ*, May 21, 1927, saying that while there may have been some mistakes and exaggerations in the Blue-book, its main allegations had not been refuted. He stated that he had said in his speech that "it was inconceivable that either of the two mandated territories, South-West Africa or Tanganyika, would go back to the possession they were in before the war." He expressed regret, however, that "under present conditions" he had referred to the past, and "revived these controversial questions." *Times*, May 21, 1927.

likely to remain under that control than is the Tanganyika territory. I make this statement with the full authority of His Majesty's Government." Referring to the chiefs and other natives of the territory, he added that he had told them repeatedly in "the last 18 months that Tanganyika is a part of the British Empire and will remain so; to them the words I am now using will be repeated. To them these words are a pledge."⁵⁶

The issue of East African federation was brought into the limelight in 1927 with the appointment by Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, of a commission to study the problem of closer union between the three territories—Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. The question was not a new one. The possibility of East African federation had been provided for in Article 10 of the Tanganyika Mandate, on condition that no provision of the Mandate should be infringed. An important body of opinion in Kenya had for some time favored a federation⁵⁷ and it found some support in Britain. Early in 1926 a conference of the governors of the East African Territories had been held at Nairobi to discuss matters of mutual interest. Tse-tse control might, for example, be studied jointly to advantage. A slight beginning of cooperation already existed in the postal union between Kenya and Uganda, and the Hilton Young Commission, as it was called, was to examine how more effective cooperation could be best assured.⁵⁸

In Germany, the constitution of this Commission was interpreted as a move to sink the individuality of Tanganyika in a

⁵⁶ *Times*, Jan. 15, 1927. In this case the *Times* apparently reproduced a direct quotation. See Sir Donald Cameron's reaffirmation of this attitude in a speech before the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce, *Times*, Feb. 21, 1929. He was reported as saying that he "could not conceive of any conditions arising which would cause Britain's pledge to be repudiated."

⁵⁷ See Elspeth Huxley, *White Man's Country—Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya* (London, Macmillan, 1935), ch. xxii, vol. ii.

⁵⁸ See the White Paper, Cmd. 2904, 1927, for full terms of reference.

new union, so that by ceasing to exist independently, it would become irrecoverable.⁵⁹ However, it was not only upon this ground that the argument against the projected federation was based, but also on the ground that its realization would be contrary to the terms of the Mandate. A strong speech attacking the apparent intentions of Great Britain in East Africa was made in the Reichstag by Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven of the Nationalist Party.⁶⁰ He declared that the Locarno policy, reluctantly entered into by the Nationalists, had been shown by events to be a mistaken one, since there had been no liberation of the Rhineland, no discussion of Eastern frontiers, no revision of the Treaty, no greater protection of German minorities, and no return of the German colonies. German membership in the Mandates Commission had changed nothing, and here Tanganyika was going to be amalgamated with Kenya and Uganda. Herr Stresemann defended as an asset the Treaty guaranteeing the Rhineland, and claimed that self-preservation dictated the continuation of his policy. However, he was forced to admit that, unfortunately, "the fullest use had not been made" of the Locarno Treaties, and he regretted that French opinion still did not see that "the road remained to be cleared for the collaboration of all the countries concerned." In words that later would have been heard from Berlin with pleasure and given an active response, the Foreign Minister said that it was his opinion that Locarno was

⁵⁹ That this was no idle suspicion is shown in a speech by Mr. George M. Gillett of the Labour Party during the debate on the appropriations for the Hilton Young Commission. Mr. Gillett said that there existed "a very distinct policy amongst the white population of Kenya to attempt to bring about this federation as soon as possible for the avowed purpose that Tanganyika may never again become part of the German Empire." He quoted the *East African Standard* "of over a year ago" as saying that "Only by grappling the mandated territory to the other British territories . . . will there be any proper safeguard against the danger that Tanganyika, despite the declarations of the present British cabinet, may once more be cut out from the group of territories which by all natural considerations, will eventually form a great East African Dominion or Federation of States." *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, Feb. 20, 1928, vol. 213, cols. 1285-6.

⁶⁰ *Stenographische Berichte*, III Wahlperiode, Jan. 30, 1928, p. 12504 ff.

not the end, "but the beginning of a development of common effort to maintain peace against aggressors whoever they might be, and perhaps therefrom might come an agreement upon common economic arrangements in many questions."⁶¹ Asked directly by Dr. Schnee as to the Government's attitude on the proposed East African Union, Herr Stresemann said that the Government of course opposed with all its energy any such alteration of the mandatory rules.⁶²

The publication of the Report of the Hilton Young Commission⁶³ was the occasion for fresh protests in Germany, and it received attention in an important debate in the Reichstag. The Report favored an ultimate union under a single Governor-General, of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and the naming of a preliminary High Commissioner as executive with the power to coordinate policies on native affairs and services of common interest such as communications. Dr. Schnee said that the carrying out of the Report would amount to a "cold annexation" of Tanganyika, and charges of violation of the Mandate were made in the press.⁶⁴

On June 24, 1929 the question was again aired in the Reichstag, but in no belligerent fashion. Dr. Bell of the Center Party expressed a not uncommon view by directing a question to the Council of the League of Nations. Since the charge against Germany's colonizing capacity had been retracted in conversations at Locarno, he asked: "When may we expect reparation for the colonial injustice done to Germany?"⁶⁵

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1928, p. 12558.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1928, p. 12568.

⁶³ Jan. 17, 1929, Cmd. 3234. The Chairman of the Commission, Sir E. Hilton Young, did not agree on some points with the majority report.

⁶⁴ *Times*, Jan. 19, Feb. 1, 1929. However, the *Frankfurter Zeitung's* London correspondent took the view that federation would not be contrary to the terms of the Mandate. *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1929.

⁶⁵ Reichstag, *Sten. Ber.*, IV Wahlperiode, vol. 425, pp. 2872-3, June 24, 1929. Dr. Schnee took a similar line, dwelling on the failure of the Locarno spirit to become embodied in African form. *Ibid.*, p. 2836 ff. Dr. Schnee was a member of the German Peoples Party.

Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven, for the Nationalists, proposed no more than that the Government should ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for a decision on the application and interpretation of the Tanganyika Mandate, with reference, of course, to the Hilton Young Report.⁶⁶

Herr Stresemann, while not committing himself on this suggestion, stated that in his opinion the recommendations of the Report "are not compatible in their aims with the *Mandats-charakter Ostafrikas*, even though in the Report it is stated that they do not conflict with the Mandate." He gave warning that an "actual menace to the mandate system would be opposed by the German Government with all the means at its disposal." This, however, could not be interpreted as a threat to use force, since Herr Stresemann added that he hoped for support from all those "who see in the mandate system one of the essential parts of the treaties which ended the war. (lively applause)"⁶⁷

Equal and parallel enthusiasm did not greet Herr Stresemann's views in London. The *Times* said that it was the "conviction of this and other British Governments that, unless and until the Mandates Commission condemns the administration of Tanganyika Territory, as offending against the principles of the League, there can be no conceivable reason for transferring this particular mandate into other hands."⁶⁸ The

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2870.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2877-78. See also Herr Stresemann's declaration in the Council of the League of Nations on the Hilton Young Report, September 6, 1929. In commenting favorably on the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, he approved the Commission's drawing the attention of the Council to discussions in which the majority "had felt some anxiety" about the future of Tanganyika, and said that "there could be no question of any confusion arising which would call in question the existence of the territory under mandate as a politically independent unit, and which would consequently render doubtful the permanency of the League's control over the execution of the mandate." L. of N. Council, 56th Session, *O. J.*, No. 11, November, 1929, p. 1470. Mr. Henderson, British Foreign Secretary, assured the Council that any definite decision on the Hilton Young Report would be communicated to the Mandates Commission for its comments. p. 1471.

⁶⁸ Editorial, June 27, 1929.

phrase "other British Governments" was necessary not only because of Labour's looming strength, but also because of evidence that certain Opposition members were in sympathy with the German point of view.⁶⁹ The reference to "this particular mandate" is also interesting because its precision automatically turns attention to those mandates excluded. The only areas which could have been intended are Togo and the Cameroons, since the remaining German mandates were in other hands. However, these territories did not figure importantly in the German claims, which concentrated first on Tanganyika and secondarily on Southwest Africa. Both the latter were much larger than Germany, both produced valuable raw materials, and both were "white men's countries."⁷⁰ Several hundred Germans had entered Tanganyika in the years following 1926, when the ban was lifted and Germans were allowed to return. To Britain also, Tanganyika was of first importance. A considerable number of influential English settlers had pioneered in the territory, capital had been invested, and this growing stake required security.⁷¹ The territory made possible the

69 See, *e. g.*, speech by Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy, who, in Supply, was trending in a vein sympathetic to German colonial aspirations when cut off by the Chairman as not speaking to the question at issue—the Hilton Young Commission Vote. *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, Feb. 20, 1928, vol. 213, col. 1296. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, taking part in the same debate, hoped that the Opposition would "not encourage the idea that, if the Labour party comes back into power they are anxious immediately to hand over to Germany those territories which we are now administering." *Ibid.*, col. 1306.

70 The Cameroons of 1914 measured about 305,000 sq. mi., or over half again as large as the Germany of 1929. However, the area of the mandate of the Cameroons (British and French) is only about 200,000 sq. mi. This reduction of one-third is due to the fact that France reincorporated into her colonial system the area which had been ceded to Germany in 1911 after the Agadir incident. See above, Ch. II, p. 32. This truncated Cameroons is still, however, slightly larger than Germany's area of about 185,000 sq. mi. in 1929. The area of the British share of the mandated Cameroons is only 35,000 sq. mi.

71 Cf. Times, Nov. 27, 1929 for report of action of the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce, consisting of 275 companies and individuals engaging in trade with East Africa. The section favored the

"all-red" Cape to Cairo route, was necessary to a well-rounded East African federation, and was of strategic importance at least in the sense that it might be dangerous in other people's hands.

Togo and the Cameroons are tropical areas, unfit for extensive settlement by Europeans, and their natural resources are of relatively little value. Thus, if the "particular" reference by the *Times* to Tanganyika might in any way have been considered a back-handed invitation for an inquiry about Togo and the Cameroons it could have seemed only a meager offer through German eyes.

In any case, it was not taken up, and the whole matter was settled in a manner acceptable to Germany but not for the reasons which Germans had suggested. A White Paper on Closer Union in East Africa was issued in June, 1930.⁷² It announced the Government's acceptance of the Hilton Young Commission's proposal, as modified by Sir Samuel Wilson's Report (Cmd. 3378, 1929), for a High Commissioner to supervise Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. He would advise the Secretary of State on native and other policy, and would administer and legislate with regard to certain "transferred" services: railways, posts, harbors, customs, extradition and research. This White Paper met with German criticism similar to that which had been going on for the previous three years.⁷³ The following year, however, the Report of the Joint

appointment of a High Commissioner for East Africa at the earliest moment. It was also urged that the Imperial Government should state as its considered policy "that Tanganyika shall be included in perpetuity in the administrative Union or Federation of East African Territories, in terms of the mandate."

In 1936 there were 8926 Europeans in Tanganyika, of whom 4165 were British (including South African Dutch), 2939 were German, and 893 were Greek. *Report . . . to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the Tanganyika Territory, 1936* (London, H. M. Staty. Off., 1937), p. 144.

⁷² Cmd. 3574, 1930.

⁷³ See *Times*, June 23, 27, November 22, 1930, for reports from Berlin. Herr Curtius, in the Reichstag on June 26, 1930 (*Sten. Ber.*, IV Wahlperiode, pp. 5888-9) reaffirmed Herr Stresemann's announcement of opposition to any

Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa,⁷⁴ rejected the proposal for making a single administrative unit from the three territories. This, a Parliamentary Committee, found that there was not sufficient local support for the union, and it recommended that the territories be left to grow along their own directions while cooperating through the Conference of Governors. In general, this has been the line of development down to the present time.⁷⁵

The colonial issue as an independent problem was pretty well submerged in the years immediately following 1929. It had never been of major importance, but interested groups had usually been able to prevent its disappearing from the public eye. During the economic crisis and the struggle for armament equality, the colonial question was absorbed in the

weakening of the mandate system, and said: "The German Government has for some time taken the fundamental stand, that Germany, on the basis of her colonial accomplishments, has good grounds for raising a claim for participating again in colonial activity." However, added Herr Curtius, it was of course out of the question to say anything definite as to time and form of such a claim. See also the protest against British plans for East African Federation, made by the Women's League of the *Kolonialgesellschaft*, Oct. 1, 1930, to the Permanent Mandates Commission. *Minutes*, 19th Session, Nov. 4-19, 1930, 1930 VI. A. 6. pp. 63-4.

74 House of Commons, Reports, No. 156, 1931. Dr. Schnee sent a protest against "amalgamation" of East Africa to this Committee. See also the speech by Herr Curtius in the Reichstag on February 10, 1931. He said the Government had at the beginning of September, 1930, made a protest to Britain on the plan for the unification of East Africa, on the ground that it was contrary to the mandate system. He added that the German Government "will leave no stone unturned in establishing the validity of the German conception of the inviolability of the independence of the Mandated Territories (Bravo)." *Sten. Ber.*, V Wahlperiode, vol. 444, p. 881.

75 See, however, concern expressed by members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, as to the functions of the East African Governors Conference, and also as to the implications of the issuance in 1935 of a common stamp for the three territories. *Minutes*, 27th Session, June 3-18, 1935, VI. A. I., pp. 125-30. See also *Minutes*, 34th Session, June 8-23, 1938, pp. 134-5 on Conference of Governors. The Report sent to the Council of the 34th Session made no mention of the Conference. For description of the stamps, see *Priced Catalogue of Stamps*, 1938, 44th ed. (London, Stanley Gibbons, Ltd., 1938), pp. 258-9.

discussion of treaty revision in general. It was in 1931 that concern about treaty revision became dissociated from negotiations over particular aspects of the peace settlement. The old questions were "What can Germany pay?" and "Are the Germans secretly arming?" New questions then began to appear in Great Britain. "How can we remove the feeling of injustice?" and "How can confidence among nations be restored?"

The source of this change lay in the changing situation in Germany. The rapid growth of the National Socialist and Communist parties made foreign observers fear the possible accession to power of one or the other, and their success forced the leaders of the moderate groups to strengthen the tone of their demarches. Herr Stresemann's policy of fulfillment thus disappeared in the demand for equality. The rise of the extremists was used by the Government parties in requesting a change in Germany's status,⁷⁶ and there was consequent uneasiness in Britain, and worried introspection. The state of mind of some Englishmen was made clear in a notable group of letters to the *Times*, in July, 1931. Sir Alexander Gordon on July 15 suggested that attention be given the notion of peace through contentment, rather than peace through disarmament, which was at the time diplomatically foremost; and he added that Britain should take the lead at Geneva in the direction of "appeasement", a word which later acquired

⁷⁶ See the speech by Dr. Kaas, leader of the Center Party, at Cassel, in which he is reported to have said: "Do they think in France that they can live on an Island of the Blessed if Eastern and Central Europe are caught by the Bolshevik blaze? I do not envy those who perceive in the guardianship of the *status quo* the acme of wisdom, for a day may come when they will awake and realize that they are guarding an empty grave." *Times*, Jan. 6, 1931.

It should be remarked, however, that Chancellor Brüning's attitude at this time was eminently moderate. At Chemnitz he said that "The German Government must content itself with winning ground step by step. Those who rule Germany must have the courage to tell the people the truth, even if in doing so they are shouted down." As reported in the *Times*, January 24, 1931.

prime ministerial sanction.⁷⁷ The following day, Wickham Steed attacked these views, saying that "surely the flames of discord are burning fiercely enough in Europe to-day without adding this highly explosive fuel to them." Mr. Steed evidently thought appeasement was no longer possible, for he said that if it were the secret and avowed policy of Germany to seek treaty adjustments peaceably, then "international confidence would begin to revive." "In an atmosphere of confidence much that is not possible to-day would be possible tomorrow."⁷⁸

In rejoinder Sir Alexander Gordon admitted that discussion of treaty revision would be disturbing, but he felt that most nations "would probably welcome it as leading to the only sure foundation of peace." He argued that disarmament alone was unlikely to ensure permanent peace, but that it must be accompanied or preceded by the restoration of confidence through "the application of justice and fairness" not only to Germany but to all nations.⁷⁹ Mr. Steed's position was also assailed by Mr. Horsfall Carter, who condemned British and French ministers for having evaded the issue of treaty revision "which above all should have been boldly tackled if there were ever to be any improvement in the psychological situation of Europe." He said further that "exasperated German nationalism is a perfectly intelligible reaction to this breach of faith on the part of the responsible leaders of Europe."⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Similar sentiments were expressed on the sixteenth by E. Windsor Bowen, who quoted an editorial in the *Sunday Times* of July 12 as stating with regard to the Treaty: "It is hardly pretended anywhere now that that instrument is perfect. There are modifications which everyone knows to be desirable."

⁷⁸ The same general line was taken on the same day in a letter by E. C. Arnold, who was answered on July 18, by N. B. Fuller.

⁷⁹ Letters of July 18 and 23, 1931. See also the proposals of Major John C. Daniell in the *Times*, July 18, 1931. He favored, *inter alia*, a British and American guarantee of the frontiers of France, Belgium and Italy, naval limitation by Germany, and military limitation by Germany and France, along with French permission for the Anschluss. "Great Britain might consider returning certain of the colonies lost by Germany."

⁸⁰ July 20, 1931.

The correspondence was completed by a letter from Arthur Hirst, who had recently been in Germany. He said that the "vast mass of the German people passionately believe that Germany was entirely guiltless in 1914 . . . and that the whole War and the Treaty of Versailles constituted the greatest crime in all history, against a noble and innocent people." He thought that it was "too late to do anything to counter this most fateful propaganda." In 1919 and 1920 the German people were humbled and chastened, but as a result of the war guilt lie campaign they had become "bitterly resentful," and he feared that Chancellor Brüning would be unable to carry through his great task. The letter inspired an editorial in the *Times*, on the same day, in which it was declared that "even if it is felt that the grievances are unjustified—as some of them undoubtedly are—the time has come when they should be examined with an open mind."⁸¹

A little over a year later, however, the *Times* was finding it difficult to maintain an open mind. The intensification of attacks upon the Treaty and of demands for equality "are bound to perpetuate ill-feeling, to prevent the healing of wounds of the War, and to render doubly difficult the task of those in other countries who try honestly to consider what features, if any, of the Peace Treaties may be wanting in fairness, and what adjustments they require."⁸² A month afterwards the same authority reiterated its opinion that revision was desirable, but issued the warning that "the one essential condition of revision, however, is that it should be achieved by negotiation and not by violence. Nothing would alienate so completely the popular desire in this country for justice all round as any attempt to alter boundaries by force."⁸³

⁸¹ July 28, 1931. However, see the *Times*' editorial of Oct. 27, 1931, in which it is stated that "It is not the policy of either the American or the British Government to urge revision of the Peace Treaties as a practical policy at the present time." This was in reply to some remarks of Senator Borah's on the occasion of M. Laval's trip to the United States, in favor of the revision of treaties, rather than the freezing of the *status quo*.

⁸² Editorial, Oct. 21, 1932.

⁸³ Editorial, Nov. 4, 1932.

This apparent willingness to come to terms over the Treaty was clearly due to an apprehension of dire consequences to Germany and to Europe if the republican forces in Germany could show their people no mitigation of what the people considered the economic and psychological inequalities they were made to endure. And yet there was already a suspicion in British minds that revision would not generate goodwill in Germany. The *Times*, for example, said with regard to armament equality, that "British public opinion would certainly regard any immediate and general concession of this kind as a provisional—not to say retrograde—step unless it was met by assurances such as earlier German Governments were prepared to give." ⁸⁴

But if British opinion was losing confidence because of militant trends in Germany, German opinion was losing confidence because of inaction in Great Britain. Chancellor Brüning said in a speech before the Berlin Association of the Provincial Press: "For the restoration of normal conditions, confidence is, above all, essential. How shall this confidence . . . develop so long as the provocative inequality between victors and vanquished persists?" ⁸⁵

When each party seeks the return of confidence by making demands upon the other, it is clear that confidence can be obtained only by mutual adjustment. Yet when confidence is so far lacking that its revival is brought into question, then mutuality of adjustment is with difficulty obtainable. To Britain the return of goodwill depended upon the ending of fanatical revisionism in Germany, and the repetition of the soothingly pacific assurances of Herr Stresemann. Unless these were forthcoming, and so long as the existing fear of forcible German action continued, Britain could not be expected to look

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Cf. the view of Sir Austen Chamberlain that concessions to Germany were used as pretexts for demanding more. "The moral he drew was: Back to Dr. Stresemann, back to Locarno, back to the policy of fulfillment so far as fulfillment was possible." Report of speech as President of the Debates Union of the University College of Wales, *Times*, Feb. 13, 1932.

⁸⁵ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 9, 1932.

favorably even upon those German claims which were admittedly justified.

On the other hand, Dr. Brüning implied that Germans could maintain no confidence in a policy of fulfillment unless some of their wishes were actually fulfilled. It might also be permissible to infer from Dr. Brüning's remarks that the cessation of the German manifestations of extreme nationalism, which British opinion required as an essential preliminary to concessions on its part, could be expected if at all, only as the result of the granting of concessions.

In these terms the impasse was complete, and so it continued until the end of the Weimar Republic. Later events gave rise to the reflection in Britain that these were not the only terms in which the situation might have been conceived, and that the impasse was not complete, but at the time no powerful voices were raised to point a way out.

In so far as the colonial issue was concerned, the situation in 1932 presented a curious reversal of the spirit of reconciliation so fulsomely expressed at Locarno and at the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. Many Germans had then expected that Germany's eligibility as a mandatory power would soon be followed by the return of some, at least, of her former colonies; for the justification for their transfer in 1919 had been that Germany was unfit to govern native races. As the years passed, however, and no mandate became available, mere eligibility was looked upon as devoid of meaning. True, Tanganyika was not swallowed up in an East African federation, but it remained apparently as far as ever from becoming once more German. Germany's membership on the Mandates Commission provided further evidence of her qualifications for African administration, but aside from offering opportunities for criticism, it gave no compensation for lack of territory.

The year 1932 closed with unlikely prospects for a revision of the status of the German colonies. Not only was confidence in the potential German use of colonies at a low point, but the

growth of economic nationalism during the depression had enhanced the value of colonial territory. At the same time, some slight chance for revision remained, for its discussion had at least made people in all countries aware of the problem and cognizant of some of its implications.

4. STANDPATTISM OR APPEASEMENT?

The triumph of National Socialism in Germany appeared to presage, for a time, the end of the campaign for colonies. Not only was internal consolidation the order of the day, but Nazi leaders were apparently opposed to colonial activity. In *Mein Kampf* the pre-War colonial policy is sharply criticized, particularly because it was a source of friction with England.⁸⁶ "We finally make an end of the colonial and trade policy of before the War, and begin the land policy of the future. When we speak today in Europe of new land, we can think in the first place only of Russia and the border states under her subjection."⁸⁷

In Herr Hitler's projected German foreign policy, overseas colonies were renounced with the aim of avoiding any possible clash with Great Britain. Britain is needed as a rear guard in the new *Germanenzug* toward the East. "No sacrifice is too great in order to win England's goodwill (*Geneigtheit*)."⁸⁸ Therefore, "Renunciation of world trade and colonies; renunciation of a German navy, concentration of the whole force of the state on the land army."⁸⁸

⁸⁶ (Munich, Franz Eher, Nachf., 1936), pp. 156-8.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 742. On this point see Robert Trapp, *Die Aussöhnung mit England* (Berlin, 1919). Trapp takes a point of view similar to Hitler's without the violently aggressive note. It would be interesting to know whether Hitler had been influenced by Trapp's views.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 154. The desire for British aid against Russia is a fundamental aim of German foreign policy as expressed in *Mein Kampf's* anti-colonialism, and its author's subsequent enunciation of colonial claims is explained in Germany by saying that the passages in *Mein Kampf* merely criticized former German policies, and they did not apply to post-1933 conditions. See on this, Dr. H. W. Bauer, *Kolonien oder Nicht?* (Leipzig, R. Bauer, 1935), preface by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. Inside the title page of this pamphlet

In addition, Herr Hitler was concerned with the desirability of obtaining land contiguous to Germany, in order to solve the great problem of "living room" for all Germans. "For we cannot visualize the solution of this question in the acquisition of colonies, but only in obtaining territory for settlement, which augments the area of the motherland itself, and in this way not only binds the new settlers in closest union with the *Stammland*, but also assures to the whole population all the advantages which lie in its united area."⁸⁹

In outline, this view is also taken by Alfred Rosenberg. He suggests that England might very well be sympathetic toward a German conquest in the northeast, if Germany should consider this as a substitute for overseas colonies;⁹⁰ and says that the German people, if it is not to perish, needs land. "This land can no longer be obtained in Africa, but must be secured in Europe, especially in the East."⁹¹

Finally, in its third point, the official program of the National Socialist Party declares: "We demand land and soil (colonies) for the nutrition of our people and for the settlement of our surplus population." This statement may, however, apply to land in Europe, rather than to overseas territory, and since it was formulated before *Mein Kampf* was written, that is, on

is the following statement: "Against the publication of this work no objection will be raised on the part of the N. S. D. A. P. (signed) The Chairman of the Official Party Board of Examiners for the Protection of N. S. literature."

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 741. Cf. interview with Hitler by a special correspondent in Munich, *Times*, June 9, 1931. Hitler then said that "the recovery of colonies is not a major German interest . . . but Germany must export; the export of goods becomes increasingly difficult, and therefore she must export men. If she has no colonies she must look elsewhere, and particularly towards the east."

⁹⁰ F. Th. Hart, *Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mann und sein Werk* (München, 1933), p. 59.

⁹¹ *Der Zukunftsweg einer Deutschen Aussenpolitik*, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 56. With these two considerations, according to Rosenberg, "the plan of a German foreign policy for centuries to come is formed."

February 25, 1920, it should be evaluated in relation to the anti-colonial ideas expressed therein.⁹²

This pre-Chancellorship disclaimer of colonial aspirations was not, however, maintained in more powerful days. In June, 1933, at the London Economic Conference, in response to requests sent to all delegations for statements of their views on the problems of the Conference, Dr. Hugenberg, former leader of the Nationalist Party, said that "from the German viewpoint, wise and peaceful cooperation between debtor and creditor countries might include two large-minded measures whereby Germany's capacity to make international payments might be increased. One of these steps would be to give Germany again colonial domain in Africa which might be used by her as a basis for the execution in this whole new territory of great works and constructions which would otherwise remain undone."⁹³ Immediately after the publication of this statement, it was disavowed by the other members of the German delegation, and Dr. Hugenberg left for Germany the next day. His resignation from the cabinet followed on June 29. Did this incident merely mean that the Nazi leaders wanted a good excuse to remove Dr. Hugenberg from power? Was his declaration intended as a trial balloon, or was the statement really only a personal opinion? In any case, the view thus presented was not significantly different from the official attitude adopted subsequently. A little later, in September, 1933, Franz von Papen, then apparently in good standing, claimed that "the great majority of 65,000,000 Germans refuse to regard the former colonies as lost possessions," and contended that

⁹² Text in Calvin Hoover, *Germany Enters the Third Reich* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), p. 229. See, however, Dr. H. W. Bauer, *op. cit.*: "The day must come when the third point of the National Socialist Program will be fulfilled in fact; when the new Germany will plant again on German East African soil its banners and standards..." p. 51.

⁹³ Official translation in article by Frederick T. Birchall, *New York Times*, June 17, 1933. The second measure referred by implication to the opening up of Russian territory to Germany.

"world stability cannot be established until Germany regains her place in the tropical sun."⁹⁴

Chancellor Hitler himself modified his earlier position, when he said in October, 1934, that "Germany contains too many people for her size, and it is to the interest of the world that a great nation should not be deprived of the conditions of existence, but we shall never go to war to get colonies. We are convinced that we are as capable as any other nation of administering and developing colonial territories, but we regard this as a matter for negotiation."⁹⁵

From 1934 down to 1939 the Chancellor has consistently expressed the opinion that Germany was concerned about the former colonies, and that on grounds of equity and economics, they should be returned.⁹⁶ Since 1933, German publicists have uniformly argued for the return of the colonies,⁹⁷ and a strong pro-colonial campaign has been carried on with no attempt at disguising its official sanction.⁹⁸ As a result of

94 "Germany's Place in the Tropical Sun," *Saturday Evening Post*, Sept. 30, 1933, p. 34. Cf. report of a colonial mass-meeting held under Nazi auspices, in *New York Times*, Dec. 11, 1933.

95 Interview with G. Ward Price, *New York Times*, Oct. 22, 1934. Others have, however, made threats. See Dr. Joachim Seegert, *Kolonial Schicksalsstunde der weissen Rasse* (Berlin, Bong, c. 1934). "If this way [toward colonies] along which we must go, is opened to us freely, so will our energies be limited to peaceful competition with other peoples." p. 39.

96 See his Memorandum to the Locarno Powers, March 7, 1936, quoted below, p. 128.

97 See, e. g., Major Paul Schnoeckel, *Die Weltpolitische Lage unter kolonialen Gesichtspunkten*, intro. by General Ritter (Franz) von Epp (Leipzig, Historisch-Politischer Verlag, 1935); R. Karlow, "Le point de vue allemand dans la question coloniale," *L'Esprit International*, July, 1936, pp. 355-71; Dr. H. Blumhagen, *Südwestafrika, einst und jetzt*, foreword by Dr. H. Schnee and preface by General Ritter von Epp (Berlin, Reimer and Vohsen, 1934); (this book is one of a series, "Koloniale Fragen im Dritten Reich," published by the *Kolonialgesellschaft*) August Full, *Fünzig Jahre Togo* (Berlin, 1935), in the same series; A. F. von Oertzen, *Nationalsozialismus und Kolonialfrage* (Nürnberg, 1935).

98 See M. E. Townsend, "The German Colonies and the Third Reich," 53 *Pol. Sci. Quart.* (1938), pp. 186-206, for details of the post-1933 colonial campaign. See also Evans Lewin, "German Colonial Propaganda," 27 *United Empire* (1936), pp. 175-9.

this pressure it is probable that the German people were, in 1939, more colony-conscious than at any other time since the War. In this sense, however, the Hitler régime merely carried on and intensified the pre-existing attitudes and policies on the colonial question. The only significant difference after 1933, a difference which was not immediately obvious, was that the National Socialists were more dangerous because they were stronger.

In view of this changed circumstance, what was the British reaction? What took the place of those long periods of indifference, punctuated by negatives, polite or categorical?

(a) BRITISH OPPOSITION TO GERMAN COLONIAL CLAIMS

When Herr Hitler obtained power, and his policies became clear, British confidence in a pacific German foreign policy was for a time almost completely destroyed.⁹⁹ Germany was no longer going to be tractable. Demands for treaty revision became imperative, and suspicion that Germany was rearming soon crystallized into certainty. One major opinion was early expressed by Sir Austen Chamberlain: "To come asking favors and concessions from other nations is useless unless a better spirit prevails, unless she [Germany] gives the security to Europe as to her intention the nations of Europe have the right to expect. This is not the moment to make concessions to Germany in this matter."¹⁰⁰ He was strongly seconded by Lord Grey of Fallodon shortly afterward. Lord Grey pointed out three ways in which concessions had been made to Germany — entry into the League, evacuation of the Rhineland,

⁹⁹ "The great security for peace at the present moment . . . is that Germany is not armed and in a position to go to war." *Times*, editorial, April 29, 1933, quoting Lord Grey of Fallodon.

¹⁰⁰ Speech at Birmingham, April 7, 1933, *Times*, April 8, 1933. See also his subsequent speech in the House: "Before you can afford to decide or to urge others to decide, you must see a Germany whose mind is turned to peace, who will use her equality of status to secure her own safety but not to menace the safety of others; a Germany which has learnt not only to live to herself but how to let others live inside her and beside her." *Parl. Deb.*, April 13, 1933, vol. 276, col. 2759.

and reparations, and said: "We cannot go on making concessions, or hold out the hand of peace continually, unless that gesture is to be reciprocated, and the present moment is not one in which we can go on with the same policy we would have pursued in the case of Herr Stresemann and Dr. Brüning."¹⁰¹ In an editorial on the same day, the *Times* hoped that Lord Grey's words would be understood in Germany "to be representative of the greater part of public opinion in Great Britain." Across the House from Sir Austen, Mr. Attlee took a similar view. "I think this House and this country ought to say that we will not countenance for a moment the yielding to Hitler and force what was denied to Stresemann and reason."¹⁰²

While this anti-concessionary reaction appeared to be dominant, it was not unanimously shared. Discussions of a four-power pact were proceeding early in 1933, and there was even official talk of treaty revision. Sir John Simon made cautious references in the House to the preparation of the ground for the application of Article 19.¹⁰³ Two months after Adolph Hitler became Chancellor, the *Times* lamented that "it must at last be admitted that it is not the fault of Germany that the issue [revision] was not squarely faced in the days of Herr Stresemann and Dr. Brüning,"¹⁰⁴ and even earlier it had begun to talk of the need "to remove legitimate causes of discontent."¹⁰⁵

101 Speech before the Liberal Council, April 28, 1933, *Times*, April 29, 1933.

102 *Parl. Deb.*, April 13, 1933, vol. 276, col. 2742. Commenting upon this unusual agreement between Sir Austen and Mr. Attlee, Miss Rathbone (Ind) said: "Since I have been a member of the House, I have seldom been in a debate in which feeling seemed to be so unanimous." *Ibid.*, col. 2762. The *Times*, April 15, 1933, said editorially that from this debate "emerged the clear conclusion that Germany has forfeited during the last few weeks, most of the sympathy which she had managed to regain during the last ten or twelve years."

103 *Parl. Deb.*, April 13, 1933, vol. 276, col. 2821.

104 Editorial, March 27, 1933.

105 Editorial, March 20, 1933.

To Englishmen these "legitimate" causes of discontent" consisted of inequality of status and inequality of armament. The exact content of equality of status was not always made clear, but it apparently did not include the possession of colonial territory. "The Germans who dominate their country to-day are themselves supplying the strongest argument against any entertainment of the idea of putting non-Germans, whether European or African, under German domination."¹⁰⁶ That the colonial question had received early attention, was made clear by Prime Minister MacDonald. In answer to a question about his visit to Rome, he noted that a rumor had been heard to the effect that Tanganyika had been offered "as some sort of sop to Herr Hitler." He denied, however, that Tanganyika had even been mentioned in the conversations.¹⁰⁷

The Hugenberg memorandum found no welcoming reception in Britain. The *Times* said: "There can be no question whatever of the restoration to Germany of her former overseas possessions";¹⁰⁸ and Mr. Geoffrey Mander, of the Liberal Party, exposed his feelings in the House, by asking if Mr. Eden would make it clear that before anything like Hugenberg's proposals could be considered, "Germany must become in all respects, a fully civilised State"?¹⁰⁹

In these early days there was in England little immediate fear of the realization of Nazi ambitions. It would be some time before Germany could possibly be martially formidable, and there remained hope for a disarmament convention, if only the French could be persuaded to make the necessary concessions.¹¹⁰ On the side of power, therefore, treaty adjustments were no less possible in 1933 and 1934 than in the quiet nine-

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Editorial, April 15, 1933.

¹⁰⁷ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, March 23, 1933, vol. 276, col. 518.

¹⁰⁸ Editorial, June 17, 1933.

¹⁰⁹ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, June 21, 1933, vol. 279, col. 744. See also remark about this time by Lord Lloyd to the East African Dinner Club that there were going to be "no geographical modifications of British or mandated territory in the future." *Times*, June 22, 1933.

¹¹⁰ *Times*, editorial, September 16, 1933.

teen twenties. Confidence in a progressive amelioration of relations with Germany, however, was shattered by the new régime's measures of repression at home, and by its avowed policies in foreign affairs. For several months British public opinion as a whole was dominated by distrust and a consequent revisionary aversion. This simple reaction gradually became differentiated, however, and a number of contrasting attitudes became clearly outlined. Their development may be followed in the shifting course of discussion of the colonial question.

This issue was peculiarly a matter of British concern. Reparations were dead, armament equality was held in London to depend on France; the remaining tangible evidences of British victory were the mandated territories of Tanganyika, Togo and the Cameroons.¹¹¹ Thus when British obligations were being considered, the general problem of treaty revision could hardly be separated from the colonial question.

The anti-revisionist view, which was at first common to most Englishmen, and was well expressed by Mr. R. J. G. Boothby (C) who said that "revision of the Treaty . . . together with disarmament, can only come out of confidence and security,"¹¹² began early to be broken up into specialized attitudes. Imperialists opposed colonial concessions, and they were strangely on the same side of this question as Communists, Labourites, and League of Nations supporters. On the other hand, Fascists were oddly united with pacifists in favoring Germany's return to the ranks of the colonial powers.

The opposition to the German pretensions was centered about the fear that German colonial control would be inimical to the native peoples and to the future safety of the British Empire, strategically and economically, although ideological objections were also of considerable importance. Support for the German point of view derived from a feeling that Germany

111 The Mandates of the Dominions were, of course, technically beyond the control of Downing Street.

112 *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, Dec. 21, 1933, vol. 284, col. 1515. See similar statement by Brigadier-General Spears (C) *ibid.*, col. 1516-7.

had been unjustly treated, from the desire to avoid war, and from sympathy with the National Socialist régime.

On the issue of the well-being of the natives, there were several distinct facets of opinion. Among imperialists, the asserted problem was largely one of British honor. Lord Lugard said that "to hand over on demand, as though they were slaves or cattle, peoples to whom we have pledged our protection is neither consistent with our national honour nor, in the long run, would such a surrender make for peace."¹¹³ Stronger words were used by Randolph Churchill in asserting that "to abandon these helpless natives to the crude racial hatreds of men like General Goering and Dr. Goebbels without their express desire would be an act of betrayal and infamy unparalleled in British history since the Rohilla war."¹¹⁴

This remark brings up the belabored problem of the effect upon the natives of being transferred to German administration. Nazi racial theories and the drastic measures taken against Jews in Germany were cited to prove that the natives would be bound to suffer by such a change.¹¹⁵ It was further

¹¹³ Speech before the Royal Empire Society, as reported in *Times*, Nov. 18, 1936. See also the pamphlet *Mandates*, published by the Joint East African Board, November, 1936 in which it is asserted that the proposal to transfer to any other country the task given Great Britain under the Mandate for Tanganyika "would be accounted an abandonment of the pledge undertaken by Great Britain," p. 7. Professor Arnold J. Toynbee said that before transfer of colonial territory, "honour demands that we ascertain in advance that the natives will suffer no injury from the change of sovereignty." He felt, however, that it would be possible to harmonize the British and German views on the question of honor. Speech before the Academy of German Law, *Times*, Feb. 29, 1936. Mr. A. P. Herbert added a sprightly touch to the colonial discussion by saying in his "letter to the Electors of Oxford University": "I shall examine with some suspicion any proposals that may be made for the distribution of the British Empire among foreign countries, whatever their birthrate, insolence, or inefficiency." *New Yorker*, Dec. 14, 1935.

¹¹⁴ Letter to *Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 23, 1937.

¹¹⁵ "It is no good pretending that the abominable cruelty with which Jews and Socialists have been treated in Germany has not damaged incalculably, in the judgment of other European peoples, Nazi Germany's claim to bear rule over backward peoples." Letter by Edwyn Bevan in the *Times*, Dec. 28,

claimed that German economic policies would result in exploitation of the natives in an effort rapidly to fulfill the *Vier Jahres Plan*.¹¹⁶

These charges, denied in Germany,¹¹⁷ were also countered or minimized in Britain. That long-standing friend of Germany, William Harbutt Dawson, defended the pre-War colonial administration, pointed at France as the militarizer of the natives, and upheld the fitness of Germans to rule over African territories.¹¹⁸ Lord David Cecil was willing to admit the possibility that the lot of the natives would be less happy under German control, but he also said: "I cannot think that in order to avoid such hypothetical sufferings we ought to bring upon mankind the certain and catastrophic sufferings involved in a European war."¹¹⁹ This pacifist frame of mind, which was shared by relatively few people in 1933, became more widespread as the chances of war increased.

Divergent views were also expressed concerning the attitude of the natives toward being shifted back to their former masters. The delicate character of disputes involving self-deter-

1936. Cf. similar terms used by Mr. Mander in *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, April 21, 1936, vol. 311, col. 103.

116 "Official pronouncements there—particularly the words of Dr. Schacht—have made it abundantly clear that German imperialism would be an imperialism of commercial exploitation." Letter by E. W. MacBride to the *Times*, Feb. 10, 1937. Cf. letter by A. M. Bray to the *Spectator*, Sept. 25, 1936, p. 500.

117 Dr. H. W. Bauer, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

118 Letter to the *Times*, Nov. 4, 1936. See also similar attitude taken by Sir Arnold Wilson in a letter to the *Times*, Sept. 29, 1936.

119 Letter to the *Times*, May 14, 1936. See also P. J. Hughesdon, in *Spectator*, Sept. 18, 1936: "Certainly the African people mustn't be treated as chattels. But they also should profit by a change that, while otherwise regrettable, tends to improve international relations and avert widespread war," p. 458. There were those, however, who used ethical arguments against the ethical position of the pacifists. "To contemplate transferring tropical territories, mandated, protected, or colonial to another Power in the doubtful hope of averting a European crisis is to return to the nineteenth-century concept of possessive imperialism." Letter by E. W. MacBride in the *Times*, Feb. 10, 1937.

mination was here exemplified. There are always three interest groups concerned in a given instance of self-determination. There are some few who desire simply a fair vote. A second element desires a plebiscite because it is confident of a majority. The remainder oppose a plebiscite because it is their fear that they will lose. It is usually not possible to do more than strongly suspect these motives, because they are easily camouflaged by the assertion of disinterested reasons for whichever policy is favored. An African plebiscite is complicated by dubiety as to the natives' electoral capacity. Can they be trusted to recognize their own best interests, and then to vote correctly? Such a complication, however, merely changes the ground of argument, without affecting its nature. Fear of a plebiscite can readily be transformed into an insistence upon native incompetence, combined with warm affirmation of fidelity to the democratic dogmas; and thus both the *status quo* and high principle are pleasantly served.

In the case of the mandates, an appeal was made to history by those who favored the German claims. It was asserted that the natives were not consulted when the Germans handed over the colonies in 1919, and the conclusion was drawn that their return therefore required no native approval.¹²⁰ This was countered with the claim, either that the natives were consulted in 1919, or that they should be now, because of their political development under the system of indirect rule.¹²¹

120 "All this talk about the native inhabitants deciding for themselves which country they would like to rule them, is all rot, and we know it. None of our colonies were ever consulted when we took them over." Mr. F. J. Bellenger (Lab) *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, March 2, 1937, vol. 321, col. 257-8.

121 "The wishes of the natives of Northern Tanganyika as to their transference from German to British control were specifically consulted by the late Sir Horace Byatt in 1917 or early in 1918." Letter by Hector Duff to the *Times*, Jan. 1, 1937. Cf. letter by Edwyn Bevan, *ibid.*, Dec. 28, 1936. "In the last 25 years native Parliaments and native councils have developed such a knowledge of their treaty rights and of their constitutional position that for the stronger nations to ignore their wishes and to decide now to 'save their own skins' by sacrificing the well-established and recorded

The Joint East African Board did not favor the submission of the fate of the mandates to a native vote. It claimed that "there is abundant and reliable evidence to show that those who speak with authority for the native population, the Indian community, and European residents, other than some of German nationality, would strongly oppose any transfer of this territory [Tanganyika] from administration by Britain."¹²²

Sir John Harris, Secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, with no material interests at stake, was insistent upon the holding of a plebiscite. He cited Mr. Lloyd George's war-time pronouncements about self-determination, and noted that consultation of the natives had been laid down as a condition of the transfer of the Protectorates to the Union of South Africa. "Great Britain having, for the first time in its history, deliberately adopted this principle governing a territorial transfer, we could not now deviate from it without the most serious considerations."¹²³

rights of these millions of people, without any impartial inquiry into their wishes, would surely be tantamount to a crime." Letter by Sir John Harris, Secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, to the *Times*, Oct. 20, 1937.

¹²² *Mandates*, p. 7. Cf. Mr. de Rothschild (Lib) in the House, July 9, 1936: "I may say, in passing, that for my own part, I cannot imagine that the natives would care to exchange British rule for Nazi rule." *Parl. Deb., Commons*, vol. 314, col. 1421. Cf. E. H. Keeling, M. P. (N. C.) who said he would favor return of the territories if there were evidence that the natives desired it, but there was no such evidence. Speech to an anti-transfer resolution passed by the Central Council of the National Union of Conservative Associations, *Times*, June 25, 1936.

¹²³ Letter to the *Times*, Jan. 1, 1937. In regard to self-determination in the Protectorates, an interesting sidelight is thrown by the debate between Margery Perham and Lionel Curtis in *The Protectorates of South Africa* (London, Oxford U. Press, 1935). Miss Perham, feeling sure that a plebiscite would favor the *status quo*, maintains that "The average African has a shrewd grasp of the matters which so vitally affect him . . ." (p. 100). Mr. Curtis, favoring the transfer, thinks the natives cannot understand his argument, and claims that "By shifting the onus of decision from itself to them the British Government would abandon the very idea of trusteeship, of which so much has rightly been made" (p. 84). It may be wondered whether this argument would be pressed also against native determination

Some portion of the professed concern for native well-being may have been hypocritical, but most of it appears, notably in the case of Sir John Harris, to have been sincere. Most of it was due to a fear of the effect of the policies of the National Socialists, and would not have been applicable in relation to any German Government from 1920 to 1933. There remained some individuals to point with horror to pre-War German colonial administration, but after the Locarno declaration, that attitude was no serious barrier to a return of the colonies.

A second source of opposition in Britain to giving up the mandates was the fear of a consequent menace to the security of the Empire. At the end of the War the expectation that Germany would utilize her colonies as future submarine and air bases was partly responsible for their seizure.¹²⁴ With the subsidence of war-time passions this apprehension lessened, only to be aroused again by the advent of Hitler as Chancellor of the *Reich*. "The most vital test of all is the safety of the British Empire and the ultimate peace of the world. What has happened since 1918 to convince us that the framers of the treaty were wrong in insisting that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany? If that was true with a Germany disarmed and defeated, can it be less true with a Germany clothed once more with all the martial might of a first-class Power?"¹²⁵

of the issue of transfer to Germany. As late as Feb. 18, 1939, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society issued an appeal on the colonial question. The basis of policy in this regard, it was stated in the *Times* of that date, must be some form of trusteeship in the interest of the native races. However, the "Appeal," signed by Lords Cecil, Meston, Lytton and Strabolgi, among others, stated that the Society "Expresses no opinion in advance, favourable or unfavourable, on the proposal to transfer colonial territory to any other administration." "Everything would depend on conditions," and this remarkably conciliatory statement made no reference to whether transfer was or was not at the time advisable.

¹²⁴ "The German colonies were retained by the Allies primarily for reasons of their own security." Letter by L. S. Amery to the *Times*, Dec. 22, 1936. This is not a charge, but an admission.

¹²⁵ Letter by Sir Henry Page Croft to the *Times*, Oct. 18, 1937.

In 1936 and in 1937 resolutions were passed at the Conservative Party Conferences opposing any surrender of mandates to Germany.¹²⁶ These motions were supported by contentions that Britain's security would be threatened.¹²⁷ There was talk of "jeopardizing of the Imperial communications,"¹²⁸ of a "huge black army,"¹²⁹ and of German domination of the whole of East Africa.¹³⁰ The British African point of view "is that it would be a betrayal to give a militaristic Germany air and sea bases in Africa from which she could cause immense havoc in case of war."¹³¹ The implication here is that there would be no betrayal, if only Germany were not militaristic; and Germany from 1924 to 1933 could hardly have been termed fire-eating. It should be noted, however, that there existed some propensity in Britain to ascribe the policies of the Third *Reich* to the old Prussianism which was emerging again after a period of enforced dormancy. If this phoenix-like spirit were really held accountable for Hitlerian Germany, then, of course, proposals for peaceful change would be quite

126 *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 2, 1936. The resolution, offered by Mr. Duncan Sandys, M. P., was mildly objected to in a speech by Sir Samuel Hoare, but was passed by an overwhelming majority. See the *Times*, Oct. 8, 1937 for text of resolution offered by Sir Henry Page Croft at the following Conference and accepted by it. This action of the Party was impressively condemned by A. Berriedale Keith in a letter to the *Spectator*, following the 1936 Conference: "In view of our population problem, are we morally justified in seeking to deny Germany the possession of oversea territories?" Oct. 9, 1936, p. 585.

127 Mr. Sandys said: "From the economic standpoint the loss of these territories would be as insignificant as the gain to Germany. . . . But from the military and strategic viewpoint the danger to us would be immeasurable." *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 2, 1936.

128 Letter by Charles Ponsonby, Chairman, Joint East African Board, to the *Times*, Jan. 7, 1937. Cf. Letter by A. A. Somerville, *ibid.*, April 27, 1936.

129 Letters by "Africanus" and Sir Evelyn Wrench, *Times*, Oct. 16, 1937, and Dec. 29, 1936, respectively.

130 Lord Stonehaven, *Parl. Deb.*, Lords, Feb. 24, 1937, vol. 104, col. 325-6.

131 Letter by F. S. Joelson, Editor, *East Africa and Rhodesia*, to the *Times*, Dec. 19, 1936. That this view was shared in Britain may be seen from a letter to the *Times* by H. A. Smith, Oct. 25, 1938.

useless. There would be left nothing but to kindle new fires upon the still glowing ashes of the old.

Another type of security was also called into question in this connection; namely, economic security. The Joint East African Board estimated that British and other non-native inhabitants had invested nearly £20,000,000 in Tanganyika, and that investments by the British Government or British investors amounted to about £9,500,000.¹³² In 1932 Great Britain's share of Tanganyika's imports and exports was nearly one-third.¹³³ In 1936 this figure was duplicated, and in that year about 50% of Tanganyika's total trade of £8,000,000 was carried on with parts of the British Empire.¹³⁴ "Such investors, and particularly those who have settled in the territory, would almost certainly be placed in an intolerable position if the administration passed into the hands of another Power with a different, and perhaps unstable currency and, it might be, a preferential leaning to its own nationals."¹³⁵

¹³² *Mandates*, p. 8.

¹³³ *The Dominions Office and Colonial Office List*, 1934 (London, H. M. Staty. Off., 1934), p. 459.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1938, p. 475.

¹³⁵ This delicate phraseology is found in *Mandates*, *supra*, p. 8. It was not often, however, that economic interests would fully and frankly present their views on the economic problem. Usually their emphasis was placed on the less self-centered argument of security or on solicitude for aboriginal culture. An exception was offered in the speech of Captain F. E. Guest (C) in the House on April 21, 1936. Admitting his personal concern both as a veteran of the East African Campaign and as an investor in Tanganyika, Captain Guest defended the viewpoint of those who had settled in the Mandate as colonists, and said: "I take the view that this is the time to put up a bold front. Britain should not give way . . . before the storm which has been created and which is sweeping Europe today." *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, vol. 311, col. 87-8. Cf. *Bulletin of International News*, August 29, 1936, for report of resolution of Association of East African Chambers of Commerce, requesting the Government to re-establish confidence in East Africa by a "definite statement regarding the Mandate position," p. 14; and announcement by the Executive Council of the Joint East African Board in the *Times* of Oct. 13, 1938, of its intention to form a body to educate public opinion on the importance of retaining Tanganyika.

A slightly more conciliatory attitude on the economic question was taken in a resolution of the Parliamentary Committee of the Empire Industries Association, which favored proposals that would "meet any real difficulties encountered by Germany or other States in securing adequate access to supplies of raw materials or foodstuffs."¹³⁶ This resolution was in line with Sir Samuel Hoare's famous speech of September 11, 1935, but it could hardly be considered a vital concession. On the contrary, the mere willingness to make raw materials more readily accessible savored rather of an attempt to gain a commercial advantage through drumming up trade, than of a serious effort at conciliation. The German charges that raw materials were difficult to obtain, arose not from the existence of export duties, but because of import tariffs which prevented Germans from selling abroad. Raw materials were accessible, but markets were not, and the above resolution was silent as to how Germany might find new markets.¹³⁷

It was suspected that the German Government would refuse mandatory restrictions on returned colonies, and in view of existing German economic policies there was little hope for the maintenance of the open door in the reacquired territories. British traders and investors interested in Africa therefore viewed with alarm any discussion whatever of colonial appease-

¹³⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, Feb. 9, 1937.

¹³⁷ "The currency argument, in fact, conceals a tariff argument, and there would be no difficulty at all were it not that under the guise of dealing with a currency situation the world has to deal with a tariff situation." T. E. Gregory, "The Economic Bases of Revisionism," in *Peaceful Change*, C. A. W. Manning, ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1937), p. 76.

Among other proposals for economic, non-territorial relief for Germany, should be mentioned that of L. S. Amery, who favored British relinquishment of the existing policy of demanding most-favored-nation treatment in any cases of preferential trade agreements between Germany and her continental neighbors and their possessions. This, Mr. Amery felt, would be more useful to Germany "than even a monopoly control over her former Colonial Empire." Letter to the *Times*, Oct. 26, 1937. On territorial transfer Mr. Amery held inflexible opinions: "We are in Tanganyika by plain right of conquest and formal surrender, and shall remain there until someone stronger than ourselves takes it from us." *The Forward View*, p. 250.

ment. Even such a relatively disinterested observer as Lord Lugard was unable to recommend economic concessions broader than those offered by Sir Samuel Hoare, and reaffirmed by Mr. Eden on February 24, 1936.¹³⁸

In this fashion, strategic and economic fear of Nazi Germany were combined with distrust of a Nazi native policy to persuade many Englishmen that there should be no yielding on the colonial issue.

There were important groups, however, who were willing to go further in the economic sphere. Sir Archibald Sinclair held that the "Ottawa policy of selfish and exclusive economic Imperialism" must be abandoned if a constructive policy of peace was to be pursued.¹³⁹ Lord Arnold said, in similar vein, that unless something was done to give more nearly equal trading opportunities within the Empire, "the historian of the future may well record that the Ottawa Agreements were the beginning of the end of the British Empire."¹⁴⁰ These representatives of the Liberal and Labour Parties, respectively, spoke not only for themselves but for their political organizations, which were on record as favoring British policies aimed

¹³⁸ *The Times*, Sept. 20, 1935. He did, however, suggest in this article, "Africa and the Powers" (Part II), "the possibility of including in the Civil Service, at least in mandated territories, qualified officials from foreign nations." Cf. Lord Lugard's speech in the House of Lords, March 25, 1936, *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 100, cols. 250 and 252. He there favored "international tenders for large public works" or for loans under certain conditions. Still later, on Feb. 17, 1937, he amended a motion of Lord Noel Buxton's so as to make it request an inter-imperial and international discussion of a policy of equal opportunity, instead of "the application of the Mandate system in suitable cases to British and other Colonies," as Lord Noel Buxton had proposed. *Ibid.*, vol. 104, col. 189. For Lord Noel Buxton's speech see *ibid.*, cols. 183-4.

¹³⁹ Speech before the Eighty Club, as paraphrased in the *Times*, March 11, 1937. Cf. Lionel Robbins, quoted in *Time and Tide*, September 25, 1936.

¹⁴⁰ *Parl. Deb.*, Lords, Feb. 17, 1937, vol. 104, col. 196. Cf. Lord Lothian in speech before the English Branch of the Anglo-German Fellowship, *Times*, July 15, 1936: "The new world as well as the old must be willing once more to reopen its doors to trade and migration." Leonard Barnes, in *The Duty of Empire* (London, Gollancz, 1935), attacks colonial preference as contrary to the concept of trusteeship, p. 234.

at giving equality of access to raw materials and markets to all nations.¹⁴¹ The Government was not willing to go beyond its original offer, in the words of Sir Samuel Hoare, "to take their share in any collective attempt to deal in a fair, effective way" with the problem of "raw materials from colonial areas, including protectorates and mandated territories."¹⁴² These words of Sir Samuel's caused a great sensation, but they have been implemented. True, a Raw Materials Committee appointed by the League Council held meetings in 1937, and presented a Report. True, also, M. Paul van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium, was asked by the British and French Governments in the spring of 1937 to make an investigation in various countries "as to the possibility of securing a general relaxation of quotas and other obstacles to international trade."¹⁴³ M. van Zeeland's Report was published on January 28, 1938, but its results were pretty close to zero; for, as Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, remarked in the House of Commons with regard to the Report: "A certain degree of confidence in the political sphere is, therefore, essential, particularly if we are to try to persuade those who have set up barriers, with

141 See preamble to the Executive resolution adopted by the 36th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1936. Report, pp. 181-2; Francis Williams, *Raw Materials and the Prevention of War* (London, The Labour Party, 1936), p. 10; and speech by Mr. Attlee in Paris, Jan. 17, 1937, *Daily Herald*, Jan. 18, 1937. This speech was widely misrepresented in the British press. e. g., *Sunday Pictorial*, Jan. 18, 1937, implied that Mr. Attlee desired to divide up the Empire.

142 Speech to Assembly of the League of Nations, Sept. 11, 1935, *New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1935. See also the valuable discussion of economic (and other) questions in *The Colonial Problem*, A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, Oxford U. Press, 1937). Cf. Grover Clark, *A Place in the Sun* (New York, Macmillan, 1936), and the same author's *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism* (New York, Columbia U. Press, 1936), and Gilbert Maroger, *La question des matières premières et les revendications allemandes* (Paris, Centre d'études de politique étrangère, 1937).

143 Prime Minister Baldwin in the House of Commons, April 8, 1937. *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 322, col. 342.

which to insure their own economic self-sufficiency, to pull them down.”¹⁴⁴

Further opposition to yielding colonially to Germany was expressed on lines whose nature was determined by the character of the National Socialist Government, but it was less immediately concerned with native policy or imperial safety. The Communist Party, as represented by R. Palme Dutt, feared in principle and in practice any extension of fascist influence in Africa or elsewhere, and desired a strong stand for collective security as being the best long-run policy for Britain.¹⁴⁵

In the Labour Party there was a good deal of support for the acceptance by Great Britain of mandatory obligations for all her tropical African colonies. Such action, in the opinion of an Advisory Committee of the Party would, however, depend on the creation of “an international system based upon a real League and collective security.”¹⁴⁶ The Committee, which may be taken as fairly representing the Party’s views, opposed transfer either of sovereignty or mandatory responsibility because it would amount to paying blackmail. Such action further would “perpetuate the notion that colonial ‘swag’ is a legitimate possession, only needing distribution among the robbers. The ending of all imperial domination should be preferred to a division of its ‘privileges and cares.’ ”¹⁴⁷

144 *Ibid.*, June 3, 1938, vol. 336, col. 2496.

145 “Britain at the Crossroads,” *New Masses*, July 28, 1936, pp. 14-5. Cf. the same author’s *World Politics, 1918-1936* (New York, Random House, 1936), p. 170 ff. See also Harry Pollitt, *The Path to Peace* (London, Communist Party of Great Britain, 1936): “Are those who so glibly argue for this supposed panacea colonial transfer aware that, even if it could be applied, it would result in strengthening the basis of the Fascist aggressors, improve their economic and military position and render them still stronger to carry out their war plans on an even bigger scale in Europe itself?” p. 12.

146 *The Demand for Colonial Territories and Equality of Economic Opportunity* (London, The Labour Party, 1936), p. 46. This pamphlet was prepared by an advisory committee at the request of the National Executive of the Labour Party, which, however, is not bound by all the committee’s recommendations.

147 *Ibid.*, p. 47. Cf. Editorial in *Daily Herald*, Jan. 20, 1937: “‘Carving-

The resistance to aggression through a strict adherence to the obligations of the Covenant was counselled by the League of Nations Union.¹⁴⁸ Only after assurance that the system of collective security was strong enough to prevent the outbreak of war would means of appeasement be considered. "I suggest that redress of grievances is not an alternative to the collective system, which is, indeed, the indispensable means of revision, the only means by which redress of grievances can be carried out."¹⁴⁹

Rejection of territorial cession to Germany was placed on disinterested ground by a distinguished Advisory Committee of the National Peace Council, in advocating a strengthened and extended Mandates system. "The claim for any exclusive control of undeveloped territories must be resisted, but it can only be satisfactorily resisted by the renunciation of exclusive controls throughout the world." Assuming the existence of such a Mandates system, then Britain might offer "to join in a consideration of the redistribution of mandates amongst such nations as are prepared to give adequate guarantees in regard to acceptance of the principles underlying the mandatory system, and provided that a satisfactory means of ascertaining the views of the native populations has been secured."¹⁵⁰

up' the Empire is not an issue in British politics. The Labour Party has explicitly condemned the idea."

148 Report of Conference of the Union in *Times*, June 19, 1937. Cf. pamphlet by Lionel Birch, *The Demand for Colonies* (London, League of Nations Union, 1936).

149 Letter by Sir Norman Angell in the *Times*, Feb. 21, 1936. Cf. Viscount Cecil in *New York Times*, May 17, 1936. Insistence upon the return of Germany to the League of Nations, as a condition of concessions was made by Professor S. Brodetzky of the University of Leeds, before a meeting of the League of Nations Union. *Times*, Jan. 7, 1937.

150 *Peace and Colonial Policy* (London, National Peace Council, 1936), p. 4. The signers of this report include Leonard Barnes, Norman Bentwich, G. E. G. Catlin, Sir John Harris, Harold J. Laski, Ramsay Muir, Sir Arthur Salter, and Leonard Woolf. A reservation was made by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Laski, who "desire to express their general view that no full solution

In this attitude may be traced a position between intransigent standpattism and a willingness to accept German colonial demands. This "if only" point of view was taken by a number of people who were desirous of keeping the peace, who felt a little uneasy about the colonial clauses of Versailles, and who could, without an imperial shudder, contemplate retrocession of at least Togo and the Cameroons. Further, they could even conceive that the Third *Reich* might be tolerated as a co-worker in the *mission civilisatrice*, but they insisted that a colonial arrangement could be imagined only as a part of a general settlement which would finally place European peace on a secure basis.¹⁵¹ The terms of such settlement were only vaguely defined, but they seemed to include a mitigation of racial intolerance, a return to the League, general disarmament, and other evidence of a peaceful disposition on the part of the recipient of colonies.

Further, among those opposed to colonial concessions might be listed a goodly number who were conscious of the desira-

of the colonial problem is possible within the confines of capitalist organisation," p. 8.

See also *The Colonial Problem* (cited), for a scholarly discussion of the colonial issue, and a conclusion that: "In view of the difficulties attending transfer described in the foregoing pages, it seems more practical to consider alternative means of satisfying the grievances of non-colonial powers. Some of the suggestions made have been considered in the preceding chapters, but it must be remembered that none of them satisfy colonial 'hunger' in terms of prestige and world power," p. 105. A curious admission which appears concessionary, yet admits nothing, is made in regard to native interests: "There may be advantages for the natives transferred if the incoming Power has a more enlightened colonial policy and is prepared to spend on developing the territory, if all native rights acquired are maintained and if the transfer enables the territory to become part of a larger unit within which movement of men and goods is free," p. 103. Clearly, none of these conditions is satisfied by the Third *Reich*.

¹⁵¹ See letter by Lord Allen of Hurtwood to the *Times*, Oct. 16, 1937, and dispatches by Frederick T. Birchall, December 1, 2 and 5, 1937. Cf. editorial in *Times*, March 3, 1937: "The colonial question can only usefully be considered at all in a general discussion covering all outstanding difficulties and aiming at a settlement which would establish peace on a broad and stable foundation." Sir Archibald Sinclair expressed similar views in a speech at Pontypridd, Glamorgan, *Times*, Feb. 12, 1937.

bility of peaceful change, but who asserted either that the time was not quite ripe for making changes, or else that it was still far off.

"Where we 'missed the bus' was when Germany entered the League and no steps were taken to revise the Treaty . . ." ¹⁵² Such a hopeless expression of regretful retrospection was, however, less prevalent than opinions that rapprochement was merely inopportune for the present but that it might be feasible in the visible future. This view was eloquently put by Gilbert Murray in a letter to the *Times*:

To a peaceful and law abiding Germany faithful to the principles of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, I should like my country to make every reasonable concession and, if anything to err on the side of generosity. To a Germany which militarizes its whole culture, glorifies war, preaches the *Vernichtung Frankreichs*, and keeps Europe in a state of constant anxiety by its threats of aggression, I do not see how its destined victims can be expected to make any concessions which will make their subjugation easier. ¹⁵³

Lord Halifax, before becoming Foreign Secretary, declared in the House of Lords that "Europe needs to be satisfied that the peace project of Herr Hitler is sincerely meant," and remarked that confidence, "a plant of painfully slow growth," had been "gravely shaken" by the German Government's procedure of the *fait accompli* and its doctrine of state necessity. ¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Letter by Gordon Campbell, *Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 26, 1937. Cf. Mr. Emrys-Evans (C) *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, March 2, 1937, vol. 321, col. 264.

¹⁵³ November 6, 1936.

¹⁵⁴ *Parl. Deb.*, April 8, 1936, Lords, vol. 100, col. 525. Even earlier, J. O. P. Bland had given up any faith in German sincerity, and so had no hope from further concessions. Letter to the *Times*, June 27, 1935. Cf. Sir Arthur Salter: "By giving back those colonies we should not only not buy peace, but should buy additional trouble." Speech before Liberal Summer School as reported in the *Times*, Aug. 5, 1936. Lord Runciman in *New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1937, gave as the private opinions of a parliamentarian and Cabinet member on vacation, the judgment that "you know well enough what it means to those who pay tribute—demands for more and more tribute." Cf. letter by Alwyn Parker in the *Times*, March 16, 1936: "Belief in inter-

Finally, the German case for colonies on economic grounds found a ready rebuttal in Britain. Dr. Schacht, afterwards followed by Herr Hitler himself, said: "The German colonial problem is not a problem of imperialism. It is not a mere problem of prestige. It is simply and solely a problem of economic existence. Precisely for that reason the future of European peace depends on it." Further, Germany needs colonies because she cannot "buy raw materials in the world market at will. No, Germany cannot do that because she does not possess the means of paying for them in foreign currencies; and she does not possess the means because foreign countries do not consume enough of her wares."¹⁵⁵

This point of view was strongly contested in Great Britain, where Right and Left minimized the economic advantages of empire, and pointed out the insignificant amount of trade with her colonies carried on by pre-War Germany.¹⁵⁶ It was urged also that the economic distress in Germany was due rather to German financial policy and to the diversion of foreign exchange to satisfy rearmament requirements, than to any foreign restrictions resulting in the unavailability of raw materials.

national good faith is now so shattered by cumulative experience that no confidence worth the name can be restored . . . "

155 "Germany's Colonial Demands," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1937, pp. 234, 229.

156 Angell, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Letter by Charles Strachey to the *Times*, Jan. 8, 1937; letter by Lord Winterton to *Daily Telegraph*, Jan. 25, 1937. In the Royal Institute of International Affairs' *The Colonial Problem*, are given figures which, with a little computation, show that in 1934 the trade of all mandated areas amounted to \$100,000,000 or .0043% of total world trade. The German reply to this showing is that the colonies in 1914 were just beginning to show the fruits of German development, and they have since received insufficient capital. "Today, when there no longer is free trade in the world, when Germany is crushed by foreign debts and harrassed by the lack of raw materials and valuta, if her colonies were returned to her she would proceed to develop them with far greater intensity. A large part of the food supplies and raw materials which we now lack could be furnished by them." Schacht, *op. cit.*, p. 231. The Germans are not at all disturbed by the present low production of the mandates, but they talk in terms of great future production through the application of German energy and methods.

Mr. R. J. G. Boothby tersely summed up a widespread opinion in saying: "No, Sir; colonial possessions may bring a measure of political satisfaction, which may be badly needed in Germany today, but they are no panacea for economic distress."¹⁵⁷

(b) BRITISH OPINION FAVORABLE TO COLONIAL
CONCESSIONS

It was possible, of course, to deny the validity of the economic claim, and yet to be willing for other reasons to see Germany once more exercising imperial sway. There were in Britain almost no partisans of the case for concessions who maintained that the acquisition of the former colonies would solve, or nearly solve, the German economic distress. It was clear that no matter how many colonies were ceded, the maws of the armament factories, rather than the mouths of civilians, would receive the benefits from a policy intended by the British to make possible a large scale belt-loosening. The German stringency was the direct result, not of raw material embargoes, but of the monopolization of available foreign exchange, in the interest of rearmament; and, in a minor degree, of the existence of foreign import tariffs.

Further, few were willing to contest the view that Germany's ex-colonies were so poor in raw materials that their possession would provide no sensible amelioration in the German standard of living even if their products were utilized solely to augment the stocks of consumers' goods in Germany.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Letter to the *Times*, Dec. 24, 1936.

¹⁵⁸ Cf., however, letter by Captain Robert Gordon-Canning, of the British Union of Fascists, *Times*, Jan. 28, 1937, in which the economic value of the colonies is emphasized. "The German claim for the return of her colonies is not based on the possibility of those areas being able to absorb a large number of German immigrants but upon the economic development of these areas under the drive and energy of German science and German citizens, whereby such development, both in supplying raw materials to Germany and in increasing the prosperity of the native population, will enhance the possibility of increased production and thus of employment in Germany itself, thus giving to the German people a possibility of existing on a more dense

That body of opinion in Britain, therefore, which favored territorial appeasement in the shape of colonies, rested its contentions principally on political and psychological grounds. As in the case of the opposition, here too were found strange allies. The British Union of Fascists lay down with the pacifist lambs, and Lord Astor unfamiliarly consorted with Mr. George Lansbury. The professions of these diverse individuals centered around the lofty conceptions of peace for the world and justice for Germany. Sir Oswald Mosley, on a visit to Berlin, said that the return of the former colonies would be "a contribution to peace and justice."¹⁵⁹ Sir Oswald's motives may have been more complicated than is here apparent, but he and others who for various reasons favored appeasement, found the slogans of "peace" and "justice" of no small political value.

There were those, however, who possessed a clear title to the use of the word "peace" as the touchstone of their colonial policy. Such undifferentiated pacifists as the late Canon Sheppard and A. A. Milne were quite content that England should disgorge colonies in order to keep the peace. Milne, for example, asserted that "the tragedy of the next world war will not lie in the result of it, but in the happening of it. Compared with the war itself, victory or defeat will be a triviality."¹⁶⁰

Apart from this singleminded attachment to peace there were a number who, while evincing their desire to avoid war, added

basis of population than at present. Economic necessity is obvious, and out of 18 raw materials required by Germany to-day, at least 5 could be fully supplied by her old colonies and portions of the remaining 13."

¹⁵⁹ *Times*, Nov. 24, 1936. Cf. *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 23, 1936.

¹⁶⁰ Letter to the *Times*, Oct. 21, 1937. He went on: "To endanger, in however small a degree, the chance of a peaceful settlement by an intransigent insistence on the key positions in the ensuing war would be criminal folly. To endanger it for a key position in the middle of Africa—O God! O Tanganyika!—there is nothing left to say." He was here attacking the position taken by L. S. Amery. See also his *Peace with Honour* (New York, Dutton, 1934). Cf. letter by Mr. Lansbury, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and Canon Sheppard, *Times*, Oct. 30, 1937, which emphasized their "confidence in the method of friendly diplomatic discussions, leading if necessary to a conference," for the consideration of national grievances likely to lead to conflict.

an expression of sympathy for the German position. The feeling on the part of many Germans that their country was unfairly placed beyond the imperial pale in 1919; that her strength and abilities rightfully entitled her to share the white man's burden, was not unappreciated in Great Britain. Lord Elibank, for example, agreed with Mr. Boothby that Germany had no case for colonies on economic grounds, but he asserted that the real issue was "that Germany, a large and powerful nation, believes herself to be regarded as an outcast, as she alone among the important nations is deprived of the privilege of owning colonies."¹⁶¹ This state of mind he regarded as being worthy of respect, and therefore, of concessions, and he suggested that Britain might give back Togo and the Cameroons; and that if European peace were at stake, New Zealand, Australia, and even Japan might be induced to retrocede at least a part of their mandates. Further, Holland and Portugal might assist with portions of their undeveloped territories and with the aid of France, Italy, Spain and the United States, the satisfaction of Germany might be achieved on condition that she make "a contribution to the general pacification of the world."

A more practical plan in the cause of peace was presented by Sir Claude Russell, who also pointed out the importance of what he called "psychological motives" in the German attitude. Stating that "no argument is possible" concerning these motives, he proceeded to outline two new West Central African Colonies, the northern of which would be composed by cession to Germany of parts of Nigeria and French Cameroons; and the southern by parts of the Congo, and parts of Angola, including access to the mouth of the Congo. "Germany would thus become the owner of two colonies, richer and more varied, if not more extensive, than her former possessions. She ought to be satisfied."¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Letter to the *Times*, Jan. 5, 1937.

¹⁶² Letter to the *Times*, Feb. 3, 1937. Sir Claude Russell mentions Western Nigeria, but he presumably meant the Eastern part of Nigeria, which adjoins the British mandate for the Cameroons.

This imputation of "psychological motives," or "desire for prestige," is not in harmony with the strictly economic case as presented above by Dr. Schacht; but, in spite of protests by individual Germans, it would indeed have been strange if there had not been a number of them who felt that Germany's lack of colonies implied an undeserved imputation that Germans were unfit to govern uncivilized peoples. This feeling may be traced to "the insulting manner" in which the former colonies were taken away,¹⁶³ or to "Germany's natural desire for colonies,"¹⁶⁴ but it must be accepted as one of the primary sources of the German claim.¹⁶⁵

The larger part of those in Britain who recognized the justice of what they conceived to be German aspirations based on a desire for prestige, proposed to satisfy them by territorial transfer. Mr. Maxwell Garnett, however, took another view, saying that "if it be true that Germany's most dangerous discontents are spiritual and psychological, it is no use hoping to preserve peace by multiplying armaments in order to hold Germany down, or by ceding territory in order to buy her off."¹⁶⁶ Writing shortly after the freely negotiated rearrange-

163 Letter by Colonel R. Meinertzhagen to the *Times*, Dec. 19, 1936. Colonel Meinertzhagen was General Smuts' Intelligence Officer during a long period of the Great War. He has here a tart comment on the question of African self-determination. "Lastly, let us drop the hypocritical doctrine that we cannot hand over Colonies without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants. Have we ever asked a single native if he wishes to be ruled by us? Did we consult the wishes of any German native in 1919?"

164 Bishop Walter Carey in *Times*, Oct. 13, 1937.

165 See Johannsen and Kraft, *op. cit.*, p. 72, where emphasis is placed on *Gleichberechtigung* as well as upon the economic basis of German claims; A. F. von Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 46, quoting from *Hitlerjugend*, by Baldur von Schirach. Oertzen said the return of the colonies would mean a "cleaning of Germany's scutcheon," a greater security in the economic field, an advancement of social reconstruction, satisfaction of the German claim to factual equality; and also it was one of the conditions for the maintenance of world peace. p. 52.

166 Letter to the *Times*, July 24, 1936. Mr. Garnett, Secretary of the League of Nations Union, was the first, so far as I can determine, among letter writers to the *Times* on the colonial question, to make use of the term "peaceful change".

ment of the régime of the Straits at Montreux, Mr. Garnett suggested that an attempt might be made to secure a harmony of purposes between Germany and Britain, along with the other powers, on a basis of recognition of the German claim to equality of rights, excision of the war-guilt clause from the Treaty, a mandate system for non-self-governing colonies in which the League's control would be increased, separation of the Covenant from the Treaty, and "as a mark of German equality of rights in this field, transfer to her administration of a mandate, thus modified, over one of the ex-German colonies. (Say Togoland . . .) "

There were a number of proposals to satisfy Germany in the colonial field by returning the former colonies under various conditions ranging from international supervision to the acceptance by Germany of obligations to the natives and to other states.

Sir John Harris on February 15, 1937 presented a suggestion for the extension of the Berlin Act of 1885, which laid down principles of economic equality to be observed in the Conventional Basin of the Congo. He favored an enlargement both of the territory covered by the Act, and of the obligations accepted by the various states. Nigeria, the whole of the Sudan, and Abyssinia might be drawn into the Conventional area, so that "from the Nile to the Zambezi, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean there would be provided scope for all the colonial energies of Europe."¹⁶⁷ In principle, open tenders for all public works should be made throughout the area, and international enterprise should be encouraged to proceed to its development. Control over the added territories was to remain in its original hands, but a "given percentage of other nationals" was to be absorbed into the administration, and by provision for native equality, the adoption of "trustee-

¹⁶⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, Sir John Harris leaves up in the air the precise status of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia in this scheme, and influential imperialist groups would without doubt oppose the whole plan as a fatal blow to their dreams of an East African Dominion.

ship as the basis of native policy " would produce an approximation of the mandatory system.

Another interesting scheme was advocated in a letter by a group of distinguished students of international affairs: Mr. Vernon Bartlett, Professor Gilbert Murray, Lord Noel Buxton, and Professor Arnold J. Toynbee.¹⁶⁸ Looking forward to a conference to consider the German colonial requests, they suggested two conditions to be observed in reaching a settlement: (1) the natives " should not be sacrificed in any way for the sake of improving the relations between European Powers "; (2) in the administration of non-self-governing territories and in the matter of access to raw materials " the European Powers should be placed upon a footing of approximate equality with one another." ¹⁶⁹

These conditions might be met by a three-point program to be adopted by a Conference. In the first place, some of the former colonies should be returned, to be administered under the existing mandate régime. Secondly, the mandatory powers should agree to place an equivalent portion of their crown colonies under mandate, so that Germany would not be the only country to have to exercise a mandate over territory which she formerly held in complete sovereignty. Thirdly, all non-self-governing territories should be thrown open to trade on equal terms. " On such lines as these we see the possibility of a colonial settlement which might prove equally favorable to the well-being of the native peoples and to the peace and prosperity of Europe." ¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ *Times*, Oct. 7, 1937.

¹⁶⁹ In explanation of these conditions it was noted that the second implies a revision of the Treaty, and the first requires that no European power shall be permitted to exercise unrestricted sovereignty over any territory at present under mandate. Thus Germany might conceivably obtain in fee simple some existing non-mandated territory, but would have to accept limitations on her sovereignty over any of her former colonies which might be returned. This suggestion would of course be criticized by those who held that any transfer of natives to German control would involve their being " sacrificed "; and it seems pretty clear that any transfer would have been in part at least, for the purpose of " improving the relations between European Powers."

¹⁷⁰ See letter by Sir Arnold Wilson to the *Times*, Oct. 11, 1937, referring

These proposals, ingenious as they were, and instinct with goodwill, would almost certainly have been gladly accepted by any of the Weimar Governments, and Herr Stresemann might have found stronger support in Germany as the result of such an unquestionable victory of his fulfillment policy. It may well be doubted, however, whether such a token retrocession as Mr. Maxwell Garnett offered would have satisfied Germany; and even whether the Government would have accepted any mandatory obligations. What the Germans asked for was full sovereignty over all the former German colonies, although some exception might have been made for the benefit of Japan, in the interest of preserving the Anti-Comintern Pact; and something less might have been accepted should negotiations actually have gotten under way.¹⁷¹ However, what would have satisfied Dr. Brüning was regarded as unacceptable, and yet the regaining

to this letter, and proposing an International Bureau of African Powers, as an information center, "whose powers and functions will grow with the years." "Let us realize that if we refuse to negotiate any territorial changes by agreement we are making war, somewhere, some day, inevitable." Cf. Mr. F. Montague (Lab), *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, March 15, 1937, vol. 321, col. 1687. After suggesting surrender of mandates, as mandates, to Germany, Mr. Montague said: "The common people of this land will not murder Germans wholesale for the sake of a splash of tropical red." Lord Allen of Hurtwood in a letter to the *Times*, Dec. 30, 1936, favored an international fact-finding commission as a means of keeping the colonial problem "out of the arena of prejudice and political conflict." See also report of plan for "pooling mandates" by a group of Australian professors. *Times*, April 17, 1937; and article by Captain Edgar Abraham, "The Colonial Problem: A Constructive Suggestion," *The New Commonwealth* (monthly), January, 1939, pp. 73-4.

171 See, e. g., W. Behrmann, review of Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschlands Koloniale Forderung*, in *Koloniale Rundschau*, July, 1936, pp. 320-321. "We, who worked in the South Seas and knew the German achievements in China, must demand that the impression should not be obtained abroad . . . that we are resignedly drawing back from our legal position in these colonial territories." The demand for African colonies, of course, is here assumed. "When Germany returns to Africa it will be to her former colonies, says the National Zeitung, because she does not propose to leave unfulfilled the historic mission which she undertook there." *Times*, Nov. 16, 1938. In his speech of February 20, 1938, Chancellor Hitler indicated that he was not interested in territory in Eastern Asia, so that Kiao-chao might have been with some slight assurance written off the list, since he was here addressing Japan, a co-signatory of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

by Germany of her old imperium was a prospect which few in Britain could "face with equanimity."

The calm minority of pacifists was increased slightly by those who were pro-German for other reasons. As a variation upon the peace motif which ran through the works of all the British composers of plans to produce harmony between Britain and Germany, there may occasionally have been heard what might be called an Anti-Comintune. The dislike and suspicion of Soviet Russia which was shared by many Englishmen entered only rarely into the discussion of peaceful change; partly because of its indirect relationship to the question and partly, perhaps, because of a reluctance to express publicly any satisfaction at the potential injury of Russian interests, or the blocking of Russian ambitions through an Anglo-German rapprochement. A guarded statement of the reasons why the giving of satisfaction to Germany might be combined with an anti-Soviet policy was made in a letter by Sir George Shee to the *Times*, August 11, 1937. He stated that there were "a number of matters on which England and Germany can never agree," and continued:

England will never accept Fascism or the suppression and penalization of individuals and parties . . . simply because they adhere to principles and beliefs . . . which are not in agreement with a dictated regime. Still less can England view without a deep and generous indignation the ruthless persecution of individuals solely on the ground of race.

Germany, on the other hand, sees in the Soviet not only a danger to herself, encircled as she is between France on the west and 170,000,000 Russians on the east, while 15,000,000 Germans live in minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other non-German territories. Above all, she abhors the avowed policy of the Soviet, which aims at the overthrow of all government not based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the destruction of religion, the family, and private property, a policy which has spread its poison not merely to Spain and France, but to China and Mexico, and constitutes a menace to the whole world. It may well be doubted whether Britain has ever taken a more disastrous step than when she gave a "cordial welcome" to the Soviet Union in September,

1934, on its admission to the League of Nations. For it is obvious that the Franco-Russian Pact might, through our steady support of France, lead us into war as the ally of the Bolshevik Government. In any case, this fatal link with a nation which has never disavowed its policy of world revolution is a factor which makes a real understanding (*sic*) with Germany very difficult . . .

For the outlook of the two great Teutonic nations is, in fundamentals, the same: respect for the family as the basis of the commonwealth, the physical, moral, and intellectual development of the people as a whole on the principle that service to the community is the first claim on every man and woman—not service to the State as such (which is rather the principle of Fascism) and a belief in a divine providence that shapes our ends, rough-hew them as we may.

This letter has been quoted at length not only because of its intrinsic interest, but because it is believed to express in a general way the inclinations and prejudices of a number of Englishmen, who preferred to remain silent on this issue. Probably few of them would have accepted Sir George Shee's characterization of the "two great Teutonic nations," but a good many would presumably have shared his preference for National Socialist Germany as against Soviet Russia; and they would have been prepared therefore to support a policy aimed at avoiding conflict with Germany, if, as the result of such conflict, Russian influence had been enhanced in Europe or elsewhere.¹⁷²

¹⁷² See letter by Lord Astor to the *Times*, October 10, 1937, in which he foresees the "suicide of the British Commonwealth" resulting from a war with Germany caused by a refusal to make colonial concessions, and the continuance of military alliances encircling Germany. "Moreover, such a result would serve the strategy of Communism, which desires to see non-Communist countries at war in the belief that revolution must follow." Lord Astor further suggests in terms which must have caused inquietude across the Channel, that France will be more secure with a German non-aggression pact "than if she depends on her existing provocative military alliances (of diminishing military value) and a British entente inevitably more half-hearted and less cordial and binding because of France's provocative alliances." This pointed repetition leaves little doubt as to Lord Astor's point of view, which is particularly interesting in view of the Prime Minis-

From the point of view of those to whom Russia, and not Germany, was the real enemy, the colonial problem was of minor importance as an aspect of the general question of peaceful change. There was then little apprehension of danger to Great Britain if Germany should obtain African territory, for Germany was looked upon as an ally rather than as an opponent. Confidence in German intentions was then already firm, and concessions might be made at any moment. Any analysis of colonial peaceful change between Britain and Germany, therefore, which assumes that British mistrust of German plans was so great as to prevent a transfer of mandates, must be modified by the extent to which Russia and not Germany was the bogeyman of the British public. The German menace, more direct and more active, occupied the minds of the larger part of the British people, but a small group, which grew smaller after Munich, and nearly vanished along with Czechoslovakia, was willing to try to satisfy the ambitions of Berlin in an attempt to thwart those of Moscow.¹⁷³

A systematic presentation of the case for colonial concessions from the point of view of a near-pacifist was given by Lord Noel Buxton in a letter to the *Times*, November 2, 1937. He listed six premises used as starting points by those who objected to a retrocession of colonies to Germany, and proceeded to contest their validity. He declared that the hypothesis that Anglo-German hostility is necessary and inevitable is "an

ter's policy a year later at Munich. Cf. Bertrand Russell, "Paralysis of England," *Coronet*, Dec., 1936: "An influential section of the present Government sees an issue from the confusion in an alliance with the Nazis. If Germany could be left free to attack Russia, while the British kept France quiet, communism would be wiped out." p. 7.

¹⁷³ Professor W. Alison Phillips wrote a letter to the *Times*, Oct. 4, 1938, just after Munich, in which an anti-Russian trend was only faintly disguised: "It would be contrary to all the sound traditions of our foreign policy to allow our dislike of Nazi principles and Nazi methods to stand in the way of a good understanding with Germany, without which there can be no assured peace. If this good understanding could be attained—and the auspices are favourable—substance may yet be given to the Nazi vision of an alliance between Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy as a barrier against the forces which threaten Western civilisation."

impossible basis of foreign policy"; and referred to the state of Anglo-French relations before 1904 to show that sharp antagonism between nations is susceptible of rapid and lasting transformation.

The view that colonial offers to Germany would not affect her aggressive intentions in Europe was countered by the claim that it was not certain that Germany wanted to expand eastward, and in any case Britain should not provide an incentive to "embark upon such a disastrous course" by barring the way to other means of expansion. Thirdly, the defiance of Germany, Lord Noel Buxton argued, could be contemplated only by those who, living in a fool's paradise, assumed that there could be a peaceful future while Germany nursed a deeply-felt grievance.

In his answer to the fourth premise of the standpatters, Lord Noel Buxton voiced the feeling of a number of Englishmen who considered that Germany had been harshly treated at Versailles from the colonial point of view. Putting it more strongly perhaps than would most of those who shared his opinion, he said that "there are few to-day who can contemplate calmly the breach of the promise conveyed in the fifth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points—'an absolutely impartial investigation of all colonial claims.'"¹⁷⁴ To those who exhibited concern over the welfare of the natives, he asserted that Germany had a contribution to make to Africa, and that in any case "the greatest injury that could befall the natives of Africa would be war, which the denial of colonies to Germany might well produce."

Finally, he dealt with the strategic objection by suggesting that Germany might be satisfied in West Africa rather than in

¹⁷⁴ Lord Noel Buxton does not quote Point V with verbal exactitude, but he does not distort its meaning. For text of Point V see above, n. 21, p. 56. It may be noted that Lord Noel Buxton's views have changed since his exchange of letters with Dr. Schnee in 1927, above, p. 68. Cf. letter by E. N. Bennett: "Are those politicians and journalists who take a *non possumus* attitude on this matter prepared to face the horrors and risks of another war in order to defend the last outstanding blunder of Versailles?" *Times*, Dec. 18, 1936.

East Africa. However, lest this should be considered an evasion of the question by the "Hold Tanganyika!" school, he added that, while territorial transfer would necessarily involve "difficult problems of vested interest and established tradition . . . sacrifices of some kind are inevitable in the cause of peace."¹⁷⁵

Many were the variations of this theme of sacrifices for peace, and from lukewarm to hot ranged those who proclaimed the warmth of their attachment to this ideal. Sir John Fischer Williams suggested that, since the doctrine of peaceful change was already being practiced within the British Empire, "let us not be afraid of a similar policy when the claim for change comes from outside the Empire and concerns the peace of the world." However, he minimized the sacrifices necessary by saying that the "retention of these colonies . . . is not any part of our secular national policy."¹⁷⁶

No slighter enthusiasm for peace was expressed by Mr. A. L. Kennedy,¹⁷⁷ but he was less indifferent to the prospect of certain colonial concessions. He strongly favored negotiation toward a colonial agreement with Germany, but he ruled out discussion of Tanganyika because of its strategic importance to Britain.¹⁷⁸

175 The notion of making sacrifices for peace was assailed in a letter by Mr. A. L. Kennedy to the *Times*, Nov. 23, 1937: "If any readjustment is to be made by us and other Colonial empires it should surely be done on exactly the opposite principle—that changes should be made in the *status quo* without any question of war whatever." Mr. Maxwell Garnett in his above quoted letter, written a year and a half before, said that "In discussing such a programme with Germany it is essential to avoid any appearance of having been frightened into making concessions." Cf. letter by Charles Roden Buxton and others to the *Times*, June 21, 1935.

176 Letter to the *Times*, Oct. 19, 1937. Since Sir John Fischer Williams did not apparently consider colonial concessions a great sacrifice, he should, from this letter at least, be listed among the more temperate of the advocates of peace.

177 See his letter to the *Times*, April 22, 1937.

178 See his *Britain Faces Germany* (London, Oxford U. Press, 1937), p. 166. Mr. Kennedy must also be reckoned as temperate in his call for peace, for he considered part of the ex-German colonies as unreturnable, and, therefore, presumably worth fighting for.

The question of the timing of peaceful change was admitted to be important by the proponents of a colonial understanding, and Mr. Harold Bowden pointed out that the existing demands for treaty revision should have been satisfied even before they were made. In spite of the unpropitious state of the European atmosphere, however, he felt that "the attempt must be made to rewrite the Treaty, since there is, literally, no alternative to it except war."¹⁷⁹

A different and not uncommon attitude on the timing of peaceful change was adopted by Lord Astor, who wrote a series of letters to the *Times* in the latter part of 1937 in which he strongly supported the granting to Germany of African satisfactions. Like all those who took the general line of reconciliation with Germany, Lord Astor rested his case upon the keeping of the peace; but while Mr. Bowden feared that confidence was already destroyed, Lord Astor feared that it had not yet been created, and said that "unless and until there is some adjustment of the colonial issue there can be no confidence or any sense of security in Europe, nay, there must be an ever-running sore liable at any moment to burst."¹⁸⁰

The confidence with which Mr. Bowden, and most of the anti-concessionary elements, were concerned, was the confi-

¹⁷⁹ Letter to the *Times*, Dec. 4, 1937. This line of "reasonable appeasement" to avoid war had been followed also by Lord David Cecil, who accepted German discontent as a necessary result of her vitality and strength, and said that a refusal to find means for German expansion "is to show ourselves guilty of the same narrow, selfish nationalism that we deplore in the more reckless utterances of Fascist leaders." Letter to the *Times*, Dec. 14, 1936. Mr. A. L. Kennedy in a letter to the *Times*, Oct. 14, 1937, emphasized the importance of the problem of timing, and insisted that there was little time left in which to make concessions: "If we wait until Hitler formally demands of us the return of the whole of the former German colonies I can see no way out except his fall from power or war between Germany and Great Britain."

¹⁸⁰ Letter to the *Times*, Oct. 13, 1937. Sir George Shee expressed a similar point of view in a letter to the *Times*, Oct. 23, 1937: "The fact is, Sir . . . the time has come—is, indeed, long overdue—for us to accept the offer of friendly discussion with a great people which was beaten in the Great War, and which, even (*sic*) under the terms of a dictated peace, has hardly had a fair deal."

dence of Englishmen in Germany's beneficent employment of power in the colonies. Confidence, in Lord Astor's sense, meant the confidence of Germans that they might gain what they wanted in Africa without having to resort to war. He apparently was unafraid of the consequences of returning Germany's ex-colonies, and therefore expressed his anxiety lest Germany should be pressed beyond the limit of pacific endurance of colonial deprivation.¹⁸¹

This attitude was directly opposed to that of one who had no faith in the possibility of Germany's responding in a permanently cooperative manner after an African rearrangement, and who therefore judged that the first requirement for reconciliation was extensive modifications of National Socialist policy external and internal. Lord Astor, possessing hope in a satisfactory German reaction, asserted that the first move must come from Britain, so that German confidence in the ways of peace might be generated. Between these two states of mind, down to mid-March, 1939, swayed the jelly of British public opinion, now hardening as its confidence evaporated under some new German blast, and now melting as it contemplated the promised frightfulness of war.

The effects of the Munich "settlement" upon British opinion about the colonial problem were rather mixed, but on the whole it may be said that the beginning of a generally stiffer attitude may be traced from October 1, 1938. In the Parliamentary Debates was expressed more fear than hope,

181 "To-day we are strong enough to review the question of colonies without the accusation of weakness. We can still count on powerful influences of answering good will. We can still negotiate with War veterans." Letter by Lord Astor in the *Times*, Oct. 18, 1937. See also J. L. Garvin's stirring appeal for an arrangement with Germany in the *Observer*, Jan. 31, 1937. Mr. Garvin said that the colonial question "can be settled on moderate terms without the slightest injury to the strength or prosperity of the British Empire," and he asserted his belief that "The time to begin a supreme effort for settlement on the practical lines we have described is now." Those "practical lines" involved primarily the granting to Germany of an assurance that Britain would in no case "join in tying Germany's hands in the East."

more foreboding than confidence in the future. However, aside from the opinion of members of the Government, which is noted below, there were a number of speeches which considered Munich as offering good chances for European cooperation. Viscount Samuel thought that "now we have the prospect open for consideration of some general settlement in Europe. From that I believe that the colonial question cannot be excluded";¹⁸² and quite a few Conservative back-benchers praised the Prime Minister for having averted a war. Few of Mr. Chamberlain's supporters, however, were very sanguine about what was to come. Earl Baldwin of Bewdley said: "I would never lose hope, but I am entirely in agreement with those who would push on to bring up those defences of which I have spoken to a satisfactory point with the least possible delay. I would mobilise our industry to-morrow."¹⁸³

Such serious concern for the future was only deepened by Sir John Simon's admission that "it is true that the Agreement at Munich was reached under the pressure of the alternative of instant invasion";¹⁸⁴ and by Mr. Chamberlain's declaration with regard to rearmament, that no one should think "that because we have signed this agreement between these four Powers at Munich we can afford to relax our efforts in regard to that programme at this moment."¹⁸⁵ Of course, the Prime Minister said also that now that they had got past the question of Czechoslovakia, "I feel that it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity";¹⁸⁶ but if

¹⁸² *Parl. Deb.*, Lords, Oct. 4, 1938, vol. 110, col. 1389. Even Mr. Attlee was, on conditions, not without hope: "I believe that to-day, if the world can take a lesson from the events of these months, despite the sacrifice of the Czech people, there is an opportunity of going forward to build a new world." *Ibid.*, Commons, Oct. 3, 1938, vol. 339, col. 66.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, Lords, Oct. 4, 1938, vol. 110, col. 1392. Similar sentiments were expressed by Lord Astor, *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1938, col. 1472; and The Earl of Glasgow, *ibid.*, col. 1474-5.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Commons, Oct. 5, 1938, vol. 339, col. 345.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1938, col. 49-50.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 48.

there could be no slackening of rearmament, the main advantage of Munich seemed to be the chance to catch Germany in the arms race.

If Mr. Chamberlain thought it of advantage to report that, concerning colonies, Herr Hitler had said: "There will be no mobilisation about that";¹⁸⁷ he also found it desirable to admit that "if we want to secure a lasting peace, I realise that diplomacy cannot be effective unless the consciousness exists, not here alone, but elsewhere, that behind the diplomacy is the strength to give effect to it."¹⁸⁸

Those who opposed the Government's policy were no less anxious for rearmament than were Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters;¹⁸⁹ and it was this near unanimity on the need for rearmament which marked the beginning of the stiffening of British opinion toward Germany.

However, even those Englishmen who were dismayed by the extent of the German victory at Munich, and by the methods by which it was gained, felt relief that war had been avoided, and many of them believed that a chance for appeasement might develop from what was called the "spirit of Munich."¹⁹⁰ This hope died quickly. The news of the pogrom of November tenth caused an outburst of anti-German feeling, and new adherents joined those groups which opposed colonial transfer on the ground that Germans could not be entrusted

187 *Ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1938, col. 22.

188 *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1938, col. 551.

189 See the powerful denunciations made by Sir Stafford Cripps and Winston Churchill. *Ibid.*, col. 412 ff.; and col. 366 ff. It should be noted that Sir Stafford Cripps proposed, besides building up a collective defence, the "working out at a world conference that new system which will make available to the common people of all nations commodities which now, though so bounteously produced, cannot be obtained by many starving millions," col. 417.

190 See, *e. g.*, letter by W. A. Goodchild in the *Times*, Nov. 17, 1938. The Aga Khan, in an article entitled "Peace or Truce?" in the *Times*, Oct. 19, 1938, stated that "The substance of German unity is now achieved," and expressed the view that the possibility for making a colonial settlement had thereby been enhanced.

with the care of African natives. Sir Archibald Sinclair, for example, listed as a lesson of the pogrom, "that we in Britain could not honourably hand over to a Government which permitted and even instigated such vile outbursts of frenzied barbarism against what it regarded as a subject and inferior race, any of those primitive peoples in Africa who now enjoy the blessings of freedom and impartial justice under British rule. There are several possible solutions of the colonial problem, but that solution must now be ruled out."¹⁹¹ In measured phrases, an editorial in the *Times* joined the condemnatory chorus with the statement: "What does matter is that no one at the moment feels disposed to risk the unconditional transfer of any backward race to the sort of subjection which finds favour in Germany to-day."¹⁹²

191 Speech at Northampton, Nov. 11, 1938. *Times*, Nov. 12, 1938. Cf. *Times*, Nov. 15, 1938, for report of questions in the House, and letters by W. E. Goodenough, Herbert Russell, and Stephen Harding. In a letter, Lord Lugard noted that "There is, however, no denying that the recent action of the present rulers of Germany has caused misgivings in this country," but he maintained his earlier views in favor of permitting Germans to enter the technical services of the mandates, and in favor of granting commercial equality in all the British colonies. *Times*, Nov. 23, 1938. In a speech, Dr. Temple, Archbishop of York, was reported as saying: "But all Christian and humane opinions should be united in a firm refusal to subject African races to a Government whose conception of justice found expression in the recent attack upon the Jews." *Times*, Dec. 2, 1938.

192 Nov. 16, 1938. It should be noted that "unconditional transfer" only is here opposed. The editorial went on to suggest, as an "ideal to be steadily pursued," that "between the great self-governing communities in the South of Africa and those others to the East and on the Mediterranean seaboard which are on the way to self-government, there exists a vast continent of backward races whose future must lie, perhaps for centuries to come, in the guidance of Europeans." Germany, it was suggested, "might well find an honourable place" in the undertaking of applying the principle of trusteeship to this area. As thus defined with careful vagueness, South-west Africa, the Rhodesias, Tanganyika, Uganda, the Sudan, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco might all be excluded from this "vast continent." This editorial was not well received in Berlin, where "official circles" stated that what Germany demands is not "a share in an international administration of part of Africa, but the restoration of the colonies wrongfully taken from her." Dispatch from Berlin, *Times*, Nov. 18, 1938.

The development of the editorial stand of the *Times* is interesting. On

This reaction against German brutality pleased Mr. Winston Churchill. "Whereas only a few weeks ago a lot of influential people were taking it for granted that the former German colonies, or their equivalent, would be handed over to Herr

September 19, 1935, it was editorially held that the colonial question "is positively insoluble by the exercise of mere force." On January 13, 1936, it was stated that "The principle is now firmly established that 'possessions' are trusts to be administered in the interests of the inhabitants with a view to the time . . . when they will be qualified to look after themselves" and that no criticism of "civilising capacity" is involved in emphasizing "the wholesale dislocation of the life of local communities that would be inherent in any abandonment of responsibility or in any departure from a policy which is equally essential and well-established." This is a bit oblique and smacks of the pulpit, but it would seem that a conclusion opposed to colonial transfer would follow. A little later, however, on March 9, 1936, favorable comment was made on Herr Hitler's "offer" of March 7, and the *Times* said: "It is the moment, not to despair, but to rebuild." The demand for equality was not unreasonable, nor the demand for "full autonomy in the Memel territory," nor that for separation of the Covenant from the Treaty. Herr Hitler had referred to colonial equality also, but the *Times* here rather pointedly ignored colonies, although Britain's contribution to equality would primarily concern them. The latest anti-transfer statement appeared on September 10, 1936: "At present the war mentality is being fostered in Germany, and to make concessions to it to-day would be merely to invite larger demands to-morrow." By March 3, 1937, this attitude had changed to one slightly less intransigent, even though the "war mentality" in Germany had not noticeably changed. In commenting on Herr von Ribbentrop's demand for colonies in a speech at Leipzig on March 1, the *Times* admitted that the colonial question might be considered, but only in a "general discussion covering all outstanding difficulties," since the colonial question was not the affair of any one country, and since the mandatory Powers must be convinced that a definite improvement in atmosphere would follow concessions. On October 28, 1937, the *Times'* view had sufficiently moderated in favor of Germany that it could say that there was no case for refusing to discuss the colonial issue "as part of a general settlement, in a frank and friendly spirit," after the "Spanish trouble" is ended, and if the "shouting-match" over the colonies is discontinued. The *Times* said that "the recognition of Germany as *capax imperii* would be all the more satisfactory if such a field could be opened to her by the common action of three or four of the great colonizing Powers with contiguous African territories;" and, while excepting the retrocession of Tanganyika, advocated "a genuine attempt to find for Germany some acceptable field for development." This barely veiled advocacy of giving territory to Germany inspired some adverse comments in the House of Commons at the end of 1937 on what Colonel Wedgwood called the "pro-German propaganda" in the *Times*. *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, Nov. 8, 1937,

Hitler in order to appease him for the time being, there has now been a very decisive rally against such surrender and betrayal of trust."¹⁹³

A survey by the British Institute of Public Opinion indicated the existence in October, 1938, of a greater sentiment against return of colonies to Germany than was found a year earlier. The question asked was: "Are you in favor of giving back any former German colonies?" Of those polled, 15% were in favor of return and 85% were opposed. Those who voted against were asked: "Would you rather fight than hand

vol. 328, col. 1414. Cf. Mr. Vyvyan Adams, *ibid.*, Nov. 3, vol. 328, col. 902; and Captain McEwen, (C) *ibid.*, Dec. 21, vol. 330, col. 1859.

For a time the *Times* responded typically to German demands, the pronouncement of September 10, 1936 being an almost perfect example of the general arguments on peaceful change which have been made above. The shift in attitude can hardly be explained by assuming the *Times* to have adopted pacifism, since Tanganyika is not transferable; but it may be connected with pro-concession opinions of Lord Astor, the brother of the owner of the paper, who, as suggested above (p. 112, n. 172) apparently did not consider Germany as Britain's greatest potential enemy.

193 Speech at Harlow, Essex, *Times*, Nov. 26, 1938. Even such an ardent pro-German as Sir Arnold Wilson, who favored the return of some of the colonies in a general settlement, said that such settlement "must include a different attitude towards Jews," on the part of Germany. Speech in the House of Commons, as reported in the *Times*, Dec. 20, 1938. Another well-known advocate of an arrangement with Germany, Lord Londonderry, also changed his mind after the pogroms. According to the *New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1938, he said in an address to the Overseas League: "We cannot hand over any population to a country which seems bent on exterminating a section of its community or on reducing them to a situation which calls for condemnation by every right-minded man and woman throughout the civilized world." He called on Mr. Chamberlain to pledge that "we are not prepared to sacrifice an inch of territory or one individual" to German demands. Cf. article under Lord Londonderry's name in *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, April 3, 1937, in which is recommended the acceptance of Germany's rehabilitation as a world power, and the working, so far as possible, in harmony with her. Lord Londonderry did not, however, here mention the colonial issue specifically. See also *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1938 for reviews of British opinion after the violent anti-Jewish outbreak in Germany. For an exposition of a German policy toward African natives, see Dr. Günther Hecht, *The Colonial Question and Racial Thought*, reviewed in the *Times*, Dec. 12, 1938.

them back?" and the answer was in the affirmative, 81% to 19%.¹⁹⁴

The "very decisive rally" which Mr. Churchill mentioned was transformed into an adamantine intransigence on concessions to Germany. All groups of British opinion with the possible exception of the British Union of Fascists, and a few who remained less imperialist than anti-Russian, became thoroughly aroused by the conquest of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. A revolution in British attitudes was reported to have taken place, particularly upon two points, namely, the degree of trust to be placed in Herr Hitler's promises; and the scale of German territorial ambitions.¹⁹⁵ The Chancellor's avowal to the effect that the Sudetenland represented his last territorial ambition in Europe, was so explicit, and received so much publicity because of Mr. Chamberlain's reliance upon it, that it was generally recognized that the most solemn assurances of the Head of the German State could be given no credence.¹⁹⁶ This realization necessarily caused general opposition in Britain to con-

194 *Release*, Oct. 28, 1938, by American Institute of Public Opinion. It is remarkable that 85% of those polled opposed the return of "any" Colonies, for it might have been supposed that a larger percentage than 15 would have been willing to give up Togo and/or the Cameroons. Had the question employed "all" for "any," it is probable that the percentage against return would have been much closer to 100. "A year ago the vote on returning colonies was 24 per cent for, 76 per cent opposed." It is highly probable that the figure of 85% would have been higher after German announcement that Germany intend to equal the British submarine tonnage, for colonies would be of value as potential submarine bases from which British "life-lines" might be severed. Note also the earlier survey by the Institute in *New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1938, in which it was found that "57 per cent of all voters approve of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his foreign policy in the past few weeks, while 43 per cent are opposed." "Appeasement" apparently did not then mean "colonial appeasement" to the British public.

195 See article by Harold Callender in *New York Times*, March 19, 1939.

196 As Mr. Chamberlain said in his speech at Birmingham, on March 17, 1939: "Doesn't the question inevitably remain in our minds, if it is so easy to discover good reasons for ignoring assurances so solemnly and so repeatedly given, what reliance can be placed upon any other assurances that come from the same source?" *New York Times*, March 18, 1939.

cessions, colonial or otherwise, since any freely granted concessions would be made only in return for various undertakings by the German Government.

In the second place, after the German occupation of Prague, it was clear that German territorial conquest was not limited to German language frontiers, as some in Britain had hoped. If this was the case, then Hungary and Roumania were not excluded from the sphere of German political control as well as German economic domination, and British interests in the Near East would then be directly menaced. The appreciation of these two considerations by British public opinion made any colonial transfer impossible. At the same time, there was no abatement of the German campaign for colonies. It was reported that the German Colonial League was preparing mightily for the Greater Germany Colonial Exhibition to be held in Vienna in May and June of 1939.¹⁹⁷ In spite of disinclination toward appeasement, Togo and the Cameroons might have appeared to British eyes to be transferable if a firm demand had been made, and if the alternative had been war.

Whatever the trend of public opinion, however, it plays a minor rôle in the initiation of policies.¹⁹⁸ It may force the renunciation of a Hoare-Laval Plan, but affirmatively it functions mainly as a loud "Hear! Hear!" for the proposals presented to it by those who for the moment are in power. What were the National Government's reactions to Hitlerian manifestations of solar tropism?

(c) GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES

In general, the Government was non-committal in regard to its future policy; refusing to say that it would never agree to a transfer of mandated territory, it did not admit that

¹⁹⁷ *Empire*, April, 1939, p. 51.

¹⁹⁸ The members of a cabinet will of course be subject to those influences which mould public opinion, and they live in the same intellectual and emotional atmosphere, but their position is essentially different because they form a more homogeneous group, because they have a greater sense of responsibility for their actions, and because they possess information not available to the public.

it was at any moment giving consideration to such transfer. Questions were asked frequently enough, some seventy-five being presented between January, 1935, and January, 1939, but in spite of the worried interrogations of some of its own supporters, the Government refrained from barring the way to negotiations on the colonial problem.

As early as March 23, 1933, Colonel Wedgwood (Lab.) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to give an assurance that no future consideration would be given "to the question of surrendering our mandate." Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, rejecting the question's implication, replied that "His Majesty's Government have never contemplated any surrender of the mandate."¹⁹⁹

A hint as to the state of mind of official opinion in 1933 was given in a speech by Sir John Simon, in which he said that, while there had been considerable sympathy for the German people on the part of many people in Britain, recent events had lost for Germany much of that sympathy. "We earnestly desire that the time may come when we may with a good conscience and a full heart contribute to the solution of the problems of Europe, but we can only contribute if we have complete confidence in the treatment which minorities receive in all parts of the world."²⁰⁰ Confidence had been rudely shaken by the abrupt advent of the Hitler régime, and while some people shortly began to take what was called "the longer view," for the moment almost no one spoke out for concessions.

The German Government did not present a formal demand for revision of the colonial clauses of the Versailles Treaty. The British Government's position on the question was developed mainly in response to parliamentary queries as

¹⁹⁹ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, vol. 276, cols. 499-500. Sir Philip, in reply to a question put by Mr. Mander, Dec. 20, 1933, limited his earlier statement slightly by saying that "It has been repeatedly stated that His Majesty's Government have never contemplated any surrender of the mandate for Tanganyika. . . . That is the firm, considered and determined view of the Government." *Ibid.*, vol. 284, col. 1278.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 280, col. 452.

to its attitude should such a demand be made; and, from the nature of these queries, it is clear that nearly all of their sponsors were hostile to a colonial deal, and wished the Government to say it was inadmissible.²⁰¹

While the number of questions was large, there were only a few extended answers given, most of the questioners being referred to the latest of the definitive statements of the Government's policy.

Following the explanation by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the first important statement was made by Sir John Simon, on May 3, 1935.²⁰² Referring to his recent visit to Berlin with Mr. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary said that Herr Hitler intimated that there would be no equality for Germany if she were not to be regarded as fit to administer a colony, and Herr Hitler had pointed to the retention by Japan of a mandate after her withdrawal from the League. Sir John Simon declared that his answer to Hitler, which all reasonable men should consider, was that the distribution of mandates "is not a question for any individual member of the League. It is a question for the League itself."

201 Many of the questions were in this vein: "Sir H. Croft [C] asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will give an assurance that His Majesty's Government have not considered, and are not considering, the handing over of any of the British colonies, either under mandate or otherwise, to a foreign Power, and that they are not prepared to make British colonies the subject of barter in any world conference?" *Ibid.*, Feb. 12, 1936, vol. 308, col. 933. Mr. J. H. Thomas gave the desired assurance in terms almost identical to those used in the first part of the question. *Ibid.*, col. 934. Cf. discussion of Mr. Thomas' reply by Eugene J. Young in *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1936. Mr. Young, it would seem, went a bit far in saying that "Mr. Thomas now makes it clear that any German hopes of getting colonies at the expense of the British Empire are unfounded." Mr. Thomas did not mortgage the future, but said merely that the Government "have not considered and are not considering" giving up colonies or mandates.

202 In answering a question on April 9, 1935, the Prime Minister, Mr. MacDonald, contented himself with saying that "The policy of His Majesty's Government has been repeatedly and clearly stated by this and previous Governments." *Ibid.*, vol. 300, col. 977.

An interruption was then made by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who said: "No—certainly not," and, breaking in on an attempted explanation by the Foreign Secretary, he added: "Territories mandated were placed under the guardianship of the League. It has never been held or pretended that it was within the power of the League to transfer a mandate from one country to another."²⁰³ The Foreign Secretary thereupon gave in, and said: "I am sorry I should have stated this matter not quite accurately," but he went on to say that he did not think that he had given a wrong impression to the Chancellor of the *Reich*, for "my right hon. Friend and I made it perfectly plain that the transfer of mandates is a question which is not a discussable question . . ."²⁰⁴ This last phrase became a byword in the discussions of the colonial problem.

The Prime Minister allowed an implication of discussability to be drawn from his answer to a question put by Colonel Wedgwood on December 18, 1935, which asked that no British colony should be transferred without "consent of all classes, creeds, and races" within the territory. Mr. Baldwin replied that he could hardly be expected to be so categorical in reply to a hypothetical question, but he said that no British territory, colony, protectorate or mandate "would be transferred from British sovereignty or authority without the fullest regard

203 *Ibid.*, vol. 301, col. 686. The legal problems of the transfer of mandates await final settlement. The turning over of Ruanda Urundi to Belgium by Great Britain in August, 1919, was made with the consent of the Supreme Council, and, of course, the British Government. The Council of the League has been usually considered in this regard to be the heir of the Supreme Council, although the statement is sometimes made that the latter body would have to be re-created for the transfer of a mandate. Legal arguments might have been used to oppose a German claim, but there would probably have been no serious difficulty if the British Government had shown any real interest in returning a mandate to Germany.

204 *Ibid.*, col. 687. Sir John repeated his regret at having made "an inaccurate observation," but he said he was glad to be corrected since it seemed to him that the view that Germany "is not in a position of inferiority on this ground is, when you have regard to the structure in which we want her to form a part, surely a contention that cannot be maintained."

being had to the interests of all sections of the population in the territory concerned." ²⁰⁵

A flat rebuff met one of the rare questions which showed that its author favored a change in the status of the mandates. On February 26, 1936, Mr. Maclay (Lib.) wondered whether the Foreign Secretary would consider suggesting to the League that "Germany be invited at an early date to put before the League her territorial grievances arising out of the Treaty of Versailles . . ." Mr. Eden replied: "The answer to the . . . question is, no, Sir." ²⁰⁶

Speculation about the future of mandates was increased sharply by Chancellor Hitler's speech of March 7, 1936, at the time of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, in which he said that Germany was prepared to re-enter the League, "expressing at the same time her expectation that, in the course of a reasonable space of time, the problem of colonial equality of rights as well as of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles Treaty base will be clarified in the course of friendly negotiations." ²⁰⁷ A rash of questions broke out in the House following the speech, and three major statements on British policy were made in the course of the next month.

The first was offered by Mr. Neville Chamberlain. In response to a request for information from Mr. Winston Churchill, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer noted that no

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 307, col. 1738-9. The speech of Sir Samuel Hoare before the League Assembly on Sept. 11, 1935 aroused some hopes that mandatory transfer was in the offing, although reference was made only to the Government's willingness to do their share in dealing collectively with the problem of distribution of raw materials.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 309, col. 427. See also suggestion by Mr. Mander that the Government take the lead in proposing to other countries a mandatory system for all colonies. Lord Cranborne expressed regret that the Government "are unable to entertain the suggestion." *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1937, vol. 320, col. 1522. See *Times*, March 23, 1937, for statement by Mr. Baldwin to a deputation of signatories of a memorial on "Peace and economic cooperation," in which he raised various objections to the application of the mandates system to the British Colonial Empire.

²⁰⁷ Text in *Times*, March 9, 1936. Also in F. J. Berber, *Locarno* (London, Hodge, 1936), p. 225.

one had suggested that any British colonies should be given up, "and I need hardly say that, if any such demand were made, it would not possibly be entertained for a moment." Mandates were in a different category, however, and he went on to explain the tenure by which they were held, indicating that they included no provision for transfer, and that the consent both of the mandatory and of the Council would be necessary to effect such transfer. He said that the Government "have not considered and are not considering" any transfer, as had been made clear by the Colonial Secretary,²⁰⁸ although he would not predict the action of future Governments. However, since mandates are also held by other Governments, he could not conceive of the transfer of a British mandate "quite irrespective of what will happen to the mandates held by other Governments." Finally, the territories would not be handed over to any other power "even for the sake of obtaining that general peaceful settlement which all of us so much desire, unless we were satisfied that the interests of all sections of the populations inhabiting those territories were fully safeguarded."²⁰⁹

When this explanation, and another, repetitious and authoritative, by the Colonial Secretary, Mr. J. H. Thomas,²¹⁰ had failed to silence questioners, Mr. Baldwin himself undertook on April 27 to quiet the anxiety expressed by many in the

²⁰⁸ See above, p. 125, n. 200.

²⁰⁹ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, April 6, 1936, vol. 310, col. 2556-8. The views of Mr. Chamberlain are rather fully given here in view of his becoming Prime Minister. Cf. the refusal by Earl Stanhope, speaking for the Government in the House of Lords, to give the Earl of Mansfield the assurance that under no circumstances would the Government consider a transfer of mandates. Earl Stanhope said it would be "unwise to give any such assurance" when the attempt was being made to get Germany back into the League and to arrange a general settlement. April 8, 1936, vol. 100, col. 584-5.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Commons, April 21, 1936, vol. 311, col. 99-100. Beyond stating that the Government would not consider mandatory transfer unless the whole question of mandates held by the Dominions were reviewed, Mr. Thomas added nothing to Mr. Chamberlain's remarks. On this day a number of Members spoke on the colonial issue, and Mr. Churchill said that the Colonial Secretary's assurances were quite unsatisfactory. *Ibid.*, col. 81-104.

House. Apparently, however, the Prime Minister relied rather on his position, than on his exposition, to impress his hearers, for beyond repeating the "have not considered and are not considering" formula, his only assurance was that the Government had no intention of raising the question, but in case it should arise, "they would not commit themselves to any settlement of the problems at issue without giving the fullest opportunity for discussion in the House."²¹¹

Even this statement did not subdue or satisfy some of the supporters of the Government, and questions were raised in May and June;²¹² and in July at a meeting of the "Foreign Affairs Committee of Supporters of the National Government," the conclusion was reached that "in no circumstances could the transfer of any mandated or other colonial territory be considered."²¹³

A significant modification of the Government's position became evident as a result of a speech by the Foreign Secretary on July 27, 1936. After expressing the willingness of the Government to discuss the raw materials problem at a conference, Mr. Eden turned to the question of the future status of the mandates and said that while the problem was one for all mandatory Powers, "so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, the question of any transfer of Mandated Terri-

211 *Ibid.*, col. 552-3. Mr. Baldwin went into the question of the technique of transferring a mandate, "which were it to be contemplated, would require the most careful consideration and which would be subjected to a procedure of a very elaborate nature." He also repeated Mr. Thomas' assurances as to the welfare of the natives.

212 See, *e. g.*, those of Mr. Duncan Sandys on May 7, *ibid.*, vol. 311, col. 1873; and by Lieutenant-Colonel Sandeman Allen (C) May 12, vol. 312, col. 179. These questioners were referred to Mr. Baldwin's statement of April 27. A hopeful question about introducing international administration into the mandates to satisfy the countries without colonies was asked by Mr. Mander, but Mr. Eden answered: "I hardly think that the proposal of the hon. Member would be practicable, nor do I think that it would satisfy the aspirations to which he refers." *Ibid.*, May 6, 1936, vol. 311, col. 1675.

213 The *Times*, July 3, 1936. The Committee considered that it would be a grave error to allow Germany to suppose that transfer of such territory "was even open to discussion."

tories would inevitably raise grave difficulties, moral, political and legal, of which His Majesty's Government must frankly say that they have been unable to find any solution."²¹⁴

The Government then had considered the retrocession of mandates between April 27 and July 27, if it follows that the inability to find a solution could be admitted only after some reflection had been devoted to the matter. Yet on February 15, 1937, Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a question from Mr. Vyvyan Adams, asking for an unmistakable statement that no colonial cession was contemplated, said: "As has been previously stated, His Majesty's Government have not considered and are not considering such transfer."²¹⁵ Also, Mr. Eden, two weeks later, quoted Lord Cranborne's answer, and stated that "that state-

²¹⁴ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, vol. 315, col. 1132. This statement was made almost three months after the dispatch on May 6, of a questionnaire sent by Mr. Eden to the German Chancellor, asking him for further details on the points raised by his speech of March 7. The questionnaire, which ignored completely the Chancellor's reference to colonies, was not answered, or at least no answer was published. Text in Cmd. 5175, 1936, pp. 12-16. Dr. M. E. Townsend, in "The German Colonies and the Third Reich," 53 *Pol. Sci. Quart.* (1938), p. 202, states: "Indicative also of the government's anxiety over the portent of Nazi colonialism was the fact that Anthony Eden included the colonial issue in his famous 'questionnaire' to Hitler." There is, however, no mention of the colonial issue in the questionnaire; on the contrary, it seems to have been almost studiously avoided. In his only reference to the paragraph in which the Chancellor mentioned colonies (above, p. 128) Mr. Eden said: "Before the return of Germany to the League of Nations comes under discussion, the German Government will no doubt think it desirable to give some definition of the phrase 'the separation of the League of Nations from its basis in the Treaty of Versailles setting,' which occurs in sub-paragraph 18, of paragraph 22. At the moment His Majesty's Government prefer only to deal with points the elucidation of which is essential prior to the opening of the general negotiations which, as stated above, they are sincerely desirous of promoting."

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 320, col. 815. Cf., however, the report in *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 13, 1937, that Lord Halifax, acting Foreign Secretary, told Ambassador von Ribbentrop on February 11, that Britain "cannot hold out any hopes that transfers of mandates will be feasible." "Our Diplomatic Correspondent" goes on to say that apart from the strategic question, "it would be impossible, under present conditions, to secure the approval of public opinion in this country."

ment of my Noble Friend remains the policy of His Majesty's Government, and I have nothing whatever to add to that reply." ²¹⁶

There were two interesting reactions to these declarations. Mr. Duncan Sandys, who had been told by Sir Archibald Sinclair that he had "a bee in his bonnet" in regard to the colonial question, was pleased by Lord Cranborne's answer, and asked if he knew how satisfied the country would be to learn that the Government "have not yet thought it so much as necessary to consider the matter?" ²¹⁷ On the other hand, Mr. Bellenger, disbelieving, asserted that "the Government, when they say they are not considering that question, are not quite accurate. It has been under consideration of this Government." ²¹⁸ When pressed by Mr. Emrys-Evans (C), however, he admitted he "had not the actual occasion," but asked rather pertinently how the Government otherwise would be able to answer the colonial claims. His citational failure, however, allowed Mr. Emrys-Evans to proceed, after announcing that "it is clear that we have really not been contemplating the return of the colonies." ²¹⁹ It is difficult to escape the impression that, sophistry apart, if Parliamentary memories had been longer, that is, had they recalled the Foreign Secretary's statement of July 27, 1936, Lord Cranborne and Mr. Eden might have been embarrassed, Mr. Sandys less gratified, and Mr. Bellenger triumphant.

Despite numerous questions, ²²⁰ Mr. Eden's explanation of July 27, 1936, as confirmed, or modified by his statement of

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 321, col. 211. This was in response to a question from Mr. Grenfell (Lab) asking the Government to state its response to the German claims.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1937, vol. 320, col. 816.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, March 2, 1937, vol. 321, col. 257.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, March 2, 1937, vol. 321, col. 257, 263.

²²⁰ See, *c. g.*, those by Mr. Mander, Dec. 18, 1936, *ibid.*, vol. 318, col. 2803; Lieutenant-Commander Fletcher, March 8, 1937, *ibid.*, vol. 321, col. 779; Mr. Vyvyan Adams, June 7, 1937, *ibid.*, vol. 324, col. 1426-7. The scope of inquiry of a Committee set up by the League Council to study the question

March 2, 1937, remained the official text until November, 1937, when a certain change in tone became apparent, following the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin. Invited to visit a hunting exhibition there, Lord Halifax coincidentally found it possible to call on Herr Hitler on November 19, for a talk of an hour and a half. Considerable hope was held in Britain that some tangible agreement might be reached which would allay suspicions between the two countries; there were rumors that the grant of a free hand in the East might take the Chancellor's mind off the tropics, and parallels were drawn with the Haldane Mission of 1912. Details of the conversations have been regarded by the Government as confidential, but it appears that their principal likeness to those of Haldane was their lack of tangible result.²²¹

Two days after seeing Lord Halifax, Herr Hitler declared at Augsburg that the colonies would have to be returned; that what the world shuts its ears to now, "it will have to think about in three years time, and in five or six, it will have to take into practical consideration."²²² The Lord President of the Council did not give a report of his trip, as did Sir John Simon in 1935, and there were no new references to the non-discussability of mandates. The Prime Minister, however, summed up the situation in saying that now he had a fairly clear idea of the problems to be solved before a basis for co-operation might be established in Europe. He added, referring to the Halifax journey, and without mentioning colonies specifically: "If we are to arrive at any such condition as that obviously it cannot be achieved by a bargain between two particular countries. . . . This is rather to be considered, as we would consider it, as a first step towards a general effort to

of raw materials, was made clear by Mr. Eden on March 10, 1937, in reply to a question by Sir Robert Rankin. Mr. Eden said that "Any discussion of territorial redistribution of colonies or mandated territories, or any change in their administration, is entirely precluded." *Ibid.*, vol. 321, col. 1131-3.

²²¹ See dispatches of Frederick T. Birchall and Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., in *New York Times*, Nov. 12-21, 1937, for comment and description.

²²² *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1937.

arrive at what has sometimes been called a general settlement, to arrive at a position, in fact, when reasonable grievances may be removed, when suspicions may be laid aside, and when confidence may again be restored.”²²³

This statement characterized the new trend in British policy toward Germany—that of actively seeking methods of appeasement, which was associated with Mr. Chamberlain. There was no denial here that the colonial problem was being considered; there was rather the implication that it, along with other outstanding issues, would receive attention in an effort, with other countries, to reach a general settlement. Indeed, on November 30, Mr. Chamberlain read in the House the terms of a communiqué issued after his conversations with MM. Chautemps and Delbos in London, in which it was stated that “a preliminary examination was made of the colonial question in all its aspects,” and the conclusion was reached that “it required much more extended study.”²²⁴ Consideration was thus already being given to the problem, and it would be continued. What Mr. Shinwell (Lab.) called as late as December 1, 1937, the “somewhat ambiguous” policy of the Government,²²⁵ was now taking shape, at least in the sense that the “colonial problem” was admittedly being studied. Subsequent questioners learned from Mr. Chamberlain only that he had nothing to add to the “previous statements on this subject made on behalf of His Majesty’s Government.”²²⁶

²²³ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, Dec. 21, 1937, vol. 330, col. 1804-5. Mr. Winston Churchill approved of the Prime Minister’s declaration, saying that the “restoration of war conquests” would be discussed by Britain if the other countries which made such conquests would join in discussions on equal terms. *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1937, vol. 330, col. 1834-5.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 329, col. 1877.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 329, col. 2043-4.

²²⁶ Reply to question by Mr. Mander, *ibid.*, March 1, 1938, vol. 332, col. 913-14. Cf. Mr. Chamberlain’s statement on March 16, 1938 that he had not changed his view that the colonial question could be considered only in cooperation with other countries. *Ibid.*, vol. 333, col. 410-11. Mr. Mander’s question referred to Herr Hitler’s speech of February 20, before the Reichstag, in which the Chancellor said that the demand for the former colonies would

Deterred neither by Mr. Eden's resignation on February 20, 1938, nor by rumors of dissatisfaction within the Conservative Party's ranks, Mr. Chamberlain expressed his determination to press on toward European appeasement. Throughout 1938, however, there was no opportunity for discussion of the question of mandatory transfer. The conquest of Austria,²²⁷ and the partition of Czechoslovakia dominated the diplomatic arena; and the renewal of the more obviously brutal forms of anti-Semitism in November augmented the ranks of those in Britain who denounced any plan for placing African non-Aryans in Herr Hitler's care.

While Mr. Chamberlain said that it was his "prime duty to strain every nerve to avoid repetition of the great war in Europe," he was no pacifist; for he said in the same speech, that "if our liberties are in danger again and if we are sure there is no other way of preserving them except by war, we would fight again."²²⁸ The Prime Minister, no less than Mr. Eden, had his limits of forbearance, but he set his boundaries of peaceful change farther out into the unsurveyed wilderness of concessions than some of his colleagues were willing to drive their stakes. Mr. Eden halted on the other side of the Italian Accord, and Mr. Duff Cooper stopped short before Munich. In his dramatic speech in the House of Commons just before the Munich Conference, Mr. Chamberlain's words apparently implied that at one point in the negotiations, he had himself reached the limit of pacific dealings.

grow stronger from year to year. Text in New York *World-Telegram*, Feb. 21, 1938. Cf. comment of *Daily Telegraph* of Feb. 21, as quoted in *New York Times* of the following day: "It will be interesting to note how that declaration impresses the small but indefatigable clique which is pressing for a 'settlement' with Germany at all costs, regardless not only of British interest, but even of British dignity."

227 Mr. Chamberlain informed Mr. Henderson (Lab) on March 16, 1938, just after the Austrian coup, that, with regard to the colonial question: "Obviously, in present circumstances, nothing further can be done in that direction . . ." *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, vol. 333, col. 411.

228 Speech before a Conservative Party rally at Kettering, July 2, 1938, *New York Times*, July 3, 1938.

On September 25, after the Czech rejection of the Godesberg terms, the French Government informed the British Government that France would "fulfill her treaty obligations" if Czechoslovakia were attacked, and "we said that if, as a result of these negotiations, the French forces became actively engaged, we should be pledged to support them."²²⁹ At Munich, however, he had recovered from the shock of Godesberg, and was able to agree to terms for Czechoslovakia which were only slightly less onerous than those he lately had rejected, and which, when implemented, were much worse.²³⁰

After Munich, the stand of the Government on the general question of concessions to Germany, like that of public opinion, became gradually stiffer. As has been noted above,²³¹ Mr. Chamberlain insisted upon the need for continued rearmament at the same time that he defended appeasement. This insistence changed the former emphasis upon the policy of appeasement so that the post-Munich development was in the direction of what the *Times* as late as February 23, 1939, was able to call the "twin policies of armament and appeasement."

The increased attention to rearmament was apparently thought to demand an explanation, in view of the allegedly pacifying character of the Munich "settlement," and the first attempt at justification was a curious argument by Sir Samuel Hoare at Clacton-on-Sea on October 20, 1938. "Herr Hitler believes in the peaceful aspirations of Mr. Chamberlain, but he fears some possible successor in office. I believe in Herr

²²⁹ *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1938. This last phrase might not satisfy a drafter of alliances, but, assuming a modicum of goodwill, the inference is clear.

²³⁰ See, however, the speech by Mr. Robert H. Bernays, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health, in which Mr. Bernays rebuked Herr Hitler for the anti-British tone of his Saarbrücken speech, and said that "Never in our history has it been more necessary for Great Britain to demonstrate that while she is willing to strain every nerve for European settlement there is a line from which no threats, however formidable, will cause her to retreat." *New York Times*, October 13, 1938. It is supposed that Mr. Bernays here reflected Mr. Chamberlain's views.

²³¹ P. 118.

Hitler's peaceful aspirations, but, like Herr Hitler, I must be prepared for some successor who may not hold his views. This is the reason why, in the interests of peace, I attach such vital importance to the need for national strength. The very condition of future peace is British strength."²³²

Without following this reason for rearmament, the need was shortly afterward emphasized by Lord Halifax and Mr. Chamberlain. Lord Halifax characteristically said that it was necessary to pass through the Purgatory of armed peace to reach the Paradise of the true peace,²³³ and Mr. Chamberlain stated in the House that "our sole concern is to see that this country and her imperial communications are safe, and that we shall not be so weak relatively to other countries that our diplomacy cannot enter upon discussions upon an equal footing."²³⁴

British preoccupation with rearmament gave rise to the statement by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that "we are astonished that the first answer to the spirit of Munich took the form of the slogan: 'Peace is saved, therefore arm to the utmost.'"²³⁵ Specific notice of German remarks of this kind was taken by Mr. Chamberlain in a debate on foreign policy in the House on December 19, 1938, in a manner which showed that he had moved some distance from his Munich and pre-Munich attitude on appeasement. After admitting that "in the post-War period the treatment of the

²³² *Times*, Oct. 21, 1938. The *Times* editorially approved this speech, Oct. 21, 1938. It would be interesting to know whether Sir Samuel Hoare adapted this argument from the very similar line followed by The Earl of Glasgow in the House of Lords, on Oct. 5, 1938. *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 110, cols. 1473-5.

²³³ Speech at Edinburgh, Oct. 24, 1938, *Times*, Oct. 25, 1938.

²³⁴ Reported in *Times*, Nov. 2, 1938.

²³⁵ Speech in Berlin at the Annual Dinner of the Association of the Foreign Press, Nov. 7, 1938. *Times*, Nov. 8, 1938. After referring to efforts of agitators against Germany in the African press, he added, perhaps without knowledge of the above-quoted speeches: "Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax have with wise insight given a clear rebuke to all these English war agitators and their endeavours to drive the nations apart."

German people was neither generous nor wise," a remark which was greeted with general approval, he indicated his desire for peace with Germany. However, "it takes two to make an agreement just as it takes two to make a war, and I am still waiting for a sign from those who speak for the German people that they share this desire and that they are prepared to make their contribution to the peace which would help them as much as it would help us. To reproach us with going on with rearmament after Munich is strangely to ignore the facts which are patent to all."²³⁶ This "waiting for a sign" attitude was maintained until the annexation of Czechoslovakia, which was hardly the kind of token officially contemplated.²³⁷

With regard to the colonial question in particular, the post-Munich official declarations showed more determination than formerly to resist German demands. In November, 1938, Mr. Chamberlain was willing to say merely that the issue "could not be considered in isolation," and he referred to his declaration of November 30, 1937.²³⁸ But on December 7, Mr.

²³⁶ *Times*, Dec. 20, 1938. Cf. his Birmingham Speech, *Times*, Jan. 30, 1939. See the report in the *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1939, that "Britain's rearmament is viewed in official quarters here [Berlin] as a sad commentary on that mutual confidence that it was thought had been instilled at Munich and as an apparent attempt to undermine this confidence." Cf. article by "Augur," *ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1939, stating that "Chancellor Adolf Hitler has caused to be conveyed to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain through a reliable channel his pained surprise at the extent of British armaments."

²³⁷ See speech by Mr. Chamberlain in the House, reported in the *Times*, Feb. 1, 1939, and speech by Lord Halifax at Hull reported in *New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1939. Lord Halifax emphasized the strength of British rearmament.

²³⁸ *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1938. For his November, 1937 statement see above, p. 133. See also Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's statement in the House, Nov. 16, 1938, in response to pressure from Tanganyika, that the Government "are not contemplating transfer of any territories under British administration." *Times*, Nov. 17, 1938. In the same issue, a report is given of a meeting of the Tanganyika League at which was demanded "an early, open, and irrevocable declaration that Tanganyika would remain forever under the British flag." See also article by the Nairobi correspondent, "East African Future," *Times*, Dec. 9, 1938.

Chamberlain admitted, in refusing to disavow a speech by Lord De La Warr, President of the Board of Education, that "there is disappointment in many quarters at the response that the government's policy of appeasement . . . has evoked in Germany";²³⁹ and on the same day Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, made an important statement on the question of retrocession. After stating his belief that there was no section of British public opinion "which is disposed to hand over to any other country the care of any of the territories or peoples for whose government we are responsible, either as a colonial or as a mandatory power," he said: "We are not discussing this matter, we are not considering it, it is not now an issue in practical politics."²⁴⁰

This declaration did not, of course, rule out future negotiations,²⁴¹ but it implied an admission that there existed no popular support for transfer, and indicated that in any case it would be some little time, at least, before a transfer could take place.²⁴²

239 *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1938. Lord De La Warr had said of the Germans: "There is also a deep and growing feeling that we cannot satisfy them, that friendly words and friendly actions are mistaken for cowardice and that only armaments can speak effectively." *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1938.

240 The *Times*, Dec. 8, 1938. This speech was made in a general debate on the colonial question opened by Mr. Noel Baker (Lab) who moved that no redistribution of territory should be made without the inhabitants' consent, and that as part of a general settlement the mandate system should be extended to all colonies. The motion was rejected by 253 to 127, apparently because of objection to the second part. Mr. L. S. Amery asked if Mr. MacDonald would not give the same pledge for mandates as he had given in this speech for Nigeria; namely, that the Government "had no intention of considering" the transfer of Nigeria. Mr. MacDonald did not reply. Transfer, therefore remained possible, being only momentarily out of the question. Reply was made to Mr. MacDonald's statement by the *Völkischer Beobachter*, as reported in the *Times*, Dec. 9, 1938, which declared that Germany demanded "every one of her colonies from the countries which possess them."

241 Mr. Chamberlain, in reply to a question, refused to give assurance that he would obtain the approval of the House of Commons before opening any negotiations with Germany over the return of the former German colonies. *New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1938.

242 See summary account of trip around Europe by Mr. Oswald Pirow,

The impasse between Great Britain and Germany in the first two months of 1939 is clearly set forth in a dispatch from Berlin to the *Times*, February 17, 1939: "There is no evidence that Britain is disposed yet to recognize the former colonies as still being German property or that Germany is ready on her part to meet the British view that pacification connotes not only satisfaction of so-called *Lebensrechte* (vital rights) but limitation of armaments."

The colonial issue has never been critical, in a formal sense, since no demand has yet been made upon the British Government for the return of the colonies.²⁴³ It is true, of course, that the existence of diplomatic demands has not of late been the test of the critical nature of German intentions; but geographically the former colonies do not lend themselves to the procedure of the *fait accompli*, so that more traditional methods might be expected to be followed in this regard.

Outside the regular diplomatic channels, the German colonial campaign continued to gain momentum. In his speech of February 20, 1938, the Chancellor said that "Germany has no dispute with England, except over colonies," although he added that there was "not the slightest symptom indicating the possibility of any conflict."²⁴⁴ These sentiments were reiterated during the Munich crisis, when, according to Mr. Chamberlain,

South African Minister of Defence, which apparently was a failure so far as concerned a colonial arrangement. *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1938. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald said in the House that: "Neither directly nor indirectly was Mr. Pirow entitled to express the British Government's views concerning the colonial question." *Times*, Nov. 23, 1938. Mr. Pirow himself denied that during his tour he had "suggested some plan for satisfying Germany's colonial ambitions at the expense of Belgium and Portugal." *Times*, Feb. 23, 1939. General Smuts, declared that Mr. Pirow had gone to obtain defence aid in Great Britain, and he said at the same time that "We are going to defend South Africa and its vital interests, including Southwest Africa, to the uttermost." *New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1938.

²⁴³ Mr. Chamberlain replied in the negative to a question asked by Mr. Bellenger (Lab) in the House as to whether "an official request to this country had been made by Germany for a return to her of her former colonial possessions." *Times*, Dec. 13, 1938.

²⁴⁴ *New York World-Telegram*, Feb. 21, 1938.

Herr Hitler said: "There is one awkward question, the Colonies, but that is not a matter for war."²⁴⁵ After Munich, in his speech of January 30, 1939 before the Reichstag, Herr Hitler spoke in stronger terms than previously of the German need for colonies, although again he used words intended to create confidence in Britain, if not perhaps in the Netherlands. He said that there was no National Socialist "who even in his most secret thoughts has the intention of causing the British Empire any kind of difficulty."²⁴⁶ These reassurances carried no weight in view of British disillusionment concerning the Chancellor's promissory integrity.

The tone of this last speech was more sharp than formerly, because of the concentration throughout upon Germany's economic problems, and because of the implied admission that "autarchy is not enough." "The German nation must live; that means export or die," said the Chancellor. The only alternative to exports is the "extension of our nation's living space so that in our domestic economy the problem of Germany's food supplies can be solved," and this "extension" included the old German colonies. The absorption of Czechoslovakia may have deferred action in regard to the colonies, but they were not forgotten by Berlin.²⁴⁷

Even this most urgent of the Chancellor's statements of the German claim to colonies still refrained from an outright demand for territory from any nation. In spite of almost constant rumors of an impending demarche, and in spite of informal conversations and press declarations, the issue was not pressed.

There are at least two considerations which may be of some

²⁴⁵ *Parl. Deb.*, Commons, Sept. 28, 1938, vol. 339, col. 22.

²⁴⁶ *New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1939.

²⁴⁷ See, however, article by Anne O'Hare McCormick, in *New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1939, in which it is stated that "Informed Hungarians, who are vitally interested in Herr Hitler's plans, are convinced that he still clings to his original purpose of acquiring colonies in continental Europe. African colonies would satisfy national pride and prestige but nearer sources of supply are needed to save Germany from her 1918 fate."

significance in explaining the German diplomatic diffidence in this regard. In the first place, there was Herr Hitler's desire, first expressed in *Mein Kampf*, to avoid conflict with Great Britain. This aim was reflected in frequent statements by contemporary German writers on the colonial question to the effect that Germany would never go to war to regain the colonies;²⁴⁸ and in the acceptance of inferiority in the Naval Agreement of 1935. Thus one of the Chancellor's motives might have been a desire to avoid an open break with Britain which might have resulted from an outright demand for retrocession.

In the second place, the lack of colonies was politically useful. Externally, it made a handy bargaining weapon, and internally, it could be offered to the German people as a reason for economic stringency. Its effective employment in both these spheres was so valuable, indeed, that the suspicion may arise that some Germans might not have liked to part with their lack of colonies. There would then have been no claim on the British Government, and no one in England to plead that Germany was being unjustly deprived of her own. There would then have been no excuse for shifting the responsibility for the shortage of consumers' goods from governmental policy to exclusion from Africa, for it was extremely doubtful that *Kolonialgleichberechtigung* would of itself seriously have mitigated the sacrifices required by the *Vier Jahres Plan* or its successors. This is not to say, of course, that colonies would not have been accepted if offered,²⁴⁹ but it may partially explain the continuance of the home and foreign campaign of agitation for colonial restoration,²⁵⁰ while no direct pressure was being brought to bear on the British Government.

248 See, however, report by "Augur" that Baron Constantin von Neurath, then German Foreign Minister, had told M. André François Ponçet, French Ambassador to Berlin, that "the colonies question would, if necessary, be decided by the argument of force." *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1937.

249 It may be, also that the Germans were content to wait for the appeasement program to take its full course, so that the colonial fruit would fall into their lap without the effort and trouble involved in picking it.

250 See *New York Times*, Oct. 2, 1938, for appeal made in *Hamburger*

Mr. Chamberlain's accomplishments in appeasement were primarily of a negative character so far as British action was concerned. At Munich, while no stand was made on the last strong line of defence against German expansion into Central Europe, and beyond, the rôle of Great Britain was permissive rather than active. Vital British interests may have been there sacrificed, but directly, no British territory was torn apart, no British rights infringed. However, the process of standing aside, or of encouraging other countries to make their contributions to appeasement could not go on forever. While it was much easier for Englishmen to argue from Munich to Memel than from Munich to Dar-es-Salaam, the March 1939 crisis following the conquest of Czechoslovakia aroused such fear and anger even on the part of the British Government, that so far as colonies were concerned, defiance rather than appeasement characterized the British attitude. The return of Tanganyika had never appeared imminent, but after Munich the retrocession of Togo and the Cameroons was not outside the range of peaceful change, had Mr. Chamberlain received

Fremdenblatt, and *ibid.*, Nov. 9, 1938, for statement by Herr Hitler that "We are very grateful if there are statesmen in France and Great Britain who wish to live in good understanding with the German people. . . . It only remains for us to agree over colonies which were taken away from us on pretexts contrary to justice." See also article on schools in Germany for the training of future colonizers, *ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1938. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, as reported in the *Times*, Feb. 6, 1939, declared with regard to the German claim to colonies: "Either such claims are justified . . . in which case they cannot be fulfilled quickly enough, or their justification is disputed, in which case there can be only conflict and unrest in the world. That does not necessarily mean war, but it certainly does not mean peace and can end in war." See the report of a speech by General von Epp in February, 1939, in which he demanded for Germany a share of the world's territory commensurate with her position as a great power. *Empire*, April, 1939, p. 51. This "was the first time a Government spokesman had publicly expressed the Nazi standpoint that a mere return of her former African colonies would not now satisfy Germany." *Ibid.* Cf. report from Berlin in *New York Times*, June 14, 1939, that, according to a "Foreign Office source, before we could even consider taking part in a conference as suggested by English statesmen, the colonies stolen from us must be returned and an atmosphere of equality granted."

"a sign" from Herr Hitler. But it appeared that colonial concessions were completely out of the question, and would remain so until the "coalition policy" resulted either in the establishment of a new régime in Germany, or in an about-face in German foreign policy which would offer good chances for the "general settlement" so ardently desired in Britain. As the first half of 1939 came to a close, such an about-face by the *Wilhelmstrasse* was not counted on in Britain, although the Government did not deny its possibility. In a debate in the House on May 19, 1939, Mr. Attlee favored a "positive colonial policy" dependent on the "abandonment of aggression." In reply, Mr. Chamberlain agreed that in any discussion of the terms of a "settled peace," the colonial question would have to play a part; but he added that "we in this country are not prepared to buy peace at the price of concessions which will only lead to further demands—(Hear, hear.)—but surely that does not mean that we would refuse to discuss any method by which we could satisfy reasonable aspirations on the part of other nations, even if it means some adjustment of the existing state of things." However, at the moment, Mr. Chamberlain had little confidence in German good will. He noted that the German Government had stated that it had no intention of aggression against other peoples, but he declared that "the trouble is that the right hon. gentleman [Mr. Attlee] is not alone in not believing that—(Hear, hear.)—and that is a position which has been brought about by the German Government themselves. (Hear, hear.)" In conclusion, Mr. Chamberlain said that the discussion of terms of permanent peace rested not only on a renunciation of aggression by Germany, but also on the conviction in Britain "that there was no intention of aggression, or of the further use of force in the relations between Germany and other countries." ²⁵¹

²⁵¹ *Times*, May 20, 1939. In connection with these views of Mr. Chamberlain, see the dispatch by Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., in *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1939: "The real motive of 'appeasement' is the longing for peace and the fear of a war that might crack the political, economic and social structure of this country beyond repair, whether Britain won the war or

Mr. Chamberlain stopped here, leaving open the question of the means of obtaining the conviction to which he had referred. There seemed to be only two ways of getting it: either the German Government, over a long period of time, must prove by its actions that it harbored no aggressive designs, or the British Government, through rearmament and alliance, must gain such strength that it would have no fear that Germany would risk aggression. It is on the second of these policies that the British Government decided to concentrate while still insisting that the way to negotiation remained open.²⁵²

5. SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

An examination of the arguments used in Britain against the return of the colonies does not disclose any which would have had great force had there existed in 1926 the subsequent

not. Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues feel sure that the British Empire could survive a war with Germany at the cost of untold human misery; but they are not so sure that the men and the system, that have ruled this country for so many years would still be ruling it when the war was over. This is why, in spite of all indications to the contrary, the 'Munich mentality' is still a force to be reckoned with on the eve of the new diplomatic showdown in Europe."

²⁵² See, for example, speech by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords, reported in *New York Times*, June 9, 1939. The Foreign Minister said that a peaceful settlement with Germany would have to wait on "the conviction on both sides that the word of the other would be kept." However, "providing the independence of nations is recognized the British Government is not only willing but anxious to explore the whole problem of economic Lebensraum not only for Germans but for all European nations." In speaking of "economic Lebensraum" Lord Halifax made no territorial promises, and he therefore did not go far, if at all, beyond Sir Samuel Hoare's offer of September 11, 1935.

For important evidence of British opinion, see the series of letters in the *Times* begun by Alfred Duff Cooper and L. P. Jacks on May 4, 1939, and summarized by Harold Macmillan on May 22. Mr. Macmillan indicated that the general trend of the correspondence pointed to three conclusions: 1. Britain must become by every available means so strong as, with her allies, to be unassailable. 2. A conference to discuss outstanding issues might then be called. 3. Means should be found for the future anticipation of necessary modifications of the *status quo*. This is a skeleton program for the system of peaceful change discussed below.

concern over the process of peaceful change. The German Government of 1926 was weak, pacific and humane. It fulfilled admirably all the requirements later laid down by Winston Churchill for a future Germany to which concessions might be granted: "A tolerant, peaceful, liberal-minded Germany, ready to join in comradeship and good faith the comity of nations and thus resume its place in the van of civilization."²⁵³

Yet, while the Germany of 1926 formed the image of that ideal Germany with which Englishmen of 1938 said they would be eager to work hand in hand, it received no such tender of propitiation as Mr. Churchill's, whatever efforts might be made to glorify Locarno's pithy, meager fruits. There then seemed no urgency for propitiation precisely because Germany was weak and peaceful. Even as late as 1931, when the British and French countered Dr. Brüning's increasingly insistent demands by requests for greater evidence of German goodwill, a "general settlement" might have given the ailing régime a new lease of life. Dr. Brüning was still Chancellor, and he was pacifically inclined; and in spite of some slight German rearmament, Great Britain and France were still overwhelmingly superior in military strength. So soon as the need for concessions became urgent, however, the very conditions creating urgency were looked upon by France and Great Britain as reasons for refusing to grant concessions.

With the establishment of the Third *Reich*, the reasons for refusing concessions to Dr. Brüning seemed all the more applicable. At the same time no firm stand was taken to demonstrate that the threats of National Socialism would not succeed where the appeals of the Weimar coalitions had failed. It was not surprising, therefore, that Germans should develop a certain attachment to the only methods which appeared effective, first in ridding them of the inequalities imposed by the Treaty;

²⁵³ "The Colony Racket," *Collier's*, Nov. 19, 1938, p. 42. Cf. Mr. Vyvyan Adams in House of Commons, April 21, 1936, *Parl. Deb.*, vol. 311, col. 119: "In those days Germany was impotent, vanquished and democratic."

second in creating the new Greater Germany; and third in gaining a dubious *Lebensraum* in Bohemia and Moravia. The policy of appeasement was unsuccessful because it came too late. Not only had resentment been allowed to generate, but victories had been granted to resentment's arms. In consequence, the thirst for more victories was intensified rather than slaked; and in March, 1939, Chancellor Hitler slept in the Hradcany Palace despite his assurances in September 1938 that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe. This last action, both because it was inconsistent with the Munich pledge and because it betrayed ultra-Germanic ambitions, resulted in the abandonment of an ill-timed effort at conciliation.

It is not here suggested that a modification of the colonial clauses of the Versailles Treaty would in itself have saved the Weimar Republic. This discussion of the colonial problem is offered merely because it provided the raw material from which some notions of peaceful change have been developed. A comparable demonstration might also be made for the problem of armaments.²⁵⁴ Neither is it contended that, had Locarno eliminated all those provisions of the Treaty that were considered unjust in Germany, the Reichstag would still be holding regular sessions. The Third *Reich* is not to be explained solely in terms of an adamant defence of treaty provisions, although it is barely possible that with the grievances of Versailles removed, the German people, in a universal depression, might have rejected the program of the *NSDAP*.

It is contended, however, that the years from 1926 to 1931 offered an opportunity for substantive reconciliation,²⁵⁵ and that the opportunity was lost, not in full deliberation, but at

²⁵⁴ Further, the concentration herein upon British attitudes does not mean that Great Britain is necessarily more responsible than France for the failure to reach a durable agreement with pre-Nazi Germany.

²⁵⁵ "Could there ever have been a better moment to set up a collective system of cooperation than at the time when the same spirit ruled in Germany which also inspired the world around her? The time was ripe, the opportunity was there, but the will was not there!" Chancellor Hitler, speech of May 21, 1935, Berber, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

least in part by default. Since Germany's weakness made immediate concessions unnecessary, strategic considerations and the continuously pressing interests of economic groups were the decisive factors so far as the colonial question was concerned. Had there been full deliberation, at least two additional features of the situation would have been taken into account. The first of these was the possibility that Germany might again become powerful, and the second was the possible consequences of another world war, with their menace to the British imperial position. It may be said that the opportunity was lost in part by default because, while it was generally thought that peace had been organized, it was not clearly realized that peaceful change must also be organized, if the employment of war-like procedures of change was to be averted.²⁵⁶ It was not, and may not yet be realized, that there is no "general settlement" except through the admission of the impermanence of any "general settlement," and through the subsequent acceptance of principles and establishment of institutions which, by maximizing the possibility of obtaining justice and fair play, will make bearable the prospect of continuous change. Should such realization become general, however, there remain the problems of subduing the megalomaniac, and of making the beneficiaries of what may be considered anti-social vested rights and privileges, give them up in the general interest.

²⁵⁶ The next time, decisions similarly antagonistic to peace may also be made, but if, despite Hegel, men do learn from history, the choice should at least be a conscious discrimination between policies leading to amity or animosity.

CHAPTER IV

PREPARATION FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE

Internationally, the problem of the timing of peaceful changes has not so far received much attention. So long as war was considered a not unworthy and not too dangerous instrument of national policy, statesmen did not feel any vital concern over the peaceful initiation of a revision in the *status quo*. The increasingly acute fear of the common suffering attendant upon a general war, no matter who wins, shook the former indifference and gave rise to preoccupations over the assurance of peaceful change.

Before 1914 the history of what is called peaceful change might from one point of view be more appropriately labelled peaceful exchange. In many of the cases of territorial peaceful change, what was really accomplished was a trade of one piece of land for another, and in the commercial sphere most of the treaties involved mutual concessions. After 1920, however, the desire to avoid war, even a probably victorious one, so greatly increased, at least in France and Great Britain, that the stakes of peaceful change themselves underwent alteration, so that the view was occasionally expressed that concessions should be made merely with the hope thereby of averting or at least indefinitely postponing a war. For example, protests against any prospective renewal of the payment of "Dane-geld", provide evidence that the issue was being defined.¹ The existence of such a trend indicated a certain hardening of the intentions of both sides and at Munich the bald question was posed: "Is this change going to be made peacefully or are you going to fight to try to prevent it?"

¹ The *Manchester Guardian* of Oct. 15, 1936 quotes Viscount Cecil as follows: "I am a little tired of making concessions to countries, and particularly to Germany, when the only result is a demand for further concessions." Cf. Professor S. Brodetzky, on the "law of the bully," in the *Times*, Jan. 7, 1937.

A second element of elasticity in the pre-1914 world was the relatively low level of customs tariffs. The maintenance of free trade by Great Britain for herself and the Empire was of great significance, for even though the major share in the imperial trade fell to British merchants, the mere fact of formal freedom in the Crown Colonies made it impossible for other nations to lay charges against British "monopoly". The raising of tariffs following the war by the succession states and others including the United States, and the worldwide adoption of measures restrictive of trade during the depression, gave rise to the opinion that there should be a return to policies which would permit the regaining of the former volume of world traffic. The United States Government, under the impetus provided by Secretary Hull, has endeavored to make progress in this direction by means of the foreign trade agreements.

This problem is by no means purely economic, for the theory of *der totale Krieg* aroused the fear that in war a nation will be no stronger than its capacity to resist a blockade, or efforts to blockade it; and the theoretical structures built upon the rational choice of the economic man cannot be used to defend free trade against the assaults of the nationalist, or predatory man.² A return to freer trade, like a beginning of peaceful change, depends upon the growth of confidence, and it cannot be expected to occur in conditions of common suspicion. Whatever the hopes of Cobden, the maintenance of a free trade policy by Great Britain in the last half of the nineteenth century was made possible by British commercial and naval superiority; and it is significant that Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for protection came at a time when German enterprise was beginning to endanger British dominance, and that later the Ottawa system was put into force

² Cf. Adam Smith: "As defence, however, is much more important than opulence, the Act of Navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England." Quoted in J. A. Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion* (London, Macmillan, 1922), p. 470.

when American and Japanese competition was becoming alarmingly keen. The states engaged in any conflict of course require the "economic sinews" of war, and where the fear of war is great, the sharing of economic advantages is as improbable as the giving up of any other strategically superior position.³ The confidence which has already been described as being a prerequisite to the permanence of a process of peaceful change in a political sense, is also necessary to the accomplishment of the economic changes required in a return to free trade.

A third source of pre-1914 flexibility in international affairs which made unnecessary a conscious effort toward the timing of peaceful change was the considerable shifting of people from one state to another. The results of this freedom of movement, which consisted mainly of a flow of Europeans to the Americas, Africa, and Australia, are difficult to assess in terms of pressures which were relieved, because it is hard to say what might have happened had the migrations not taken place. It is clear, however, that protests are now being made that opportunities of migration, particularly to the United States and to the Dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations, are largely closed, and proposals for expansion are being based upon these charges of exclusion. The defence of those states which have erected barriers to immigration is that their fertility and their economic structures will not permit the influx of large numbers of people with any assurance of the maintenance of the existing standards of life. There are, of course, additional reasons based on racial differences, particularly as between Orientals, and North or South Americans and Australians.⁴ Although its precise effect as a safety valve

3 Attention has here been given primarily to tariffs, although claims were made, particularly in Germany, that access to raw materials had been curtailed. In general, however, this question of access is mainly a question of exchange arising from the existence of foreign tariffs, which limited German exports, and from the specialized uses to which the German Government decided to devote its available stock of foreign exchange.

4 There may be political objections also, particularly in connection with

cannot be known, it is probable that freedom of migration provided an element of elasticity in pre-war Europe, which will have to be compensated for in some other fashion if peaceful changes in the future are to be safeguarded. The days of free mass migration appear to be over,⁵ and the problems of commercial freedom will be solved only with the resolution of the general question of peaceful change. The primary significance of this development is that the timing of changes, economic and demographic, has, to an increasing extent, become an issue in the maintenance of peace.

The reduction in the number and scope of the automatically functioning spheres of peaceful change renders more than ever vital the problem of the conscious timing of changes in relation to the creation of confidence. For, so long as some of the continuous changes in the conditions of human life were permitted to run their course as though national boundaries did not exist, they, so to speak, timed themselves. There was no need for the creation of committees or institutes for the timing of these movements. Men left their native heaths in pursuit of economic advantage or freedom from military service or for adventure, but their actions depended upon their own individual judgments and not upon concerted calculations of the relationship of population to food supply. The evidence of "overpopulation" following the potato famine in Ireland was the arrival of thousands of Irish in the United States in the eighteen-forties; and the fact that the transfer was unrestricted made the timing of special arrangements for its occurrence unnecessary.

The timing of changes in the balance of trade was accomplished through the mechanism of the gold points in the heyday of the gold standard; and while the process depended

the organization of Germans abroad in such a way that their loyalty to their state of residence may in fact be compromised by the demands of their country of origin, even though they may not have been born in Germany.

5 Cf. Isaiah Bowman (ed.), *Limits of Land Settlement* (N. Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), Introduction. Exception must be made here for the enforced migration of Jews.

upon the decisions of men, these decisions followed well-recognized rules of self-interest, and there was no need for the system to be managed. However, now that immigration is being regulated, and trade is being controlled through the setting up of exchange restrictions and other devices, the change of these policies requires the conscious decision of a branch of a national government in relation to the question of peaceful change, because upon their nature depends the issue of whether or not the limits of peaceful change will be exceeded. The making of changes in policy is a more difficult process, and one which results in fewer modifications in practice than the earlier systems of automatic adjustment through the operation of motives of self-interest. A whole series of political pressures has to be set in motion in making deliberate decisions, but in the days when regulation was unnecessary, the following of a few unquestioned lines of action sufficed to complete the change.

More important, however, is the consideration that when control supersedes *laissez faire*, and the operation of "natural forces" is replaced by the "social will," the new system may be managed upon principles that may have little contact with the forces which formerly were effective in creating changes. Thus, when immigration was not limited, "overpopulation" was satisfied by movement of people from one state to another. The reasons for limiting immigration are concerned with racial questions, the maintenance of wages, or, more directly and with regard to the United States, the presumed voting strength of the American Federation of Labor. This restriction, however, probably has little effect upon birthrates in Japan or Italy; and if these and other states find their stocks of foreign exchange at a low level because of tariffs which are raised for similar reasons of national advantage, their citizens may be encouraged to desperate actions by the use of arguments exploiting the discrimination practiced against them by the policy of other powers.⁶

6 This does not mean to offer any condonation of the expansionist tactics

Not only is the timing of changes in policy to meet economic and doctrinal variations the crucial aspect of peaceful change, but the need for the development of planned methods of timing to replace the freedoms of yesteryear is steadily increasing. There are two stages in the organization of peaceful change. The first, which has been discussed earlier, requires the creation of confidence by a series of concessions on the part of those who, possessing power, are satisfied that a concession will not vitally weaken their position; and who expect that appeasement will be the consequence of their action. This is the easier part of the program to be accomplished, since it envisages solutions for existing disputes whose nature is fully known. Nations, even more than children, are afraid of the dark; and their consent is much more readily obtained to a concessionary deal with which they are cognizant, than for an agreement to make undefined changes under imprecise conditions in an ill-lit future.

The second stage in the program for peaceful change, however, demands the completion of such an agreement. The changes will remain undefined, the future will not be illuminated, but the nature of the conditions of change will be made precise. Over a period of time the process of peaceful change must be regularized. This implies that, while the nature of future substantive modifications remains unknown, the methods of change will be clearly laid down. The methods themselves may also, of course, be recast from time to time, as the effective realization of the basic principles may require. What are these basic principles? It is axiomatic that the government of no one state shall have the right to make decisions for all. There must be participation in the judgments reached, but how is it to be organized? What will be the "equitable" exercise

of Italy or Japan, nor is it implied that actual population pressure or lack of raw materials prompted these outbursts. It merely suggests that the adoption of restrictive policies by other nations may provide those who wish to indulge in imperial adventures with arguments which are useful, when adopted for propaganda purposes, in gaining the support of their citizenry.

of the power which will presumably be brought to the support of such judgments?⁷

As has already been suggested, the general end toward which attention should be directed is the provision for all men of satisfying conditions of living. The phrase "all men" is here employed deliberately. It is meant to be all-inclusive and to avoid the use of such collective nouns as "race" or "nation" or "group." For, when the maintenance of the power, or prestige, or even the existence of a nation is held to be pre-eminently desirable, then the prospects of peaceful change are minimized. It is only when no types of organization are held sacred that the regularity of peaceful transitions is assured; and therefore the criterion of equity should be sought in other terms than those which require the perpetuation of associational forms. This need not imply that nations must lose their identity, or that national cultures must perish from the earth. Diverse groups, diversely organized, may live side by side in peace and amity if they are willing to place their mutual well-being before the exclusive interest of any of their number. It should be clear to all those who take a stand for peaceful change that they are playing with dynamite. If there is to be any process of peaceful change permanently established, it will come through some form of worldwide procedures, and no institution or tradition will be immune from alteration. On the other hand, of course, such establishment offers, not a guarantee, but merely the greatest chance of maintaining peace. Peace comes high, in terms of changes, and its price should not be minimized.

One disastrous way of minimizing the price of peace is to concentrate on the maintenance of peace as such. However desirable the keeping of the peace may be, men will at times be willing to fight for, say, greater equality in the distribution of wealth, or freedom of religious expression. In such cases the preaching of "peace" or "unity" will go unheard, and an interest in peace will return only with general satisfaction

⁷ See above, p. 40.

over the outcome of the struggle. As has been suggested earlier, peace, while occasionally significant in the reaching of a judgment, is mainly the evidence of popular approbation of a given social order. Thus, while the desirability of peace may be constantly advocated, there must be no neglect of the process of change necessary to ensure continued approbation. The greatest surety for peace is a steady process of reform, and in view of past dereliction in this regard, it would be well to concentrate upon timely reform within the limits above mentioned, and trust that peace will emerge therefrom. These principles are applicable to political development within each state as well as to that between states. Indeed, since the sources of nationalism are found within the states, efforts at reform must be directed at those national economic institutions and those traditions and prejudices which tend to make difficult the timing of the required modifications of interstate relations. This serves to reemphasize the inclusiveness of the obligations incurred by an advocate of peaceful change, which, like charity, begins at home.

There are, then, two essential prerequisites for the setting up of any procedures by which a continuous process of international peaceful change may be carried on. There must exist confidence between the members of the various groups that such changes as are made will not harm the interests which they deem vital; and those interests must be redefined so that they do not include, as vital, the doctrines peculiar to political or economic nationalism.

The accomplishment of this second condition is imperative, not because the people of different states distrust each other individually, but because the advancement of the prestige and power of one state is held to be desirable even at the expense of the nationals of other states. The democratic process abhors an absolute, with the exception of course of the essential elements of its own system. Each nation state of today is commonly regarded by its citizens as possessing absolute value; and so long as national interests are equated with economic

exclusiveness and political power, peaceful changes may be expected to alternate with those of warlike nature. Peaceful change is by no means, therefore, a problem of international politics alone, since it waits upon changes, whether peaceful or not, within the various states, the result of which will be a moderation of present nationalist fervor. These intrastate changes, which are of primary importance, will have to be far-reaching. It is possible, for example, that the industrial system as we know it may be incompatible with peaceful change, and exponents of peaceful change should realize fully both the implications of their position in this regard, and the enormity of the difficulties in their way.

The redefinition of vital interests referred to above means, in general terms, the renunciation by governments of the right of independent decision in regard to national policies affecting the interests of other states. In specific terms, this means, for example, that tariff and immigration policies must, in a system of peaceful change, be determined on the basis of the welfare of all men, and not according to the advantages of a few. Such a requirement is clearly incompatible with political and economic nationalism, and therefore with the whole of what has come to be called the "Western State System." An analysis of the question: "Does capitalism cause war?" is outside the scope of this study, but to the extent that nationalism is fostered by a given economic system, that system must be attacked, peacefully, by partisans of peaceful change. In this direction the upper and nether limits of peaceful change are not very far apart, and their pacific expansion is now seriously in question.

Assuming the satisfaction of the two prerequisites mentioned above (p. 156), there remains the question of appropriate procedures for the accurate timing of peaceful changes. Complaints will be chronic, and the collective ear must thereto be inclined. This presents no trouble, for even today attitudes of diplomatic deafness cannot long be held. The strident international amplification of grievance has become a success-

ful technique, at the same time that its domestic counterpart has here and there been muffled to a sporadic whisper. Protests can not fail to be heard; but how will they find responsive listeners? Just now they evoke concern in proportion as they are supported by armed strength. In a scheme of peaceful change, however, another mode of determining the effect to be given to a protest must be devised. If armed strength is not to be recognized as a suitable indicator of the validity of a protest, a substitute must be found, since protests go on forever.

The only substitute for force as a criterion of the validity of a claim is a judgment between different opinions, emerging from verbal disputation.⁸ Such judgment need not always be intelligent, since it may be modified, nor must it be reached in a strictly rational manner. The question that is important is: "Whose is the judgment?" Are all men to participate, or only a few, or one? If the aim be the most accurate possible timing of peaceful change, then universal participation comparable to that existing within democratic states is desirable in the formation of decisions. On the basis of universal suffrage and in accordance with the doctrine of majority rule, representative bodies decide upon changes to be made in policy and organization. The balloting system thus decides two issues at once: it points out the general line of policy which most men prefer to have followed, and it starts the process by which that policy will be carried out. This simultaneous choosing of policy and timing of its application upon the basis of the wishes of the people constitute the elements of democratic method which particularly fit it for the purposes of those who would bring peaceful development to international relations. It is not absolutely necessary that the electorate consist of all men, but it must include all powerful men, and those who might in the proximate future attain such power as, coupled with resent-

⁸ There are, of course, other conceivable tests such as trial by water or by fire, or those of the oracular variety, but they hardly demand serious consideration here.

ment, could persuade them to risk revolt. It is the frequently surprising upsurge of this latter group which makes universality the better part of democracy when peaceful change is contemplated; for those who have gained a place within the system will be less apt to destroy it than those who from the beginning have been forced to adopt extra-legal tactics in the furtherance of their cause.⁹

In effect, this requires a world state of some kind, probably federal in form. The idea of the world state has not been popular among students of international relations. The great hopes placed in the League of Nations kept the world state in the far background, and the valuable work done through the League of Nations appeared for a time to make it unnecessary. The decline in the use of the League of Nations, however, and growing interest in peaceful change have brought the world state into discussion, if not into the sphere of probable application. There remain sufficient, if dwindling, examples of democratic political systems in which the process of peaceful change is carried on, so that the essential pattern of the world state need not be created *de novo*, and thus the conception need not be too frightening to future peace conferences. However far from a world state we may now be, the problem of accurate timing requires its existence if a system of peaceful change is to be given its fullest development.

The essential conditions for the establishment of procedures

⁹ For more precise suggestions on the organization of peaceful change, see Sir John Fischer Williams, *International Change and International Peace* (London, Oxford U. Press, 1932). See also the collection of essays called *Peaceful Change* (London, Macmillan, 1937) edited by C. A. W. Manning, in which members of the staff of the London School of Economics discuss various aspects of the problem, particularly the one by H. Lauterpacht. *The Future of the League of Nations*, the record of discussions at Chatham House in 1936, includes the reflections of a number of prominent Englishmen on the problems of peaceful change. Cf. Frederick S. Dunn, *Peaceful Change* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), who suggests the formation of committees in each country which will study and make suggestions concerning interstate relations which might with advantage be modified.

of peaceful change do not exist at the present time, and there is no imminent prospect of their appearance. The acceptance of decisions by electoral methods requires the confidence of the possible members of the minority that they will receive fair treatment from the majority. If the loss of the election means the loss of his head, no fearful minoritarian can be expected to give up his *liberum veto*. In international affairs, patriots fear that the loss of an election, or on occasion, an adverse arbitral judgment may cause grievous injury to their country; and there are therefore not many categories of justiciable disputes and almost no instances of majority determination of questions of substance.

The lack of conditions requisite to a system of peaceful change does not imply that any particular conflict is inevitable, but merely that there will be conflicts. The scope of the necessary conditions further suggests that any proposals for colonial redistribution or other measures of economic or psychological appeasement are proposals for peaceful change only in the preliminary sense that they might conduce to the growth of confidence. However, supposing their completion possible, the problem of establishing principles for the planning of future changes would remain untouched. Confidence must not only be created, but its maintenance must be assured. Planning for the mutual meeting of future contingencies of economic depression or of ideological vagaries is the condition for continuous confidence. We cannot expect that after war, there will be confidence between victor and vanquished. It will have to be created by concession and then be maintained by a continuous series of mutual adjustments, if peaceful change be the aim.

The limits of peaceful change will not disappear in the future, even after the establishment of a system for making changes. Against the ambition of some adventurer, the unreasoning protest of some persuasive fanatic, or the stubborn resistance of a privileged group, the methods of peaceful change themselves may one day have to be defended in armed combat if

they are to survive. But even if, in the last trench, the means of perpetuating peaceful relationships must by physical force be upheld, such resort to violence would not fall among the least worthy of martial efforts.

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